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Electricity prices are characterized by high volatility and severe price spikes. At
the root of these phenomena is the strategic behavior of market participants. A
good understanding of the market competition is key to making better regulation,
contract, and investment decisions. The goal of this thesis is to study the following
market competition problems: (1) the competition between flexible generators with
fast ramping rates and inflexible generators with constant production rates, (2) the
effect of the renewable generation penetration and production based subsidies on
the competition and operating efficiency, (3) generation competition in transmission
constrained networks, and (4) competition in the capacity expansion of electricity
networks.
We first consider a centralized electricity model and find that reducing the produc-
tion based subsidies to renewable plants dampens their intermittency effect through
controlled curtailment, cuts operational cost, and improves the system’s balance. We
then consider an oligopoly in which generators submit supply function bids and ana-
lyze a Supply Function Equilibrium (SFE) model with generators that have different
xi
ramping rates. We find that the controlled curtailment of renewables has an addi-
tional benefit in oligopolistic markets as it can reduce generator market power, which
has favorable operational efficiency and electricity price ramifications. We also find
that the classical SFE model is inadequate for modeling renewables and inflexible
generators, and can grossly overestimate the competition intensity. We modify the
SFE model to account for these issues. Afterwards, a Bertrand model is used to
study the duopoly competition in a transmission constrained network. We find that
adding transmission constraints in this model does not change the bidding policy,
instead it changes the critical demand levels at which firms revise their position from
competitive to aggressive bidding. We also solve the symmetric mixed strategy Nash
equilibrium problem for multiple generators in a Bertrand electricity auction. Fi-
nally, we study several transmission expansion schemes and devise two investment




Four decades ago, electricity markets around the globe were either government
owned and operated or operated as a regulated monopoly. After the oil crisis of the
70’s, many governments saw the need to shift to a decentralized competitive electricity
market structure. The earliest market decentralization took place in Chile in the
1980s, followed by Argentina and other Latin American countries. It was not until the
early 1990’s that the UK and other commonwealth countries started the deregulation
process, followed by other European countries. Some US states started decentralizing
their electricity markets in the late 1990’s, but others had reservations especially
after the California electricity crisis in the turn of the century. The decentralization
mechanisms varied by region and were influenced by many factors such as the market
and the power grid structures.
An electricity system consists of generators that consume energy and incur other
costs to produce electricity, and a network that transmits the electrical power to the
end users. In a centralized electricity system, the government operates or heavily
regulates the network and generation sectors. In such a setting, a single entity has
complete control over all generation and network assets, and operates the system
to maximize the overall benefit to society. In a decentralized electricity market,
multiple profit maximizing firms own the electricity generators. However, the power
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transmission and distribution network is recognized as a natural monopoly (Hogan
(1992)) and continues to be managed by a single independent agent. This is partly
due to the nature of power networks, where hard network constraints must hold for
the effective and healthy operation of the system.
It is the responsibility of an Independent System Operator (ISO) to coordinate
electricity dispatch while satisfying the network’s constraints as well as maintaining
other reliability measures. Network constraints entail achieving electricity balance
and abiding by capacity limits while accounting for power losses in the network. ISOs
are also responsible for satisfying the random demand fluctuation and are required
to sustain excess electricity reserves for reliable operations. In centralized electricity
systems, the ISO is also responsible for the efficient dispatch of electricity from gen-
erators to users. Schweppe et al. (1988) classify the different economic factors that
affect electricity dispatch and derive spot prices for electricity at every node in the
network that satisfy necessary and sufficient conditions for electric dispatch optimal-
ity. The spot prices are determined by generator marginal costs, network congestions,
and transmission power losses.
With the decentralization of electricity systems, markets need to adopt electricity
contracts and reflect accurate locational prices. The loop flow phenomenon, electric-
ity flows through the paths of least resistance in the network, makes it impossible
to specify a contract path between two nodes in a complex network. To resolve
this issue, Hogan (1992) uses the spot pricing idea to introduce contract networks
and transmission rights. Chao and Peck (1996) extends the concept of transmission
rights to account for network externalities in electricity contracts. Variants of these
decentralization mechanisms have been widely implemented. Today, most of the elec-
tricity trades in decentralized markets either take place over contract agreements or
through the electricity spot market.
Private generating firms participating in the electricity market submit supply
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function bids to the ISO. These supply functions convey the electricity rate the firms
are willing to produce for every market price. The ISO essentially treats these bids
as generator cost functions and sets electricity dispatch schedules with the minimum
costs to customers. To maximize their profits, generating firms typically submit bids
that exceed their true marginal operating costs. Generating firms may also collude
or exercise market power to raise electricity prices.
To protect customers from high and volatile prices, the ISO may exercise a variety
of regulatory actions such as price ceilings and other bidding restrictions. Large
customers, electricity retailers, and generating firms can also purchase a portfolio
of electricity contracts and options to hedge against the highly volatile electricity
prices. Although high prices can be attributed to a variety of sources, such as large
capital investments and expensive fuel costs, the high price volatility and price spikes
are often caused by generators exercising market power when strategic opportunities
arise, such as demand peaks, supply shortages, or network congestion. To make better
regulation and contract decisions, regulators and other entities need to have a good
understanding of the market competition.
Most of the generating firms’ strategic behavior models fall under three categories:
Cournot competition, Bertrand competition, and SFE. Generating firms are assumed
to bid production quantity offers in a Cournot model, price bid offers in a Bertrand
model, and production-price pair offers in a SFE model. The Cournot model is
typically the easiest to solve among the three, but can be inaccurate, while the SFE
model is the most difficult to handle but the most representative among the three. In
this thesis, the Bertrand and the SFE models will be used to study the competition
in the electricity market.
The goal of this thesis is to study the following market competition problems: (1)
the competition between flexible generators with fast ramping rates and inflexible
generators with constant production rates, (2) the effect of the renewable genera-
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tion penetration and production based subsidies on the competition and operating
efficiency, (3) generation competition in transmission constrained networks, and (4)
competition in the capacity expansion of electricity networks.
The impact of the renewable generation on centralized electricity systems is stud-
ied in Chapter II, and their combined impact along with generation inflexibility on the
market competition is then studied in Chapter III using a SFE model. In this chap-
ter, a Nash equilibrium for the competition is found using a linear SFE model. This
problem is studied again in Chapter IV but with a focus on the high demand daytime
market. Under such a scenario, the set of differential equations that characterize the
SFE become easier to solve, and a more general solution can be attained.
In Chapter V, a Bertrand model is used to study the duopoly competition in
a transmission constrained network. A symmetric Mixed Strategy Nash Equilib-
rium (MSNE) for the multiple generator problem is then solved using the Bertrand
competition model. Afterwards, network transmission investment models are studied
in Chapter VI. In this chapter, several transmission expansion schemes are considered
in which profit maximizing firms expand the network to gain transmission rent. Two
mechanisms that achieve social optimality and near social optimality are presented in
this chapter. Finally, Chapter VII concludes this thesis followed by Appendices with
supporting material.
For convenience, the following operators will be used throughout the chapters:
a+ = max{a, 0}, a ∧ b = min{a, b}, a ∨ b = max{a, b}, and the indicator function
1{A} = 1 if event A is true and 0 if A is false. In addition, the convention
∑b
i=a xi = 0
for integers a > b is used.
4
CHAPTER II
Using Controlled Curtailment for Integrating
Intermittent Renewable Generation in Electricity
Systems
2.1 Introduction
The rapidly expanding renewable technology capacity in electricity systems is
motivated by environmental, sustainability, and independence considerations. About
20% of the world’s electricity production in 2011 came from renewable energy sources,
and about 5% of which from non-hydroelectric plants1. According to Renewable
Energy Policy Network for the 21st Century (REN21) (2013), wind, solar photovoltaic
(PV), and concentrating solar thermal power (CSP) generation are the fastest growing
renewable technologies with capacity growth rates averaging 26%, 58%, and 37% from
2006 through 2011 to reach a total of 310 GW by the end of 2011. In the United
State, non-hydroelectric renewable generation has increased by 110% from 1999 to
2010, with an installed capacity expansion from about 16 GW to about 54 GW in
the same period (EIA, 2010). In fact, in the 2012 renewable electricity futures study,
Hand et al. (2012) concluded that 80% of the United State’s electricity demand can be
supplied by renewable generation by 2050. Many other countries have set ambitious
1Renewable Energy Policy Network for the 21st Century (REN21) (2013).
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renewable portfolio targets according to REN21 (2013). The report predicts that
renewables would make 50-80% of the global electricity generation by 2050.
To meet these targets and promote their technological development, many coun-
tries have introduced various forms of governmental subsidies and tax incentives, such
as direct grants, production tax credits (PTC) that entitle renewable plants to reduced
federal income taxes based on their production rates, investment tax credits (ITC)
that entitle renewable plants to reduced federal income taxes based on their capi-
tal investments, Feed-In-Tariffs (FIT) that guarantee electricity purchase from the
renewable plants at fixed prices, Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPS) that require
customers to purchase a portion of their electricity demand from renewable plants,
and carbon cap-and-trade that prompts customers to purchase electricity from clean
sources because of emission allowances. There have been numerous studies compar-
ing the effectiveness of the renewable subsidy schemes (Fischer and Newell (2008);
Menanteau et al. (2003); Neuhoff (2005); Palmer and Burtraw (2005)). Despite the
renewable generation virtues and governmental promotional efforts, there have been
some obstacles to their widespread. The main impediment to the renewable inte-
gration initiative is the intermittent nature of some renewable technologies, such as
wind, solar, and ocean tidal power. To distinguish between these technologies and
other non-intermittent renewable technologies, such as hydroelectric and biomass, we
refer to the intermittent technologies as variable generation (VG) technologies.
Intermittent generation can cause scheduling and balancing problems in electricity
networks. Scheduling of electricity generation is made over varying time durations.
Unit commitment schedules are set a day or more in advance and account for seasonal
trends, while economic dispatch and load following schedules are done on the day of
operation and occur between 10 minutes to a few hours in advance to account for
the daily consumption trends. Because electricity networks have very little tolerance
to system imbalance, sufficient capacity must be ensured to account for uncertainty.
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This safety capacity is categorized into contingency and operating reserves. Contin-
gency reserves, in the form of spinning and non-spinning reserves, are used to counter
discrete imbalance events such as generation outages, while operating reserves are
used for continuous imbalances to correct forecast mismatches and to fine tune the
electricity supply and demand balance. The types of generators used for the different
dispatch schedules and contingency categories vary based on their operating costs
(including fuel costs, emissions, wear and tare, maintenance, etc.), ramp rates (how
fast they can change their production levels), and how fast they can be shut down
and turned on. The inflexible generators (IG) with slow ramp rates and long up and
down times usually have narrow operating ranges throughout the day that are set in
the unit commitment phase, while flexible generators (FG) that have fast ramp rates
and short up and down times may have a more varying production schedule to follow
the demand forecast and balance the network.
The growing VG penetration trend can increase the forecast variance and make
balancing the network more costly. Several studies have confirmed the additional
operating reserve requirements as VG installations continue to increase. This may
even result in more fossil fuel consumption, increased environmental harm, higher
electricity prices for consumers, and substantial investments in FG plants. While
most studies conclude that VGs do not affect the network contingency requirements,
there have been mixed findings on the impact of VGs on load following requirements.
Ela et al. (2011) summarize the findings of several renewable integration studies.
Renewable integration has received considerable attention over the past decade,
and there have been a variety of technology and market based solution proposals
for achieving high VG penetration levels. In fact, renewable enabling technologies
have been the subject of numerous smart grid applications, and several approaches
have been considered to counter the renewable intermittency. One such approach is
the Demand Response (DR), which shifts some of the balancing burden to end users
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that willingly curtail their load to help balance the network (Albadi and El-Saadany ,
2007). Load curtailments can either be contracted in advance with customers or may
be prompted using real time price signals that incent some of the flexible electricity
consumers to adjust their consumption. Another approach is to use storage buffers to
reduce the intermittency Denholm et al. (2010). Even with the recent advancements
in energy storage technologies, their relatively low efficiencies and high costs limit
their wide spread implementation for the time being. One of the operational modifi-
cations that can be used to lower balancing costs is to use controlled curtailment of
renewables (Wu and Kapuscinski (2013)). In this approach, the electricity generation
from renewable plants is voluntarily cutback in order to maintain less variable output
from renewable plants. This in turn reduces the forecast variance and the balancing
load. In fact, VG curtailment can be part of the solution to reduce the variability
caused by the customer demand (Kirby et al., 2010; Miller et al., 2011). We will
focus in this chapter on the controlled curtailment approach as a means to integrate
variable renewable generation.
The main impediment to implementing controlled curtailment in many of the
existing markets is ironically the very incentive used to promote their widespread.
Mechanisms that subsidize renewable generation through operational rewards, such as
the PTC and FIT schemes, encourage VGs to maximize their production regardless of
the operational consequences, which makes VGs resist their curtailment. In fact, some
system operators are contractually obligated to accept all production from renewable
plants with few exceptions. Although such incentive schemes have helped spread
renewable technologies, giving VGs production priority over other generators may
discard some of the technically feasible and economically superior operating strategies.
We show in this chapter that the reduction in the overall generation efficiency due to
VG priority can become significant when VGs make up a substantial part of the power
supply portfolio, which implies that operational policies that give VGs production
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priority may not be sustainable in systems with high VG penetration levels.
Some renewable integration initiatives redefine the role VGs can play in the net-
work. Conventionally, gas turbine and some combined cycle plants are used for op-
erating reserves because of their fast ramp rates and wide operating ranges, while
VGs are merely used as energy providers. However, under certain control schemes
some renewable plants can produce similar ramp rates and operating range require-
ments for regulation reserves. In fact, some recent studies identify renewable plants
as candidates for regulation reserves. Erlich and Wilch (2010) give wind generator
control concepts that can be used in the grid’s frequency control. Rivier Abbad (2010)
conjectures that conventional ancillary service providers may fail to provide sufficient
operational reserves in high VG penetration scenarios, and suggests that VGs pro-
vide such services. Liang, Grijalva, and Harley (2011) consider a market where wind
generators can bid in both the energy and the regulation markets. Ela et al. (2011)
discuss the possible restructuring of ancillary services markets to allow for higher VG
penetration, including the option of VG supplied ancillary services.
In this chapter, we build on the idea of using VGs as energy suppliers as well
as regulation reserves to balance the network. Having the controlled curtailment
of renewables as a viable option to the system operator is central to this operating
policy. We consider in this chapter a simplified electricity system with three types of
generators; IG, FG, and VG. We first study the electricity system balancing problem
in §2.2 and characterize the optimal operational policy in §2.3. In §2.4 we consider a
variant of the model in which the system could not tolerate any supply and demand
discrepancy. We also compare in §2.5 the option of giving VGs priority over other
generators and the option of curtailing VGs for economic gain under different VG
penetration levels. The concepts introduced in this chapter are illustrated using a
numerical example in §2.6 and a brief conclusion is given in §2.7.
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2.2 The Electricity System Model
In this section, we consider a centralized electrical network balancing problem
where an ISO sets generation schedules to balance customer demand at the lowest
possible cost. We first describe our model for the generators in the electricity system
and then formulate the system operator’s problem. The length of the operating
horizon is T , which can be several hours to one day.
2.2.1 Generator Types and Costs
To approximate a fleet of power generators, we assume that the system consists of
three types of generators: inflexible, flexible, and variable generators. We assume that
each firm owns one generator, thus we use “firm” and “generator” interchangeably
throughout the chapter.
Inflexible generators (IG), indexed by i ∈ GI , cannot adjust their output rates
during [0, T ]. The output rate of generator i ∈ GI , denoted as qi ≥ 0, is determined
by the system operator prior to t = 0 and stays constant over [0, T ]. Let Ci(qi) denote
generator i’s operating cost per unit of time.
Flexible generators (FG), indexed by j ∈ GF , can adjust their output rates instan-
taneously. Let qjt ≥ 0 denote the output rate of generator j ∈ GF at time t ∈ [0, T ],
and let Cj(qjt) denote its operating cost rate at time t.
The output rates, qi and qjt, are implicitly within generators’ capacities. For the
purpose of the analysis in this chapter, we assume IGs and FGs’ capacities are not
binding constraints.
Variable generators (VG) have time-varying potential outputs, which depend on
factors such as wind speed or solar radiation. Let K denote the total installed VG
capacity, and Wt ∈ [0, K] denote the potential output of VGs at time t ∈ [0, T ], which
is the maximum possible total VG production level in time t. VGs may adjust their
actual output below Wt, which is known as curtailment. Curtailment is achieved, for
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example, by pitching the blades of wind power generators or rotating solar panels to
reduce power output.
The costs of the generators satisfy the following assumption.
Assumption II.1. (i) For any generator k ∈ GI ∪GF , the cost rate function Ck(q)
is convex, strictly increasing, and continuously differentiable in q, and Ck(0) = 0;
(ii) VGs produce energy at negligible operating cost and receive a subsidy of r ≥ 0
per unit of output that is not curtailed; (iii) FGs and VGs output can be adjusted
instantaneously at negligible cost.
The convexity and monotonicity assumption in part (i) matches with the real-
ity. Part (ii) states that VGs receive production-based subsidy and implies that the
marginal cost of VGs is −r. Although there can be multiple VGs in the system, the
identical production cost assumption for VGs allows us, without loss of generality, to
aggregate all VGs into a single VG plant. Part (iii) assumes that FGs have fast ramp
rates and ramping is costless. We refer the reader to Wu and Kapuscinski (2013) for
a model that includes ramping speed and cost.
2.2.2 Problem Description
Let Lt ∈ [L,L] denote the price-insensitive load2 at time t ∈ [0, T ], where L >
L ≥ 0. The load Lt must be satisfied instantaneously for all t ∈ [0, T ]. The load Lt
and the VG potential output Wt are the two sources of uncertainties in our model and
they can be correlated. We consider two ways to balance the load in real time: (1)
vary the production of FG plants, and (2) the curtailment of VG plants. Although
the production of IG plants must be fixed before Lt and Wt are realized, the choice
of total IG production is critical to the operational cost as it sets a tradeoff between
VG curtailment and FG production. While increasing the total IG production level
replaces the expensive FG production it may also offset some of the free VG capacity.
2Load is the term often used for the customer demand in electricity systems.
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This tradeoff is illustrated in Figure 2.1 for a given electricity load and VG capacity
realization. In Figure 2.1(a) the system operator uses a low IG production level,
in which case the FG production is high, but very little VG is curtailed. The IG
production is increased in Figure 2.1(b) and the total required FG generation is
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Excess VG Load
















IG prod VG prod FG prod
Excess VG Load
(b) System opearation under high IG produc-
tion allocation.
Figure 2.1: Production levels of each generator for a given load and VG capacity
sample path.
VG Production Subsidies
As discussed in the introduction, the VG producers are often promoted by pro-
duction based subsidies (PBS) in the form of production tax credits and renewable
credits. These subsidies are an additional stream of revenue to renewable plants that
may give incentives for VGs to produce even at a loss, and hence directly affect the
production schedule. To model the PBS effect on the system we denote r as the
monetary value paid to VGs for producing 1 MWh of electricity. In other words, a
VG is paid the market price in addition to r for every MWh of electricity it produces.
The value of r essentially sets a VG priority level over other generators. VGs would
find it economical to produce as long as the market price is above −r. This alters the
tradeoff between the VG curtailment and the FG production which in turn biases the
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operating policy towards less IG production as we will see later in this chapter.
Oversupply Penalty
Although electrical networks have little tolerance for violating the supply and
demand balance in real time, they do have a narrow imbalance allowance. A mismatch
between power supply and load causes the electricity’s frequency to diverge from
its nominal value, which may harm some of the equipment and appliances if the
frequency offset becomes significant. Some generators are unwilling to reduce their
production levels even at a zero electricity market price, which is typical for baseload
plans because of their inflexible nature, as well as renewable plants that are given
production based subsidies. This may cause electricity prices to become negative,
which results in a situations where generators are charged for producing electricity
and customers are paid for their consumption (Fink et al., 2009).
In Figure 2.1b, the total IG production is close to the minimum load. If the total
IG production were a little higher it could have exceeded the minimum load. Although
a small mismatch between supply and demand can be tolerated for short durations,
the system operator is required to take action to avoid prolonged or significant supply
and demand mismatches. Such actions include:
• Invoking responsive loads to consume extra electricity: Such loads may require
monetary incentives to deviate from their preferred consumption patterns.
• Shutting down IGs: This may not be an option for all IG plants as some can
take several hours or even days to shutdown. Even if an imbalance could be an-
ticipated early enough to schedule IG shutdowns, the shutdown and start up of
these plants incurs extra fuel and significant wear-and-tear costs. Consequently,
the system wide operating costs could increase over the start up and shut down
durations of these IGs.
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• Operating generators at emergency minimum level: Generators typically operate
within best efficiency ranges. Some generators can run below their nominal
operating ranges, but at a severe drop in efficiency and possible wear-and-tear
costs.
• Curtailing VGs: Because of the PBS, VGs are often willing to pay the network
for their production. In order to curtail VGs the system operator may have to
set the electricity price below −r.
• Storing the excess supply: For systems that have available storage capacity
(such as batteries, pumped hydro, and compressed air storage) some of the
excess electricity may be stored. This storage comes at a cost due to the energy
charging, discharging, and decay losses.
We do not intend to accurately model the system operator action when the supply
exceeds the demand. Instead, we model the extra costs for handling oversupply
situations using a penalty function h(e), which represents the extra cost rate when
the excess supply rate (total output minus the load) is e ≥ 0. A similar approach is
used in practice. For example, in the Texas electricity system, a penalty for violating
the power balance constraint is included in the objective function of the security-
constrained economic dispatch problem (ERCOT 2012, p. 24).
Assumption II.2. The oversupply penalty rate function h(e) is strictly convex, strictly
increasing, and continuously differentiable in e for e ≥ 0, and h(0) = 0.
Our model does not involve undersupply, because FGs are flexible enough to
ensure all demand is met. With the introduction of h the tradeoffs between low cost
production using IGs, the tolerance for excess supply, and the curtailment of VGs
become clear. The system has the following cost components:
• The generation costs for IGs and FGs.
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• The VG production subsidy. This cost term is given by −rq when the total VG
production is q
• The oversupply penalty. This cost is only incurred when the supply exceeds the
demand.
The system operator selects the production level for each generator to minimize the
sum of these three cost components over the time horizon. Although Lt and Wt
are treated as random variables, the model studied in this chapter extends to the
deterministic case when Lt and Wt represent the (known) variable load and capacity
duration correspondences over the time horizon.
2.2.3 The System Operator’s Problem
Let qi and qjt respectively denote the production levels of generator i ∈ GI ,
j ∈ GF , and qVt denote the total VG production at time t. Note that qi is time-
invariant because once an IG’s production level is set, it cannot be changed throughout
the planning horizon [0, T ]. The system operator’s problem is to decide qi prior to
t = 0 and decide qjt and q
V
t in real time in response to the load and wind power
realizations, with the objective of minimizing the total expected cost of serving the
demand over [0, T ].
The system operator’s problem can be formulated as first deciding the aggregate
production level for each type of generators and then allocate the aggregate produc-
tion to individual generators. Let qI and qFt denote the aggregate production at time
t for IGs and FGs, respectively. The cost-minimizing allocations of qI and qFt are





























The following lemma summarizes the properties of the aggregate production cost
functions.
Lemma II.3. The total IG and FG cost functions CI(q) and CF (q) are continuously
differentiable, convex, and strictly increasing in q.
Proof of this lemma and other results in this chapter can be found in Appendix
B.
Because the per-MWh subsidy r applies to all VGs, the total subsidies depend
only on the aggregate VG production qVt . The allocation for q
V
t among VGs can be
arbitrary as long as it satisfies the capacity constraint for each VG. With the optimal
allocation of the aggregate production in (2.1)-(2.2), the system operator’s problem
can be written as
min










s.to et ≡ qI + qFt + qVt − Lt ≥ 0, ∀ t ∈ [0, T ], (2.4)
qVt ≤ Wt, ∀ t ∈ [0, T ], (2.5)
qI , qFt , q
V
t ≥ 0, ∀ t ∈ [0, T ]. (2.6)
This problem contains two stochastic processes: the electric load {Lt : 0 ≤ t ≤ T}
and the maximum wind power generation {Wt : 0 ≤ t ≤ T}. The two processes can
be correlated and we assume that their (joint) probability distributions are known
to all players. The expectation is taken with respect to these two processes. The
inequality in (2.4) ensures sufficient supply to meet the load, whereas excess supply
(if et > 0) is penalized in the objective (2.3).
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2.3 Optimal Dispatch
To solve the system optimization problem in (2.3)-(2.6), we first fix IGs’ output
rate qI and solve for the optimal qFt and q
V
t in response to the realizations of Lt and
Wt. Then we decide the optimal q
I prior to t = 0. These two steps are analyzed in
§2.3.1 and §2.3.2, respectively.
2.3.1 Optimal Flexible and Variable Generation Under Given qI
Suppose IG output rate qI ≥ 0 is given. At time t, knowing the realized load





{qFt , qVt }
CF (qFt )− r qVt + h(et) (2.7)
s.t. et ≡ qI + qFt + qVt − Lt ≥ 0, (2.8)
qVt ≤ Wt, qFt , qVt ≥ 0. (2.9)
Recall the marginal penalty h′(e) strictly increases in e with minimum value





′)−1(r), if r ≥ h′(0),
0, if r < h′(0).
(2.10)
When r ≥ h′(0), µ(r) gives the oversupply level at which the marginal oversupply
penalty equals r. The following theorem provides an explicit solution to the problem
in (2.7)-(2.9).
Theorem II.4. For a given IG production level qI ≥ 0, under the realized VG po-
tential output Wt and the load Lt, the optimal FG and VG production rates at time t
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are
qF∗t = (Lt − qI −Wt)+ and qV ∗t = min
{
Wt, (Lt − qI + µ(r))+
}
. (2.11)
Furthermore, the real-time cost rate C̃(qI , Lt,Wt) in (2.7) is jointly convex in (q
I , Lt,Wt).
The solutions in (2.11) under various realized values of Lt and Wt are illustrated
in Figure 2.2. If the load Lt drops below the IG output q
I to such an extent that the
marginal oversupply penalty exceeds the subsidy, h′(qI − Lt) > r (or qI − Lt ≥ µ(r),
i.e., event A1), then the VG output does not bring net benefit to the system and
is completely curtailed. However, if the subsidy r exceeds the marginal oversupply
penalty h′(qI−Lt), then some or all of the VG potential output is used, corresponding




qI − µ(r) qI
A1
No use












qV ∗ = Wt
qF∗ = 0
pt =
−h′(qI +Wt − Lt)
A4
Full use
qV ∗ = Wt
qF∗ = Lt − qI −Wt
pt = (C
F )′(Lt − qI −Wt)
A1 : Lt − qI ≤ −µ(r) A3 : Lt − qI ∈ [Wt − µ(r), Wt]
A2 : Lt − qI ∈ (−µ(r), Wt − µ(r)) A4 : Lt − qI > Wt
Figure 2.2: Real-Time Operating Policy and Price.
In event A2, VGs are partially curtailed and the VG output is such that the
per-unit subsidy equals the marginal oversupply penalty, r = h′(et) or µ(r) = et =
qI + qV ∗t − Lt. In event A3, the per-unit subsidy outweighs the marginal oversupply
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penalty when all the VG potential output is used, r ≥ h′(qI +Wt−Lt), and thus, no
curtailment occurs. In event A4, IGs and VGs cannot meet the entire load, and FGs
serve the remaining load.
The four events together imply that FGs produce if and only if the load cannot be
satisfied by IGs and VGs. In other words, FGs only produce to make up the supply







That is, when FGs produce, VGs’ potential output is fully used. When VG curtail-
ment occurs, FGs do not produce.
Figure 2.2 also describes the real-time price, pt, which equals the system marginal
cost of serving the load at time t. When the load exceeds the combined output of IGs




Wt−qI) > 0. When the load can be met by IGs and VGs, the real-time price becomes
zero or negative:
a) The real-time price is zero when VG output is partially curtailed (event A2
occurs) and no subsidy is provided (r = 0). A small incremental load can be
served by VG at zero cost.
b) The real-time price is negative when additional load lowers the total revealed
cost by either reducing the oversupply penalty or increasing VG output (when
r > 0). In event A1, all VG output is curtailed, oversupply is q
I−Lt, and price
is pt = −h′(qI −Lt) < −r. In event A2, VG is partially curtailed and pt = −r.
In event A3, pt = −h′(qI +Wt − Lt) ∈ (−r, 0).
Summarizing the above discussion, we can express the real-time price pt as a
function of qI , Lt, and Wt as in (2.13) below. In this expression, the dependence on
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FG cost function CF (·) is also emphasized.





(Lt−Wt− qI)1A4 − h′(qI+Wt− Lt)1A3
− r1A2 − h′(qI− Lt)1A1 ,
(2.13)
where 1{·} is the indicator function taking value 1 if statement in {·} is true and 0
otherwise.
Using (2.13), the time-average of the expected real-time price can be written as













where the expectation is taken prior to t = 0. The function P (qI , CF ) relates the
average price to the IG output qI under a given aggregate FG cost function, thus
P (qI , CF ) is the IGs’ inverse residual demand function. Note that P (qI , CF ) decreases
in qI , because P (qI , Lt,Wt, C
F ) decreases in qI due to the monotonicity of CF (·) and
h′(·).
2.3.2 Optimal Inflexible Generation







C̃(qI , Lt,Wt) dt
]
. (2.15)
The convexity of CI(qI) and C̃(qI , Lt,Wt) in Theorem II.4 implies that the objective
in (2.15) is convex in qI . This property allows us to characterize the optimal IG
production qI∗. For most of the realistic situations, inflexible generators do produce
energy, and thus for the rest of this chapter, we will focus our attention to qI∗ > 0.
The optimal IG production is given by the following theorem.
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Theorem II.5. The optimal IG output qI∗ is the unique solution to
(CI)′(qI∗) = P (qI∗, CF ). (2.16)
This Theorem states that at the optimal IG production level, the marginal pro-
duction cost of IGs equals the time-average expected system marginal cost over the
planning horizon. As qI increases from zero, the marginal production cost of IGs in-
creases while the time-average system marginal cost decreases; the optimal qI∗ is the
unique intersection of these two curves. The system marginal cost can be interpreted
as the the spot price under perfect competition. Thus, Theorem II.5 implies that
under perfect competition, IGs equate their marginal cost with the time-average spot
price, so that their expected marginal profit is zero.
2.4 Robust Balancing Requirement
We consider in this section the policy when the system is required to be balanced at
all times. The problem (2.3)-(2.6) can be modified to accommodate this requirement
by dropping the overproduction penalty term h(·) from (2.3) and changing the “≥” in
(2.4) to “=”. When there is no overproduction penalty the real-time operating policy
becomes trivial: maximize the generation from VGs as long as it does not exceed
Lt − qI and make up the balance using FGs. The optimal VG production becomes
qV ∗t = min{Wt, Lt − qI}
and the total FG production has the same solution as in (2.11). The real-time cost
function becomes
C̃(qI , Lt,Wt) = C
F ((Lt − qI −Wt)+)− rmin{Wt, Lt − qI},
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which is clearly jointly convex in (qI , Lt,Wt). This cost function shows that FGs
are the marginal generators when Lt − qI > Wt and VGs become marginal when
Lt − qI ≤ Wt. When FGs set the system’s marginal cost, the spot price becomes
pt = C
F ′(Lt − qI − Wt), and when VGs are marginal the spot price is pt = −r.
Therefore, the average price over the time horizon is






















(Lt − qI −Wt)1{qI<Lt−Wt}
]
− rP{Lt ≤ Wt + qI}
)
dt.
The optimal IG production problem can be solved using the same approach as in
§2.3.2 with the additional requirement that the total IG production not exceed the
total demand to prevent excess supply, which is given by the constraint qI ≤ L. If














(Lt − qI −Wt)1{qI<Lt−Wt}
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By complimentary slackness, ν is 0 when qI < L but can be positive when qI = L.













(Lt − q∗ −Wt)1{q∗<Lt−Wt}
]
− rP{Lt ≤ Wt + q∗}
)
dt
and then set qI∗ = min{q∗, L}. When ν > 0 the price IGs get for their electricity
becomes less than the average spot price over the time horizon in a decentralized









(a) Small q∗ scenario: The robust model











(b) Large q∗ scenario: The robust model gives a
lower qI∗ and a higher average spot price than
the original model.
Figure 2.3: IG production under the robust balancing model.
In Figure 2.3(a), the IG marginal cost and average price curves intersect at
qI∗ < L, which gives a solution that is similar to the original problem’s solution
shown in (2.16). However, when the two curves intersect in q∗ > L as shown in
Figure 2.3(b), then the system operator sets qI∗ to the maximum feasible production
level L. ν in in Figure 2.3(b) represents the difference between the average market
price and the marginal IG cost. This implies that the optimal solution may not be
implementable in a uniform price market mechanism and discriminatory pricing may
be more applicable, otherwise the higher market price may signal IGs to overproduce
and violate the network balance.
Another approach to solve the balanced system problem is to allow an imbalance
to occur but charge a large overproduction penalty that never makes it economical
to violate the system balance. Consider a penalty function h with an initial marginal













(Lt − qI −Wt)1{qI<Lt−Wt} − h
′(qI − Lt)1{qI≥Lt}
]




This confirms that if the optimal qI from Equation (2.16) does not exceed L then the
solution from (2.16) and (2.17) agree. However, if the optimal qI from (2.16) exceeds













(Lt − qI −W t)1{qI<Lt−Wt}
]
− rP{qI < Lt ≤ qI +Wt}





































and hence qI → L as h′(0) → ∞. The multiplication of h′(0) and
∫ T
0
P{Lt ≤ qI} dt













(Lt − L−Wt)1{L<Lt−Wt}]− rP{Lt ≤ Wt + L}
)
dt− TCI ′(L),
which is precisely Tν from (2.17) when qI = L. Therefore, the optimal qI from (2.16)
converges to the same solution as the optimal qI from (2.17) when the initial marginal
penalty h′(0)→∞.
This shows that requiring the network to be balanced is a limiting case of the
original model with the overproduction penalty function. However, solving this prob-
lem using the infinite marginal penalty approach gives another explanation to the
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price discrimination based on generator flexibility. This approach shows that the IG
marginal cost is indeed equal to the average spot market price, but the average spot
market price becomes infinitely negative when Lt = q
I which almost surely never
happens, but the product of this infinitely negative price and its infinitesimally short
duration amounts to a constant that equals this price difference. It just happens
that all other generators don’t produce during this infinitesimally short duration and
hence aren’t subject to this negative price. In fact, the average prices other generators
see may be different from the IG prices even when overproduction is allowed. For
example, when Lt ≤ qI − µ(r) the price becomes −h′(qI − Lt) < 0 and neither FGs
nor VGs produce in this case, and if this event occurs with positive probability then
the FGs and VGs would sell their products at larger average prices than IGs.
2.5 The Impact of VG Subsidy and Penetration
In this section, we study the effects of subsidy r and total VG capacity K on
system operations. In particular, we focus on their effects on the optimal inflexible













where the optimal generation levels qI∗ and qF∗t and the excess supply e
∗
t are given
by Theorems II.4 and II.5.
To disaggregate the impact of the installed VG capacity K and the natural energy
sources that drive the VG units, such as the wind speed and solar illumination, we
define the VG capacity factor ρt = Wt/K and we assume that the distribution of ρt is
independent of K. The total realized VG capacity in time t, Wt = ρtK, is increasing
in both ρt and the total installed VG capacity K.
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Theorem II.6. The production based subsidy r and VG penetration K have the
following impacts on the solution:
(i) The optimal IG production qI∗ is decreasing in r and K.
(ii) The average production cost Ca is increasing in r.
(iii) If r = 0 then Ca decreases in K.
(iv) Ca may increase in K when r > 0.
The willingness to sell power in spite of the negative price signals gives priority to
VGs over other generators, and the value of r can be regarded as a priority level for
VGs over other generators or imbalance response actions. Specifically, a larger r gives
a larger VG priority over IGs, which in turn reduces qI as shown in Theorem II.6 (i).
Additionally, the subsidies skew the VG profits from their true values and raising r
increases the distortion in the optimal generation allocation problem, causing Ca to
increase as pointed out in Theorem II.6 (ii). K’s impact on the cost is more compli-
cated as it depends on two counteractive factors; the reduced cost due to free energy
from VG plants and the increased balancing costs that result from the VG priority. In
the special case r = 0 the subsidy term vanishes from the system operator’s problem,
and therefore increasing K necessarily improves the non-subsidized solution as indi-
cated in Theorem II.6 (iii). Furthermore, the VG dispatch priority that comes with
r raises the VG capacity utilization
∫ T
0
E[qVt /Wt|Wt > 0]P{Wt > 0} dt as evident by
Equation (2.11), making the VGs less susceptible to curtailment. In particular, when
r = 0 VGs lose their preferential treatment and the VG curtailment is at its high-




To illustrate the impact of r and K on the system we will consider a simple
example of a system with truncated time invariant normally distributed L ∈ [80, 100]
MW and ρ ∈ [0, 1] with means 90 MW and 0.5, and standard deviations 10/3 MW and
1/6 respectively. We will consider a unity time horizon and the aggregate generation
cost functions CI(q) = 2q + 0.05q2 and CF (q) = 5q + q2, and the penalty function
h(q) = 10q + 2.5q2. qI and Ca are plotted against K ∈ [0, 120] MW for various r
values in figures 2.4 and 2.5. These figures illustrates the declining trend of qI with
respect to r and K and the increasing trend of Ca with respect to r. Figure 2.5 shows
that the inefficiency due to r is minuscule for low VG penetrations but can become
significant for systems with high VG penetration levels. Figure 2.5 also proves that
Ca can increase with K if r > 0. The relationship between the VG curtailment as
a fraction of the available capacity and r ∈ [0, 60] $/MWh is shown in Figure 2.6
for several K values. As expected, the VG curtailment percentage decreases with
r. Although the VG curtailment value in MW increases with K, this result cannot
be extended to the % of curtailed VG capacity as demonstrated by the intersections
and non-monotonicity of the W = 5, 10, 20, and 40 MW curves in Figure 2.6. The
non-monotonicity is caused by the rapid rate of change of qI with respect to K for
small values of K that can make d
dW
(qVt /Kρt) > 0.
2.7 Conclusion
We have developed in this chapter a simplified model to study the impact of of
the renewable penetration and production based subsidy on the power system, and
quantified the short term benefits of curtailing VG capacity. Our results show that
the subsidies increase production costs, and can make additional VG installations
harmful. The intuition for these results is that subsidies enable VGs to produce in
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Figure 2.4: The impact of r and K on the total IG production.


















































Figure 2.5: The impact of r and K on the average non-subsidized cost.
otherwise uneconomical circumstances, which can cause inefficient generation alloca-
tion. On the other hand, the additional revenue from the PBS mechanism promotes
the renewable expansion and potentially speeds up technology advancements that
can improve the renewable generation efficiency and reduce its costs. We did not in-
tend in this chapter to find the best subsidies that give the optimal tradeoff between
VG expansion and operational efficiency, nor did we intend to compare the subsidies
28


































Figure 2.6: The impact of r and K on the VG curtailment.
with other renewable promotional mechanisms. Our aim was to study the short term
implication of the production based subsidies on the system’s operating policy and
production costs for various renewable penetration levels. As it turns out, the VG
subsidies and penetration can influence the generator competitive behavior as well.




Supply Function Competition in Electricity
Markets with Flexible, Inflexible, and Variable
Generation
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter we study the supply function competition between power-generation
firms with different levels of flexibility. Inflexible firms produce power at a constant
rate over an operating horizon, while flexible firms can adjust their output to meet
the fluctuations in electricity demand. Both types of firms compete in an electricity
market by submitting supply functions to a system operator, who solves an optimal
dispatch problem to determine the production level for each firm and the correspond-
ing market price. We study how firms’ (in)flexibility affects their equilibrium behavior
and the market price. We also analyze the impact of variable generation (such as wind
and solar power) on the equilibrium, with the focus on the effects of the amount of
variable generation, its priority in dispatch, and the production-based subsidies. We
find that the classical supply function equilibrium model tends to overestimate the
intensity of the market competition, and even more so as more variable generation is
introduced into the system. The policy of economically curtailing variable generation
intensifies the market competition, reduce price volatility, and improve the system’s
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overall efficiency. Moreover, we show that these benefits are most significant in the
absence of the production-based subsidies.
The special nature of the electricity industry (quick and random fluctuations of
demand, limited storage capability) requires production decisions to be automated
and coordinated instantaneously. Thus, in an electricity market, the instruments of
competition are supply functions, which specify the amount of electricity each firm is
willing to generate at every market price. Based on the submitted supply functions, a
system operator finds the most economical production schedule to meet the electricity
demand and determines the payment to each firm. A set of supply functions from
which no firm would benefit by unilaterally altering its supply function is known as
a supply function equilibrium (SFE).
Klemperer and Meyer (1989) pioneered the effort in analyzing the SFE in general
industrial contexts. Green and Newbery (1992) and Bolle (1992) are the first to em-
ploy the SFE framework to analyze electricity markets. These works and the following
stream of research provide important economic insights and policy recommendations,
which we will review in §3.2.
Most SFE models for electricity systems assume that all firms have the flexibility
to adjust their power output at different prices and do not explicitly consider ramping
constraints. This assumption can be justified in two situations. First, each firm owns
a portfolio of power generators and offers a supply curve representing the aggregate
output as a function of the market price. The portfolio is not dominated by inflexible
generators (e.g., nuclear and some coal-fired generators), and the aggregate output
can be adjusted in response to the price changes throughout the day. This situation
is studied by Green and Newbery (1992), Green (1996), Rudkevich (1999), Baldick,
Grant, and Kahn (2004), among others. Second, in the real-time market that runs
and clears every hour (or half-hour in some markets), firms with flexible generators
submit real-time supply offers to meet the energy imbalance (the energy that deviates
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from the day-ahead schedule). This situation is considered by, for example, Holmberg
(2007, 2008) and Sioshansi and Oren (2007). The theoretical framework of SFE
is applicable to both situations, as discussed in Anderson and Philpott (2002) and
Holmberg and Newbery (2010).
As industry deregulation continues, firms downsize their portfolios by selling off
parts of their generation assets, and independent power producers emerge and par-
ticipate in the power markets. In many of the current markets, firms exhibit different
levels of flexibility: Firms that own mainly inflexible generators cannot change their
power output in a short time, whereas firms owning flexible generators can quickly
ramp up or down their production. All firms engage in a supply function competition
in the day-ahead market and the system operator determines the production schedule
taking into account the firms’ different levels of flexibility.
Because firms’ flexibility directly affects their production and revenue, it is natural
to ask the following questions: How do firms with different levels of flexibility behave
in a supply function competition? How does the presence of inflexibility affect the equi-
librium market price? Answers to these questions will help policy makers understand
whether the classical SFE model may over- or underestimate the intensity of the
market competition. Understanding the effect of generation flexibility/inflexibility
on competition is also important in this era of generation technology evolution, with
coal-fired generation shifting toward more flexible generation fueled by natural gas.
An integral part of this technology evolution is the increasing variable generation
from renewable sources. According to the Renewable Energy Policy Network (2013),
globally the fastest growing renewable energy technologies from 2008 to 2012 are
solar photovoltaic, concentrating solar thermal power, and wind power, with average
annual capacity growth rates of 60%, 43%, and 25%, respectively. Variable generation
from renewable sources displaces conventional flexible and inflexible generation, and
thus changes the competition between them, but the classical SFE model does not
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address competitions involving inflexible firms. This raises another question: How
does variable generation impact the competition between flexible and inflexible firms?
The answer to this question depends on the priority of variable generation. Due to
its environmental and economic benefits, variable generation is often given the highest
priority in dispatch, i.e., it is curtailed only when the excessive energy from variable
generation threatens system reliability. However, curtailing variable generation may
also provide economic benefits, as shown by Ela (2009), Ela and Edelson (2012), and
Wu and Kapuscinski (2013). Hence, a relevant question is: How does the economic
curtailment policy affect the competition between flexible and inflexible firms? A
caveat is that even if economic curtailment policy is in effect, the production-based
subsidies for renewable energy may lead to partial economic curtailment. Therefore, in
addressing the last question, we also examine the case of partial economic curtailment.
This chapter aims to address the several questions raised above through theoret-
ical and computational analysis. Our model is not intended to be a comprehensive
depiction of the electricity industry, but to be a stylized model that captures the rele-
vant tradeoffs. We assume each firm’s generators are either fully flexible or inflexible.
Inflexible generators (IGs) produce power at a constant rate over an operating hori-
zon (e.g., several hours to one day), while flexible generators (FGs) can adjust their
output to meet the load fluctuations. We formulate the system operator’s optimal dis-
patch problem and derive the market clearing conditions. We then characterize and
compute the SFE with linear supply functions, which is commonly adopted both in
practice and in the research literature, assuming variable generators are price-takers.
The main insights from this chapter are summarized as follows. First, the classical
SFE model tends to overestimate the intensity of the supply function competition.
IGs do not compete with FGs in matching production with uncertain demand and,
in equilibrium, FGs offer significantly lower output at each price than predicted by
the classical SFE model. IGs compete with all other generators for market share and
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in equilibrium offer slightly less output than in the classical model. Our equilibrium
model with flexibility consideration also leads to a higher average price and a higher
price volatility than predicted by the classical SFE model.
Second, when variable generation receives absolute priority in dispatch, the ad-
ditional variability introduced into the system must be balanced by FGs, leading to
more market share for FGs, as well as less intense market competition. As more
variable generation displaces the conventional generation, the average market price
drops, but the price volatility increases significantly.
Third, economic curtailment of variable generation is a partial substitute for FGs
in balancing against variability. Thus, economic curtailment intensifies the market
competition: All IGs and FGs offer more competitive supply functions than under
priority dispatch, and IGs’ supply functions may be even more competitive than
predicted by the classical SFE model. Economic curtailment has little impact on the
average price, but substantially reduces the price volatility. The overall operating cost
of the system is also reduced by the economic curtailment, but the emission reduction
depends on the types of the generators in the electricity system.
Finally, production-based subsidies increase the priority of variable generation
and reduce the amount of VG curtailment. With the presence of the subsidies, the
economic curtailment policy does not achieve its full benefit to encourage competition
and improve the system’s efficiency.
3.2 Literature Review
In their original work, Klemperer and Meyer (1989) showed the existence of a
family of SFE for competing firms with identical cost functions and without capacity
constraints. They characterized the SFE by differential equations and show that,
given the support of the uncertainty, the equilibria are independent of the distribution
of the uncertainty. Since this seminal work, the SFE framework has been applied
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extensively to the research in electricity markets. Comprehensive reviews of this area
are provided by Ventosa et al. (2005), Holmberg and Newbery (2010), and Li, Shi,
and Qu (2011). Thus, we review below only the works most relevant to ours.
Green and Newbery (1992) consider the effect of capacity constraints on SFE and
calibrate the model for the British electricity industry. Their results suggest that the
market power had been seriously underestimated by the policy makers. Rudkevich,
Duckworth, and Rosen (1998) study symmetric SFE with inelastic demand, and find
that even with a relatively high number of competing firms, the market clearing
prices are still significantly higher than perfectly competitive prices. Anderson and
Philpott (2002) derive the conditions under which a supply function can represent a
firm’s optimal response to the offers of other firms and show that their model admits
symmetric SFE. Holmberg (2008) proves the SFE is unique when power shortage
occurs with positive probability and a price cap exists. All these studies focus on the
case of symmetric equilibria in which firms offer identical supply functions.
When firms differ in costs, the general asymmetric SFE is difficult to find and,
thus, linear supply functions are often used to simplify the analysis. Green (1996)
obtains the linear supply function equilibrium for the asymmetric case and studies
the effects of various policies that could increase the competition in the electricity
market. Rudkevich (1999) provides a more explicit solution to the SFE with linear
supply functions and further finds that this equilibrium could be reached by a learning
process.
Several studies analyze firms with identical cost but asymmetric capacities. Genc
and Reynolds (2011) consider SFE when some firms are pivotal, i.e., they can move the
market price to the price cap with positive probability. Holmberg (2007) establishes
the uniqueness of SFE in a real-time market under certain conditions.
It is also possible to consider asymmetries in both costs and capacities. Baldick,
Grant, and Kahn (2004) focus on SFE with piecewise linear supply functions and
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point out that linear supply functions are useful for practical applications. Ander-
son and Hu (2008) consider more general SFE and analyze situations when supply
functions may have jumps. They also develop numerical methods for calculating
asymmetric SFE. Anderson (2013) establishes the existence of an SFE under more
general conditions.
Incorporating physical constraints, especially the network transmission constraints,
into the SFE model is also an important research direction. Berry et al. (1999) find
that the strategic behaviors on networks may lead to results that differ from those
predicted by the traditional models. Wilson (2008) characterizes the necessary con-
ditions for an equilibrium when transmission capacity is uncertain and transmission
constraints may be binding. Holmberg and Philpott (2012) consider a situation where
demand shocks exist at all nodes and transmission capacities are known.
This chapter contributes to the literature by analyzing supply function competi-
tion between firms with different levels of flexibility. To the best of our knowledge, the
impact of flexibility on firms’ strategic interactions has not been analyzed, and this
chapter tries to begin filling this gap. The key feature of our model is that the system
operator takes into account the firms’ different levels of flexibility when determin-
ing the production schedule. The outputs of inflexible firms, once determined, stay
constant throughout the operating horizon. The optimality condition of the system
operator’s problem serves as a constraint in the firm-level profit-maximization prob-
lem. Our approach shares similar features with the bi-level optimization procedure
by Hobbs, Metzler, and Pang (2000).
Integration of variable generation into electricity systems has received substantial
research attention over the past decade. The National Renewable Energy Laboratory
recently completed two large variable generation integration studies: the Western
Wind and Solar Integration Study (WWSIS) (GE Energy , 2010) and the Eastern
Wind Integration and Transmission Study (EWITS) (EnerNex , 2011). Excellent
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reviews of these and earlier variable generation studies are provided by Smith et al.
(2007), Ela et al. (2009), and Hart et al. (2012). Most of these integration studies
focus on quantifying system cost reduction due to variable generation, as well as the
integration cost, i.e., the incremental cost in balancing against variable generation.
The impact of variable generation on the SFE in electricity markets has not
been considered until recently. Sioshansi (2011) recognizes the difficulty in modeling
simultaneous-move of wind and conventional generators and analyzes a Stackelberg
game with embedded supply function competition among conventional generators.
Assuming wind-power generators are price-takers and have priority in dispatch, Buygi,
Zareipour, and Rosehart (2012) analyze an SFE with linear supply functions and find
that although the intermittency of wind power tends to increase the market price,
the net impact of wind power is reduced market prices. In this chapter we also treat
variable generation as price-takers and study its impact on both average price and
price volatility. We further consider the impact of dispatch policies (priority dispatch
vs. economic curtailment) on SFE and market prices.
The role of economic curtailment policy has been investigated in several studies.
Ela (2009) explores the network effects of economic curtailment. Ela and Edelson
(2012) analyze the benefit of curtailment on relieving physical constraints of gen-
eration resources, thereby bringing substantial cost savings. Bentek Energy (2010)
points out that accommodating variable generation may lead to increased cycling
cost of conventional generators and increased emissions. Katzenstein and Apt (2009)
also find that, due to extra emissions from cycling, the emission reductions are likely
to be significantly less than those assumed by policy makers. Wu and Kapuscinski
(2013) analyze the impact of economic curtailment on cycling cost and peaking cost,
and find that curtailing wind power can be both economically and environmentally
beneficial under certain situations. This chapter complements the above body of work
by studying the impact of economic curtailment on market competition. We find an
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additional benefit of economic curtailment—economic curtailment intensifies market
competition.
3.3 The Model
In a decentralized electricity system, an ISO receives supply function offers from
electricity suppliers, then sets dispatch schedules to satisfy demand with the minimum
cost to consumers. Upon receiving the supply offers, the ISO can convert them into
revealed cost functions and use the centralized electricity system model studied in
Chapter II. We will go over the supply offers and show how they are converted into
revealed costs next.
3.3.1 Supply Offers and Revealed Costs
The supply offers from IGs and FGs are characterized by supply functions. Prior
to t = 0, FG j ∈ GF submits a supply function Sj(p), p ∈ <, which specifies the
output rate it is willing to produce when the real-time price is p. Also prior to t = 0,
IG i ∈ GI submits a supply function Si(p), p ∈ <, which specifies the fixed output rate
it is willing to set over [0, T ] if the average price over [0, T ] is p. We assume generators
are risk-neutral, so that IGs care only about the average price. The aggregate supply













To fix ideas, we can set the operating time horizon T = 1 day and assume that
each generator submits a supply function for the entire day (i.e., the supply offer is
“long-lived”). In many markets, although generators are allowed to submit hourly
offers, most generators submit the same supply functions for the entire day. This
is because they do not anticipate status changes (e.g., maintenance) of their own or
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other generators, and thus, a single supply function describes the generators preferred
output at different prices during the day. Indeed, using the historical generator offer
data from Midcontinent Independent System Operator (MISO)1, we find that about
90% of the generators submit the same supply offers for the entire day.
The supply functions satisfy the following assumption.
Assumption III.1. For any k ∈ GI ∪ GF : (i) There exists pmink ≥ 0, such that




Assumption III.1(i) implies that no generator is willing to produce when the price
(or average price in the case of IGs) is negative. Part (ii) is consistent with practice2.
Part (iii) is automatically satisfied if pmink > 0 due to part (i); when p
min
k = 0, part
(iii) states that no generator is willing to produce when the price drops to nearly zero.
All these assumptions are mild. The commonly used affine supply function Sk(p) =
βk(p − pmink )+, where βk > 0 is a constant, satisfies Assumption III.1. (Throughout
the chapter, we use notation x+ = max{x, 0} for any real number x.)
The system operator computes generators’ revealed cost functions based on their






S−1k (x)dx, ∀ k ∈ G
I ∪GF , (3.2)
where the inverse supply function is S−1k (q)
def
= inf{p : Sk(p) > q}. If generator k
submits its inverse marginal cost function as its supply function, then the revealed
cost is its true cost function. Assumption III.1 ensures that the revealed costs have the
same properties of the true costs (increasing, convex, and continuously differentiable),
1Available at https://www.misoenergy.org/Library/ MarketReports.
2E.g. MISO’s Business Practice Manual states that the price-quantity pairs that form a supply
function must be increasing for price and strictly increasing for quantity (MISO, 2013, p. 92).
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and hence all the results based on these properties for the cost functions in Chapter II
hold.
Unlike IGs and FGs, VGs are unable to guarantee an output rate because of their
inherent intermittency. Therefore, we assume each VG submits a price offer for its
potential output. To focus on analyzing the strategic interactions between IGs and
FGs, we assume that VGs submit their marginal cost −r as the offer price, where r
is the subsidy per unit of output. This means that VGs produce Wt when the price
exceeds −r, completely curtail output when the price drops below −r, and are willing
to produce any amount in [0,Wt] when the price is −r.
3.3.2 System Operator’s Problem
The system operator’s problem can be divided into two parts. First, the ISO
chooses the aggregate production levels form the different generator types, and then
allocates the production from each type to the individual generator units. The second
problem is given in Chapter II by Equaitons (2.1) and (2.2). Since the revealed cost





























The fact that Ĉi and Ĉj have the same properties as the true costs implies that
Lemma II.3 holds. The following result shows the relation between the aggregate
supply functions and the aggregate revealed costs.





(q) and (CF )
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Proof of this lemma and other results in this chapter are shown in Appendix C.
With this modification, the problem of determining the aggregate production lev-
els qI , qFt , and q
V
t is identical to the Problem (2.3)-(2.6). Consequently, Theorems
II.4 and II.5 hold, and the FG and FG real-time production levels are given by (2.11)
and the optimal IG production level solves (2.16).
To express the spot and average prices in terms of SF instead of CF , we will
modify the definitions of P and P from Equations (2.13) and (2.14) in Chapter II to





(Lt−Wt− qI)1A4 − h′(qI+Wt− Lt)1A3
− r1A2 − h′(qI− Lt)1A1 ,
(3.6)













The events A1, A2, A3, and A4 are defined in Figure 2.2 in Chapter II. Note that for
a given qI , the real-time price does not depend on IGs’ supply function SI(·). Also
note that P (qI , Lt,Wt, S
F ) decreases in qI due to the monotonicity of SF (·) and h′(·),
and hence P (qI , SF ) also decreases in qI . The supply function form of Lemma III.2
also gives an alternative formula for the spot price as shown in the following result.
Corollary III.3. The real-time price function in (3.6) can be expressed as
P (qI , Lt,Wt;S
F ) = inf
{
p : SF (p) +Wt1{p≥−r} − µ(−p) ≥ Lt − qI
}
. (3.8)
This Corollary gives a supply function-based method for calculating the real-time
price. In (3.8), SF (p) is FGs’ supply function, Wt1{p≥−r} is VGs’ supply function
(VGs offer the entire potential output whenever the price is at least −r), and the
oversupply function µ(−p) gives the oversupply level when the real-time price is p < 0.
According to (3.8), the real-time price is the minimum price at which the supply minus
oversupply meets the demand.
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With the average price P (qI , SF ) computed in (3.7), the aggregate (constant)
output rate IGs are willing to set over [0, T ] is SI
(
P (qI , SF )
)
. The system operator
needs to ensure consistency between what IGs are asked to produce and what they are
willing to produce. Thus, qI must satisfy the constraint qI = SI
(
P (qI , SF )
)
. Imposing
this constraint, however, may prevent the system from achieving the optimal qI∗ that
minimizes the total system cost. A significant result in Theorem II.5 from Chapter II
is that the optimal qI∗ actually satisfies this constraint. Indeed, by using (3.5) and
the revised average price formula (3.7), the IG production level qI∗ from Equation








Equation (3.9) confirms that imposing the constraint qI = SI
(
P (qI , SF )
)
does
not sacrifice system optimality. Equation (3.9) can also be written as (SI)
−1
(qI∗) =
P (qI∗, SF ), which means that qI∗ is the intersection of the IGs’ inverse supply func-
tion (SI)
−1
(qI) and the IGs’ inverse residual demand function P (qI , SF ). These two
functions are depicted as the solid curves in Figure 3.1.
Figure 3.1: Optimal IG Production qI∗
How does the optimal IG production qI∗ vary with the supply functions? When
IGs bid more competitively by increasing their supply function to ŜI(p) or decreasing
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their inverse supply function to (ŜI)
−1
(qI) shown as the dashed curve in Figure 3.1,
qI∗ rises to q̂I∗, i.e., IGs’ market share increases. When FGs bid more competitively
by increasing their supply function to S̃F (p), (3.8) implies that the real-time price
decreases, and the average price decreases to P (qI , S̃F ), as shown in Figure 3.1. Con-
sequently, qI∗ reduces to q̃I∗. In both cases, more competitive supply offers lead to a
lower average market price. These results are in line with our intuition.
3.3.3 The Market Mechanism
Theorems II.4 and II.5 in Chapter II solve the system operator’s problem of de-
ciding the optimal production for all generators to minimize the expected total cost
(implied by the generators’ supply offers). We now formally define the market mech-
anism based on the these results.
1) Prior to t = 0, IGs and FGs submit supply functions {Si(p) : i ∈ GI} and
{Sj(p) : j ∈ GF}, and VGs offer price −r (assumed in §3.3.1).
2) The system operator clears the market prior to t = 0 according to the following
steps:









(ii) Compute the real-time price as a function of the IG output qI , the load L,
and the VG potential output W :
P (qI , L,W, SF ) = inf
{
p : SF (p) +W1{p≥−r} − µ(−p) ≥ L− qI
}
, or
P (qI , L,W, SF ) = (SF )
−1
(L−W − qI)1A4 − h′(qI +W − L)1A3
− r1A2 − h′(qI − L)1A1 .
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(iii) Determine the IG output rate qI∗ by
(SI)
−1










3) Production and market settlement:
(i) IG i ∈ GI produces Si(P (qI∗, SF )) for all t ∈ [0, T ].
(ii) At any t ∈ [0, T ], the real-time price is pt ≡ P (qI∗, Lt,Wt), and FG j ∈ GF
produces Sj(pt).
(iii) VGs produce Wt if pt > −r, produce Lt − qI + µ(r) if pt = −r, and do not
produce if pt < −r.
(iv) All generators are paid pt per unit of output at time t.
The above mechanism is common knowledge to all generators. In the next section,
we will analyze the equilibrium behavior in a supply function competition.
3.4 Supply Function Competition
In the classical supply function equilibria (SFE) literature, each firm submits a
supply function such that for each demand realization, the firm behaves as a monop-
olist with respect to its residual demand. Hence, the mark-up percentage is inversely
proportional to the elasticity of the residual demand. Because this elasticity consists
of derivatives of competitors’ supply functions, a SFE satisfies a system of differential
equations (Klemperer and Meyer , 1989).
Unlike the supply function competitions analyzed in the literature where genera-
tors essentially are all FGs, in our model, generators have different levels of flexibility.
FGs in our model not only compete among themselves, but also compete with all IGs
for market share, manifested in the IG production qI∗ in Theorem II.5 and the dis-
cussion at the end of §3.3.2. Therefore, the residual demand facing an individual FG
44
or IG depends on qI∗, which in turn depends on its own supply function. This is the
key difference between our model and the classical SFE model.
For our model, it is possible to derive a system of differential equations for the
equilibria; see Chapter IV for the detailed derivation and special solution to the sys-
tem of differential equations when the real-time price is always positive. Appendix C
also shows the derivation for the general problem. For the purpose of this chapter,
we are interested in all possible price scenarios, especially the situations involving VG
curtailment (see the four events illustrated in Figure 2.2). However, solving for the
general SFE for our model raises several challenges. First, the first-order conditions
are only necessary; the optimality of a generator’s response depends on other con-
ditions such as the shape of the supply functions and the probability distributions
of uncertainties. These conditions are much more difficult to analyze than in the
classical model (where the SFE does not depend on the probability distributions of
the uncertainties). Second, there is usually a continuum of equilibria for the classic
SFE model, thus a common approach in the literature is to focus on some special
class of supply function equilibria. For our model with different classes of generators,
the general theoretical analysis is even more difficult.
SFE with linear supply functions are considered in the classical works by Klem-
perer and Meyer (1989); Green (1996); Rudkevich (1999), among others. One of the
goals of this chapter is to examine how firms’ (in)flexibility affects SFE (see the first
two questions raised in §3.1) and compare the results with the insights obtained from
those in the literature. To compare our model with the classical model, we focus on
SFE with linear supply functions. In fact, using the historical generator offer data
from MISO3, we find that more than 70% of the generators (excluding those who
submit only one price-quantity pair) actually submit affine supply functions.
3Available at https://www.misoenergy.org/Library/MarketReports
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3.4.1 Linear Supply Function Equilibrium
From this point onward, we consider the case where each generator’s production





2, k ∈ GI ∪ CF , ck > 0, q ≥ 0, (3.11)
which implies a linear marginal cost C ′k(q) = ckq. Hence, in a perfectly competitive
market, generator k would submit the inverse marginal cost as its supply function,
i.e., Sk(p) = c
−1
k p
+. In an imperfect competition, we assume generators submit linear
supply functions:
Sk(p) = βkp
+, k ∈ GI ∪ CF , βk > 0, p ∈ <. (3.12)
That is, when the real-time price (or average price over [0, T ]) is positive, the out-
put rate that generator j ∈ GF (or i ∈ GI) is willing to produce is linear in price.
Our market equilibrium analysis is confined within the linear supply function strate-
gies. The pure strategy set will be defined in §3.4.1 after we discuss the optimal IG
production in §3.4.1.





2, ah ≥ 0, ch > 0, e ≥ 0. (3.13)
Optimal Dispatch under Given Supply Functions
For given qI > 0, Theorem II.4 gives the optimal qF∗t = (Lt − qI − Wt)+ and
qV ∗t = min
{
Wt, (Lt − qI + µ(r))+
}
, where µ(r) = (h′)−1(r) = (r − ah)+/ch based on
the penalty in (3.13).
The results on the optimal qI∗ in Theorem II.5 are specialized below. The aggre-
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gate IG and FG supply functions are










βj. Hereafter, we write the price P (q
I , Lt,Wt, S
F )
in (2.13) as P (qI , Lt,Wt, β
F ), and the average price P (qI , SF ) in (4.2) as P (qI , βF ),
expressed as follows:




(Lt −Wt − qI)1A4 −
[
ah + ch(q





















In most of the practical situations, the system operator instructs IGs to produce
a positive output and the average market price is also positive. Thus, we assume the
optimal qI∗ > 0. Equation (4.1) that determines qI∗ can be written as
qI = βIP (qI , βF ). (3.16)
There is a unique qI∗ satisfying (3.16). We denote this unique qI∗ as a function of βI
and βF :
qI∗ ≡ QI(βI , βF ) def=
{
qI : qI = βIP (qI , βF )
}
. (3.17)
Lemma III.4. The total IG output rate QI(βI , βF ) strictly increases in βI and
strictly decreases in βF .
The monotonicity of QI(βI , βF ) is intuitively illustrated in Figure 3.1 and formally
proved in Lemma III.4 in Appendex C.
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Pure Strategy Set
In the linear supply function competition, the supply function slopes, βk, k ∈
GI ∪ CF , are strategic variables. This section establishes the bounds on βk. These
bounds form a compact and convex pure strategy set, which is needed to establish
the existence of the equilibrium in §3.4.2.
For generator k’s supply function Sk(p) = βkp
+, a larger βk implies a more com-
petitive supply offer. The discussion preceding (3.12) reveals that an upper bound for
βk is c
−1
k <∞, which is what generator k would offer in face of perfect competition.
For FG j ∈ GF , a lower bound on βj can be found by solving a less competitive
game in which IGs do not exist; for IG i ∈ GI , a lower bound on βi can be obtained
by considering a less competitive game in which FGs do not exist and the demand
is constant over [0, T ], but its level is uncertain prior to t = 0. These games are
the same as the standard supply function game considered by Klemperer and Meyer
(1989). Rudkevich (1999) studies the linear SFE for such games and shows that the
slopes of the equilibrium supply functions are strictly positive and independent of the
demand distribution. Hence, βk is bounded from below by a strictly positive number,
denoted as βmink > 0, which is independent of the distribution of the uncertainties.
We define the pure strategy set of generator k as [βmink , c
−1
k ]. The slopes of the
aggregate IG and FG supply functions are also bounded: βI ∈ [βI min, βI max] and

















Using Lemma III.4, we can establish bounds on qI as
qI min = QI(βI min, βF max) and qI max = QI(βI max, βF min). (3.18)
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Furthermore, we assume P (0, βF max) > 0, i.e., when IGs do not exist and FGs reveal
their true marginal cost, the average price is positive, which is a mild assumption.
This assumption implies qI min > 0, because qI min is the unique solution to qI =
βI min P (qI , βF max).
Individual IG’s Problem
We now formulate how an individual IG i ∈ GI chooses βi in response to all other
generators’ supply functions. Given an average price P > 0, generator i will produce

















. Note that P depends on qI and βF
through (3.15), and qI is affected by βi through (3.16). Hence, IG i’s optimization









P (qI , βF )2 (3.19)
s.t. (3.16) and βi ∈ [βmini , c−1i ].
The system-level optimization yields (3.16), and the firm-level objective is given
by (3.19). Thus, this formulation is similar to the bi-level optimization procedure
described in Hobbs et al. (2000).
Using (3.16) and (3.17), we can write the price function as




























The best response of IG i to β−i and β







An individual FG j ∈ GF chooses βj in response to all other generator’s supply
functions. Observing price pt at time t, generator j produces at rate βjp
+
t and incurs
























2. Note that pt = P (q
I , Lt,Wt, β


















s.t. (3.16) and βj ∈ [βminj , c−1j ].
Equations (3.14) and (3.17) lead to
P (qI , Lt,Wt; β
F )+ =



























Lt −Wt −QI(βI , βj + β−j)
)+)2]
dt. (3.22)
Then, FG j’s best response to β−j and β








Interactions Between IGs and FGs
The total IG production function QI(βI , βF ) is the only component in the profit
functions (3.20) and (3.22) through which IGs and FGs interact. This implies that
the competition between the two types of generators is over the average market share.
The variabilities in load and VG potential output play no (direct) role in lGs’
profit function (3.20). Hence, IGs do not directly complete with FGs in meeting
the variable demand. The variabilities directly affect FGs’ profit in (3.22), and FGs
compete among themselves to serve the variable demand.
The interactions between IGs and FGs also render the equilibrium dependent on
the distributions of the uncertainties. If QI(βI , βF ) were constant in (3.22), then the
distributions of the load Lt and VG potential output Wt would not affect the strategic
choice of βj. In fact, without IG-FG interactions, the FGs’ problem reduces to that
in the classical SFE model. In our model, however, the distributions of uncertainties
affect the choice of βj in (3.22), which in turn affect the strategic decisions of all other
generators. This feature is in contrast with the classical SFE model. For example,
Klemperer and Meyer (1989), Green (1996), Holmberg (2007), and Anderson and Hu
(2008) demonstrate that supply function equilibria are independent of the demand
distribution.
3.4.2 Existence of SFE under Normally Distributed Load and VG Output
Because the SFE depends on the distribution of uncertainties, the existence of an
SFE is difficult to establish for general distribution of uncertainties. In this section,
we show the existence of an SFE in a special case when the load and VG potential
output are jointly normally distributed and the net demand variance is not too large.
As common with models using normal distributions as an approximation, we assume
that the probability of Lt or Wt being negative is sufficiently small such that it has a
negligible effect on the equilibrium.
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The fact that generators do not modify their decisions within the time horizon
and that all generators are risk neutral implies that we can collapse all sample paths
across time into a single probability distribution.









fLt,Wt(x, y) dt. (3.23)
It can be verified that fL,W (x, y) is also a probability density function. Let L and
W be the random variables that follow the distribution fL,W (x, y). Then, for any






























 dx dy = E[g(L,W )].
That is, the time-average of the expected value of g(Lt,Wt) equals the expected value
of g(L,W ) under the time-invariant probability distribution fL,W (x, y).
In this section, we assume L and W follow a bivariate normal distribution: L ∼
N (µL, σ2L) and W ∼ N (µW , σ2W ) with a correlation coefficient ρ. We define the net
demand random variable D
def






According to Debreu (1952), a sufficient condition for the existence of a Nash
equilibrium of this game is that the IG and FG profit functions shown in (3.20) and
(3.22) are quasi-concave in their own strategic variables. Proving the quasi-concavity
under general conditions is difficult due to the complicated structure of the price
function in (2.13), which gives an average price that is neither convex nor concave (see
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illustration in Figure 3.1). However, having qI < D (in region A4) with a sufficiently
high probability makes the average price curve close to linear, which bounds the
average price’s second derivative and bestows some structure to the problem. The
following result gives a sufficient condition to establish such a bound on qI .










, then qI max < µD.
Lemma III.5 shows that for a sufficiently small σD, the IG production is bounded
above by µD. Indeed, the IGs’ aggregate output does not exceed the average net
demand for most situations in practice. The condition given in Lemma III.5 is
not very stringent. For example, if min{r, ah} = 0 and βF min is one tenth of




F min/βI max ≈ 0.25µD. Thus, the Lemma’s condition holds if the
standard deviation of the net demand is within 25% of its mean, which is a mild
assumption in most practical situations. The importance of Lemma III.5 is that it
provides sufficient conditions for bounding qI , which ultimately leads to the following
equilibrium existence theorem.
Theorem III.6. When generators compete using linear supply functions and the
standard deviation of the net demand σD is sufficiently small, there exists a (pure
strategy) supply function equilibrium.
The result above establishes the existence of a linear supply function equilibrium
under certain sufficient conditions. Our numerical experiments, however, show that
the equilibrium exists for a wider range of demand variances and for other load and VG
output distributions. Indeed, a linear SFE is obtained in all our numerical examples.




In this section, we compute the SFE based on the model analyzed in §§3.3-3.4. We
compare our results with the classical SFE model by Klemperer and Meyer (1989) and
Green (1996). We also analyze the effect of increasing VG penetration and its curtail-
ment on the SFE. Our analysis does not aim to predict the magnitude of these effects
in reality, but to derive qualitative insights and provide policy recommendations.
3.5.1 Setups and Computational Procedure
We focus on the linear SFE described in §3.4.1. We consider a system consisting
of four IGs indexed by i ∈ GI = {1, 2, 3, 4} and four FGs indexed by j ∈ GF =
{5, 6, 7, 8}. The production cost rates (in $/hour) of these generators are quadratic in




2, where q is
in MW, ck = 4 $/MWh/MW for k ∈ GI , and ck = 12 $/MWh/MW for k ∈ GF . The
cost functions are kept identical within each generator group to facilitate comparison
between IGs and FGs; our computational procedure allows for different cost functions.
We assume the system’s oversupply penalty for e MW of oversupply is h(e) = 2e2
$/hour. We set the operating time horizon T = 1 day, and assume that each generator
submits a single supply function for the entire operating day; see discussion in §3.3.1.
We next specify the time-invariant probability distribution fL,W (x, y) defined in
(3.23). We assume the load L and VG potential output W follow independent normal
distributions, with µL = 100, σL = 15, µW = 5, and σW = 1.75 in the base case. These
parameters are in MWh per 5 minutes. (Many electricity systems measure load and
VG output at 5-minute intervals, which can be used to estimate these parameters.)
The VG penetration level is µW/µL = 5% (close to the current VG penetration
in the U.S.). In addition to this base case, we also consider various VG penetration
levels. Following Wu and Kapuscinski (2013), when VG penetration increases by m
times (µW increases by m times), the standard deviation σW increases by m times if
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the existing and added VG outputs are perfectly correlated, or
√
m times if they are
independent. The realistic case is likely in between and we assume that σW increases
by m0.75 times. Specifically, we consider four additional VG penetration levels: 0%,
15%, 30%, and 50%. That is, m = 0, 3, 6, 10.
We consider the following VG curtailment policies: priority dispatch for VG (no
curtailment), economic curtailment for VG (when subsidy r = 0), partial economic
curtailment (when subsidy r = 20 or 40 $/MWh).
The generators submit linear supply functions Sk(p) = βkp
+, described in (3.12).
The following procedure is used to compute the generators’ equilibrium supply func-
tions:
Step 1. Start with iteration n = 0 and set the initial slopes βnk ≤ c−1k , ∀ k ∈ GI∪GF .
Step 2. Let n := n + 1. For every generator k ∈ GI ∪ GF , find the optimal slope
βnk that maximizes generator k’s profit, assuming that none of the other
generators modify their slopes (i.e. use the βn−1l slopes from the previous
iteration for generators l 6= k). The market equilibrium condition (3.16) is
used in this step to find qI and the spot price function.
Step 3. If max
k∈GI∪GF
{ ∣∣βnk − βn−1k ∣∣ /βn−1k } < ε, then terminate the procedure and the
equilibrium slopes are {βnk }, otherwise go to Step 2.
We use ε = 0.1% in the convergence criterion. The program typically takes 4 to 5
iterations to converge. We select multiple different starting points for our iteration,
and all of them lead to the same equilibrium in the numerical examples tested.
For the purpose of presenting the insights from our numerical experiments, it





We refer to γk as price offer slope. In a perfect competition, the price for generator
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k to produce q is equal to its marginal cost ckq. In an oligopolistic competition,
generator k offers price γkq, γk ≥ ck. The closer γk is to ck, the lower the markup
and the more competitive the price offer is.
3.5.2 FG-IG Equilibrium vs. Klemperer-Meyer Equilibrium
Our model extends the classical SFE model by Klemperer and Meyer (1989) to
include the asymmetries in both cost and flexibility. We first compare the equilibrium
in our model (referred to as FG-IG equilibrium) and the Klemperer-Meyer (KM)
equilibrium, focusing on the linear SFE. The KM equilibrium with linear supply
functions and asymmetric cost is solved by Green (1996) and Rudkevich (1999).
We compute the KM equilibrium under the assumption that generators 1-4 are
also flexible and have the same cost functions as described in §3.5.1. In the KM
equilibrium, generators 1-4 each offer price 5.0 q and generators 5-8 each offer price
10.9 q. Figure 3.2(a) shows these price offer slopes, as well as the price offer slopes in













































Stdev. of price 
(b) Average and standard deviation of
price.
Figure 3.2: Klemperer-Meyer Equilibrium vs. FG-IG Equilibrium without VG
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Using the procedure in §3.5.1, we compute the FG-IG equilibrium when there is
no VG in the system. The only difference in setup between our model and the KM
model is that generators 1-4 are IGs. Thus, one might expect IGs 1-4 to behave more
differently than FGs 5-8 compared to the KM equilibrium. However, Figure 3.2(a)
shows that IGs’ equilibrium price offer is slightly higher than in the KM model,
whereas FGs’ equilibrium price offer is significantly higher than in the KM model.
The reasons stem from the asymmetry in flexibility. First, IGs do not compete with
FGs in matching production with the uncertain load. Hence, the competition facing
an FG in our model is less intense than that in the KM model, allowing FGs to raise
their price offers. Second, FGs still compete with IGs for market share (i.e., IGs
produce qI∗ and FGs produce the rest, which are allocated by the system operator
according to (3.17)). Hence, the competition facing an IG in our model is similar
to that in the KM model. It is slightly less intense because FGs raise their price
offers as explained in the first reason. As a result, IGs slightly raise their price offers
above the KM equilibrium. The above finding suggests that the KM model tends to
underestimate generators’ price offers, more significantly so for FGs.
Figure 3.2(b) shows that the average and standard deviation of the real-time price
in the FG-IG equilibrium are higher than those in the KM equilibrium. Because
both IGs and FGs offer higher prices in the FG-IG equilibrium than in the KM
equilibrium, the average price is also higher. The price volatility increases for two
reasons. First, in the KM equilibrium, all generators adjust their outputs in response
to load fluctuations, whereas in the FG-IG equilibrium, only four FGs respond to
load fluctuations. Consequently, the price is more sensitive to load fluctuations in the
FG-IG equilibrium than in the KM equilibrium. The higher FG price offers seen in
Figure 3.2(a) further increase this sensitivity. Second, when the load drops below the
IGs’ production level, an oversupply situation occurs and the price becomes negative,
whereas the price in the KM model is always positive when there is no VG.
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In short, in view of both the generators’ price offers and the equilibrium price, the
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(b) IGs’ price offer slope γ.
Figure 3.3: Effects of VG on Equilibrium Price Offers.
3.5.3 Impact of Variable Generation (under Priority Dispatch) on SFE
The impact of VG penetration on the FG-IG equilibrium depends on the dispatch
policy for VG. In this section, we focus on the priority dispatch policy, i.e., the entire
VG potential output is absorbed into the system.
The KM equilibrium is known to be independent of the distribution of the un-
certainties (Klemperer and Meyer , 1989). Thus, the KM equilibrium price offers are
invariant to the VG penetration levels and shown as the flat dashed lines in Figure 3.3.
In the FG-IG equilibrium, FGs and IGs together serve the net demand (load
minus VG output). As VG penetration increases, if FGs and IGs keep their price
offers unchanged, the system operator will allocate a larger market share to FGs and
a smaller share to IGs to avoid significant oversupply penalty. To profit from this
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advantage, FGs raise their price offers as VG penetration increases, which is confirmed
in Figure 3.3(a); the top curve is for priority dispatch.
On the IGs’ side, as VG penetration increases, IGs face a price-quantity tradeoff:
They can either increase price offers to raise the equilibrium price but get a smaller
market share, or lower their price offers to gain more market share. Because under VG
priority dispatch the system operator tends to keep a low IG output to mitigate the
oversupply penalty, IGs’ strategy of lowering price offers may not lead to an output
increase sufficient to raise IGs’ profit. The strategy of raising price offers turns out
to be more profitable for IGs, partly because FGs also raise their price offers, seen in
Figure 3.3(a). The higher IG price offers are confirmed in Figure 3.3(b); the top curve
is for priority dispatch. Hence, under priority dispatch, as VG penetration increases,
both IGs and FGs raise their price offers in the FG-IG equilibrium.
Although increased price offers tend to raise the market price, increased VG pen-
etration also reduces the average net demand and exerts downward pressure on the
price. The equilibrium price is a result of the combination of these two effects. The
second effect dominates in determining the average equilibrium price, as shown in Fig-
ure 3.4(a), where the average equilibrium price declines as VG penetration increases.
However, the first effect is important in affecting the price volatility. At a high VG
penetration level, the VG output can still occasionally drop to a low level, requiring
the system to ramp up FGs production to meet the demand. In such situations, FGs’
increased price offers at high VG penetration levels lead to high equilibrium prices.
On the other hand, when VG output surges, the system has to take all VG output
because of the priority dispatch policy, resulting in an oversupply penalty and nega-
tive prices. Therefore, under priority dispatch, increasing VG penetration makes the
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(b) Standard deviation of price.
Figure 3.4: Effects of VG on Equilibrium Price.
3.5.4 Impact of the Economic Curtailment Policy on SFE
The analysis in §3.5.3 assumes priority dispatch for VG, which is used in some
electricity systems. Some other electricity systems allow curtailment of VG for eco-
nomic reasons, but as discussed in §3.1, the production-based subsidy reduces the
amount of VG curtailment, effectively increasing the priority for VG. In this section,
we consider three subsidy levels: r = 0, 20, and 40 $/MWh. We focus on discussing
the economic curtailment case with zero subsidy, and refer to the cases of r > 0 as
the partial economic curtailment cases.
The economic curtailment policy increases the competition among IGs and FGs
in two ways. First, economic curtailment provides the system operator with an ad-
ditional lever to manage uncertainty, and thus, the system operator allocates less
production to FGs than under the priority dispatch policy. As a result, FGs offer
more competitive prices to compete for market share. Second, economic curtail-
ment significantly reduces the oversupply penalty, thereby altering the price-quantity
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tradeoff facing IGs (this tradeoff is described in §3.5.3). Consequently, IGs’ strategy
of lowering price offers can yield a market share increase that is sufficient to increase
IGs’ profit. These two effects of economic curtailment reinforce each other in equi-
librium, because IGs reduce their price offers in response to FGs’ reduced price offers
and vice versa.
The combination of these effects yields the equilibrium price offers shown in Fig-
ure 3.3. The economic curtailment policy encourages both IGs and FGs to offer
more competitive prices. In Figure 3.3(b), IGs’ price offers may drop below the level
predicted by the KM model.
Figure 3.3 also shows the effect of subsidies. Because subsidies effectively grant
priority to VGs to some extent, a higher subsidy leads to less competitive price offers.
Thus, the curves for the partial economic curtailment cases lie in between the curves
for priority dispatch and economic curtailment.
Economic curtailment has little effect on the equilibrium average price, but the
impact on price volatility is significant. Figure 3.4(a) shows that when VG penetration
level is below 30%, average prices under various VG policies are indistinguishable. At
higher VG penetration levels, the average price under economic curtailment is slightly
higher because the curtailment reduces the severity of the negative prices. In contrast,
the price standard deviation drops considerably under economic curtailment, as shown
in Figure 3.4(b), because economic curtailment reduces extreme prices by making the
market more competitive when prices are high and reducing the oversupply penalty
when prices are negative.
3.5.5 Effects of Curtailment on Costs and Emissions
The economic curtailment policy also impacts the system operating cost, including
the actual (not revealed) production cost and the oversupply penalty. Table 3.1 shows
that, on average, one MWh of economic curtailment reduces the system operating cost
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by about $30. This cost reduction effect is consistent across all VG penetration levels.
This finding is also in line with the economic benefit of curtailment found in Wu and
Kapuscinski (2013).
Table 3.1 also shows the effect of production-based subsidies on curtailment and
the system operating cost. A higher subsidy reduces the amount of curtailment,
but increases the system operating cost. In theory, when the subsidy approaches to
infinity, no curtailment will occur, and the system operating cost equals that under
the priority dispatch.
Interestingly, a higher subsidy also increases the value of per-MWh curtailment.
For example, at 5% VG penetration with r = 20 $/MWh, one MWh of economic
curtailment reduces the system operating cost by $49; with r = 40 $/MWh, this
value increases to $67. This result is again consistent across all VG penetration
levels. The implication is that the benefit of economic curtailment may be very high
in countries and regions where VGs are heavily subsidized based on production.
An environmental benefit from increasing VG penetration is the reduced CO2
emissions due to the replacement of the conventional production by the clean VG
production. Table 3.1 confirms that the total CO2 emission significantly decreases as
VG penetration increases.
The impact of economic curtailment on CO2 emission, however, is not as obvious
and depends on the generators’ fuel types. Because economic curtailment allows for
more IG production and less FG production, if IGs have a higher/lower CO2 emis-
sion rate than FGs, economic curtailment may increase/decrease total CO2 emission.
Table 3.1 demonstrates that when IGs are coal-fired/nuclear-power generators and
FGs are natural gas combustion turbines, economic curtailment increases/decreases
emissions. Furthermore, when subsidies exist, the emissions lie in between economic
curtailment and priority dispatch cases.
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3.6 Conclusion
Electricity markets have been gradually evolving toward deregulated structures
that are meant to encourage competition and improve efficiency. The research in
deregulated electricity markets, especially the supply function competition, has pro-
vided considerable insights into generators’ bidding behavior and market power. This
chapter provides new results that address how the competition is affected by genera-
tors’ flexibility and variable generation. The two most important messages from this
chapter are that inflexibility contributes to the market power and that the economic
curtailment of variable generation increases the market competition and system effi-
ciency.
Inflexibility contributes to the market power in the following way. Inflexible gener-
ators do not compete with flexible generators in matching production with uncertain
demand, leading to increased market power for flexible generators, which in turn re-
sults in higher average price and price volatility than predicted by the classical SFE
model.
Variable generation, when given priority in dispatch, exacerbates the effect of in-
flexibility on market competition, but the economic curtailment policy can intensify
the market competition because economic curtailment serves as a partial substitute
for flexible generators to balance against variability. Furthermore, economic curtail-
ment improves system efficiency by reducing the oversupply penalty and using more
inflexible generation which is less costly than flexible generation.
The insights from this chapter also provide several recommendations for the reg-
ulators and policy makers. First, in assessing the competitiveness of the electricity
market, it is important to incorporate generators’ flexibility/inflexibility. Flexible
generators compete in balancing against variability and often set the market price.
Encouraging the development of more flexible generators (e.g., fueled by natural gas)
enhances the overall competitiveness of the electricity market. Second, in assess-
63
ing the benefit of the economic curtailment policy, it is important to recognize that
economic curtailment helps increase market competition and reduce price volatility.
Policy makers need to revisit the policy of giving priority to variable generation from
renewable sources, and consider a full range of benefits of economic curtailment.
Other benefits of economic curtailment include reduced cycling cost and peaking cost
(Wu and Kapuscinski , 2013), and improved production allocation in a network (Ela,
2009). Third, policy makers need to reconsider the design of incentives aimed to
maximize the benefits of renewable energy. The design of subsidies should facilitate
economic curtailment and avoid unintended consequences. Investment in research
and development can push technology advancement that makes renewable energy
generation more competitive in the near future even without subsidies.
It remains an area of future research to study the competition among generators
with various ramping capabilities and the costs associated with ramping. A model
with ramping would more accurately reflects the composition of generators in prac-
tice and would provide a more accurate estimate for the magnitude of the effects of
inflexibility and economic curtailment. In this chapter, variable generators are as-
sumed to be price-takers. A more comprehensive market competition model would
include strategic behavior of variable generators as well. Furthermore, in some re-
gions, variable generators are also allowed to submit supply functions, and certain
market rules specify the actions to take when the realized output differs from what
they offer to supply. We leave the analysis of such behavior and resulting supply
function competition to future research.
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5% 15% 30% 50%
VG penetration
(after curtailment)
r = 40 4.97% 14.91% 29.73% 49.10%
r = 20 4.93% 14.79% 29.42% 48.34%




Priority Dispatch 1076.4 887.1 648.9 415.4
r = 40 1075.8 885.4 643.7 397.6
r = 20 1075.4 884.2 640.9 390.9





r = 40 67.1 65.0 66.8 69.3
r = 20 48.9 47.0 48.8 51.3




Priority Dispatch 30.91 25.07 17.52 9.67
r = 40 30.92 25.10 17.60 9.87
r = 20 30.94 25.14 17.70 10.04




Priority Dispatch 4.12 3.51 2.79 2.09
r = 40 4.11 3.50 2.75 1.99
r = 20 4.10 3.48 2.71 1.90
Economic Curtailment 4.09 3.44 2.63 1.76
Emission rates: 215 lb. of CO2 per MBtu of coal, 117 lb. of CO2 per MBtu of natural
gas, no emission for nuclear power generators. Fuel price: $2.5 per MBtu of coal and
$5 per MBtu of natural gas.
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CHAPTER IV
Daytime Supply Function Equilibrium Model with
Generation Inflexibility
4.1 Introduction
The electricity system model we have considered thus far permits the total elec-
tricity supply to exceed the demand. We have found that such events produce non-
positive electricity prices. Excess electricity occurs when the electricity demand falls
below its nominal level in a system with either of the two following characteristics:
1. The system has substantial IG production that cannot promptly react to the
demand dips, or
2. The system has a large VG penetration with government subsidies that make
it profitable for VGs to continue to generate electricity even when the prices
become negative.
In practice, the electricity demand plummets during the night, while the daytime
demand, especially during peak time, requires a large fleet of generators, with FGs
supplying the marginal demand. This is precisely the A4 scenario shown in Figure 2.2
with FGs as price setters.
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In this chapter, we will consider the electricity system’s problem during the day-
time when flexible, inflexible, and variable generators all have positive production
rates throughout the time horizon. In such circumstances, we assume that the load
is large enough such that all the VG production is accepted (see Equation (2.11)).
Therefore, we will regard VGs as negative demand and only consider flexible and
inflexible generation in this chapter.
The main contribution in this chapter is that we derive the Oridinary Differential
Equations (ODE) system for the SFE when there system has a mix of flexible and
inflexible generators in §4.3. We then find an affine solution to the ODE system when
generators have quadratic costs in §4.4. We then conclude this chapter in §4.5 by
presenting some possible future research direction in this area.
4.2 The System Operator’s Problem
Consider an operating time horizon [0, T ] during the daytime (peak hours). A
system operator schedules production to satisfy a price inelastic demand Dt in time
t ∈ [0, T ] using two types of generators:
• Inflexible generators (IG), indexed by i ∈ GI , cannot adjust their output rates
during [0, T ]. The output rate of generators i ∈ GI , denoted as qi ≥ 0, is
determined by the system operator prior to time t = 0 and stays constant over
[0, T ]. We assume that i incurs an operating cost rate Ci(q) for producing q
MW.
• Flexible generators (FG), indexed by j ∈ GF , can adjust their output rates
instantaneously. We denote the output rate of generator j ∈ GF at time t ∈
[0, T ] by qjt, and use a cost rate function Cj(q).
We assume that every firm owns a single generator and we do not consider generator
capacity limits in this problem.
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Before time 0, every generator k ∈ GI ∪ GF submits a strictly increasing sup-
ply function Sk(p). After receiving these offers, the system operator computes the






S−1k (x)dx, ∀ k ∈ G
I ∪GF ,
where the inverse supply function is S−1k (q)
def
= inf{p : Sk(p) > q}. The objective of
the system operator is to minimize the total expected revealed cost of serving the
demand over [0, T ].
The system operator’s problem can be formulated as first deciding the aggregate
output rate for each type of generators and then allocating the aggregate output to
individual generators. Let qI =
∑




j∈GF qjt be the aggregate IG
and FG output rates, respectively. The allocations of qI and qFt to individual IGs and


























We can show that CI and CF are continuously differentiable, convex, and strictly
increasing in q, and that (CI)′(q) = (SI)−1(q) and (CF )′(q) = (SF )−1(q), where SI













Let Dmin > 0 be the minimum possible demand over [0, T ]. Assume that no
oversupply or shortage is allowed. Hence, the system operator must set qI ≤ Dmin
and qFt = Dt−qI at time t. Then, the FGs’ revealed cost rate at time t is CF (Dt−qI),
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and IGs’ revealed cost rate is CI(qI) at all times. The system operator determines qI






CF (Dt − qI) dt
]
.
By the convexity of the cost functions, we can use the first order condition to solve
for the optimal qI . Assume that the optimal solution, qI∗, is an interior solution:
qI∗ ∈ (0, Dmin), which is a typical case for the day time. The first order condition for
qI gives the following optimality condition
qI∗ = SI
(













(SF )−1(Dt − qI)
]
dt, (4.2)
P (qI , SF ) is the average market price when the total IG production is qI and the
aggregate FG supply function is SF . Note that P is decreasing in qI and increasing
in SF (in the sense of SF (p) increasing uniformly).
4.3 Generators’ Best Response Problem
4.3.1 IG Problem





k∈GI\i Sk(p) and S
F (p). The function P (qI , SF ) is es-
sentially an inverse demand function facing IGs, and generator i can use the average





= inf{q : P (q, SF ) ≥ p}. (4.3)
Notice that the total IG supply must match QI in equilibrium, which gives the relation
























By substituting Si(p) for Q






(p), ∀ i ∈ GI . (4.4)
This resembles the classical equilibrium condition derived by Klemperer and Meyer
(1989). The difference is that the demand function in our setting shown in (4.3) is
implied by FGs’ supply functions. Hence, the last term in (C.12) captures how FGs’
decisions affect IGs’ supply functions.




















[p− C ′i(Si(p))] .
(4.5)
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P (qI , SF )|qI=SI(p)[
∂
∂qI
P (qI , SF )|qI=SI(p)
]3 .
Notice that P shown in (4.2) is decreasing in qI , and since all supply functions are
increasing then QI is decreasing in p and QI
′
(p) ≤ 0. Furthermore, if P is concave
with respect to qI then QI would be concave in p and QI
′′
(p) ≤ 0. Therefore, the
first term in (4.5) is negative because QI is decreasing and S−i is increasing in p and
the second term is negative because Ci is convex. If Q
I were concave and Si(p) were
convex then the last term would become negative since p − C ′i(Si(p)) ≥ 0. Hence,
the second order condition holds and (C.12) becomes sufficient if the following two
conditions hold:
• The IG supply functions Si(p) are convex ∀ i ∈ GI .
• The average price function P (qI , SF ) is concave with respect to qI .
4.3.2 FG Problem
An individual FG j ∈ GF offers a supply function Sj(p), knowing that Sj(p)
has two effects on the outcome of the game. The first effect is that Sj(p) directly
influences real-time prices (SF )−1(Dt − qI). This effect captures the fact that FG j
directly competes with other FGs in satisfying the balance of the demand. This first
effect also changes the average price in (4.2), which affects the market-clearing IG
output rate qI∗ in (4.1). This second effect captures the fact that FGs and IGs are
also competing with each other. These two effects are intertwined because the IG
output qI∗ influences real-time price as well. Recognizing these effects, FG j decides
its supply function Sj(p). We first consider FG j choosing among all feasible supply
functions that support a given qI as the market-clearing IG output. Once a desired
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supply function is found to support each qI , FG j will then optimize over qI .
When the demand is Dt, generator j produces Dt − qI − S−j(pt) at a price pt,
which corresponds to a point on its supply function. Hence, we can equivalently use
pt as j’s decision variable, under the constraint that the price should support q
I as







Taking one step further, FG j chooses qI and pt jointly as long as they satisfy this

















E[pt] dt = T (S
I)−1(qI) ⊥ ηj.










Dt − qI − S−j(pt)
)]
dt+ ηj T (S
I)−1(qI).
The first-order condition for pt is
(




pt − C ′j(Dt − qI − S−j(pt))
]
= 0.




∀ j ∈ GF . (4.6)
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The second derivative of the Lagrangian with respect to pt is
−2S ′−j(pt)− (S ′−j(pt))2C ′′j (Sj(pt))− S ′′−j(pt)
[
pt − C ′j(Sj(pt))
]
.
The first term is negative since S−j is increasing, the second term is negative because
Cj is convex, and the third term is negative if S−j is convex since pt ≥ C ′j(Sj(pt)).
Therefore, the second-order condition holds for pt and (C.17) becomes sufficient if all
the FG supply functions are convex.












E[pt] dt = P (q
I , SF ), the dual variable ηj becomes
ηj = S





E[pt − C ′j(Sj(pt))] dt ∀ j ∈ GF . (4.7)
Since the spot price pt depends on q
I and SF , then ηj depends on all generator bids.














The following is a summary of the ODE system that characterizes the first order










∀ j ∈ GF ,
ηj = S





E[pt − C ′j(Sj(pt))] dt ∀ j ∈ GF ,
where














= inf{q : P (q, SF ) ≥ p},
pt = (S
F )−1(Dt − qI),
qI = SI
(
P (qI , SF )
)
.
It turns out that this system admits an affine supply function solution when the costs
are quadratic as we will show next.
4.4 Affine SFE
We assume in this section that the production cost for generator k ∈ GI ∪GF is






and the supply functions take the form
Sk(p) = βk(p− αk).
We will often refer to βk as the slope bid and αk as the intercept bid of generator k.
For this linear supply function form to be valid we need to ensure that the average
price exceeds αi for i ∈ GI and the minimum price exceeds αj for j ∈ GF , otherwise
generators may have negative production values. Furthermore, the average price
must not fall below ai for i ∈ GI and the minimum price must not fall below aj for
j ∈ GF because a rational generator would benefit from setting its supply bid to 0
for all prices below its initial marginal cost, rendering the linear supply function form
invalid.
If we denote minimum demand by Dmin and the average and minimum prices by
P and pmin, then the following list summarizes our assumptions about the problem:
(1) 0 < qI < Dmin. (2) ai < P for i ∈ GI . (3) αi < P for i ∈ GI .
(4) aj < pmin for j ∈ GF . (5) αj < pmin for j ∈ GF .
We will show in §4.4.5 conditions under which our assumption about these properties
is valid. Note that the second order conditions for the SFE ODE system are satisfied
for affine supply functions. Therefore, if we can find slopes βk and intercepts αk for
all generators k ∈ GI ∪GF that solve the ODE system (C.12), (C.17), and (4.7) then
this solution would give a valid SFE.
4.4.1 The System Operator’s Problem
Given the generator supply bids, the system operator sets the IG production level
qI such that (4.1) is satisfied. We will find in this subsection the equilibrium qI , the
average spot price, and the spot price as a function of the realized demand for given









j βj, and γ
F =
∑
j βjαj. The aggregate
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IG and FG supply functions are
SI(p) = βIp− γI and SF (p) = βFp− γF ,








The average price and its derivative with respect to its first argument are
























P (qI , SF ) = − 1
βF
.
where D is the average demand in the operational time horizon. The IG production
function QI(p) shown in (4.3) and its derivative are
QI(p) =βF (D + γF − p),
QI
′
(p) =− βF .





βI(D + γF )− γIβF
]
, (4.8)
P (qI∗, SF ) = (SI)−1(qI∗) =




Furthermore, we can calculate the spot price when the demand is Dt as
P (Dt) =(S
F )−1(Dt − qI∗) =





















4.4.2 The IG Problem









p− (ai + ciβi(p− αi))
− βF
⇒β−i + βF =
βip− βiαi
p(1− ciβi)− (ai − ciβiαi)
.












If we solve for the αi values in the last equation we get
αi = ai, (4.12)
which is the well known incentive compatibility result by Rudkevich (1999). This also
shows that the βi values are determined from the competition only among IGs, but
with a price elastic demand with the FG slope bids setting the demand derivative.
Therefore, we need to know βF in order to determine the equilibrium IG slope bids.
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4.4.3 The FG Problem






p− (aj + cjβj(p− αj))
=
βjp− (βjαj + ηj)
p(1− cjβj)− (aj − cjβjαj)
.











This gives two results. First, FGs can determine their slopes independently from IG
bids or their own intercept bids by solving a linear SFE competition with only FG
participants and with inelastic demand. Second, Rudkevich’s incentive compatibility
result for the intercepts does not hold for FGs in general, and their intercept bids can
be determined by







An FG’s intercept bid equals its linear price coefficient if and only if its ηj value is





D + γI + γF
βI + βF
(1− cjβj)− aj + cjβjαj
]
. (4.15)
This equation shows that ηj depends on the slope and intercept bids of all generators
as well as the average demand, and hence even if βj is known, Equation (4.14) alone
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is not sufficient to determine αj. Instead, αj and ηj can be found simultaneously by
solving the system of linear equations (4.14) and (4.15) after determining βj ∀ j ∈ GF
and βI .
The dual variable ηj can be interpreted as generator j’s reaction to q
I . A large ηj
is indicative of j’s resistant to IGs increasing their production quantity, while a small
negative ηj suggests that j benefits from IGs raising their production. By substituting







Since we only consider cases where the price exceeds the generator initial marginal
costs, this formula shows that ηj is always positive for our problem, implying that
FGs benefit from lowering qI . This observation has an important implication: FGs
submit lower bid intercepts than their cost function intercepts. This can be easily
verified by substituting a positive ηj into (4.14) to get αj < aj. This, however, does
not imply that FGs produce at a loss because the price is assumed to never fall below
aj during the daytime.
4.4.4 Calculation Method
Given the problem parameters ck and ak for k ∈ GI ∪GF and D, we will develop
in this section an algorithm to find the βk and αk bids for k ∈ GI ∪GF .
From §4.4.2 and §4.4.3, αi = ai and βj can be determined independently from
other bids, and hence the first step of the algorithm is to solve for βj using (4.13).
Given βj, the IG slope bids can be found from (4.11), which is the second step of our
algorithm. Finally, given all other bids, we can simultaneously find all the αj and
ηj values by solving the system of linear equations given by (4.14) and (4.15). An
outline of this algorithm is shown below.
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Algorithm IV.1.
Step 0: Set αi = ai for i ∈ GI .






























Steps 1 and 2 of the algorithm can be solved using the method by Rudkevich
(1999) shown in Appendix D.1, which gives βk ∈ (0, 1ck ).
4.4.5 Parameter Ranges
To ensure that the linear SFE solution is valid we have to ensure that the 5
conditions listed in the beginning of this section hold. Note that conditions (2) and
(3) are the same since IGs submit the same intercept bids as their initial marginal
costs, and condition (4) implies (5) because FGs bid smaller intercepts than their
initial marginal costs.
According to (4.10), the minimum price occurs at the minimum demand Dmin,
and hence the fourth condition is given by















































βI(D + γF )− γIβF
]
= qI .
Therefore, if the minimum spot price exceeds all FG linear cost coefficients then the
total IG production would never reach the minimum demand. The second condition
is given by
aImax < P =
D + γI + γF
βI + βF
⇒D > aImax(βF + βI)− (γI + γF ), (4.17)












γI − γF ,
















This implies that the first assumption is guaranteed whenever the second and fourth
assumptions are satisfied. Ultimately, the five necessary assumptions about our model
are valid for any set of parameters ak, ck, D, and Dmin for which the two inequalities
(4.16) and (4.17) hold.
81
4.4.6 Analysis
In this subsection, we will analyze the SFE solution (from sections 4.4.2 and 4.4.3)
and obtain some insights on the problem. We will then show the effect of disregarding
the generation flexibility by comparing the SFE model studied in this chapter with
the conventional SFE models in which all generators are assumed to be flexible.
Solution Interpretation
We have shown in §4.4.3 that IGs have no effect on the FG slope bids, but can
influence the FG intercept bids. The more competitive IG bids are the higher their
aggregate slope βI becomes, which raises ηj and causes αj to fall. This implies that
increasing the IG competition causes FGs to lower their intercept bids, and hence
makes FGs more competitive1. The IG intercept bids, on the other hand, are not
affected by any bid, but their slope bids depend on the FG competition as shown in
4.4.2. When the FGs bid more competitively the sum of their slope bids βF increases,
causing the demand derivative for the IG competition to rise and intensifying the IG
competition.
This outcome can be explained by two types of competition:
• Market share competition in which all generators participate to increase their
average production rates, and
• Competition to balance the variable demand, in which only FGs participate2.
IGs chose their slope bids based on the market share competition, while FGs base
their slope bids on the variable demand competition and their intercept bids on the
market share competition. The IG market share is given by (4.8) and the average FG
1FGs become more competitive because they would offer more production quantity at the same
price when they have lower αj bids.
2The absence of IG dependent terms in Equation (4.13) signifies their exclusion from competing
over the variable demand.
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market share is










An intensive market share competition is characterized by high IG slope bids and
low FG intercept bids, while an intensive variable demand competition causes FGs
to raise their slope bids.
The demand distribution plays no role in determining the supply function bids
in the conventional KM model. Although the slope bids can be determined indepen-
dently from demand for all generators, the FG intercept bids depend on the demand.
According to (4.15), the αj values decrease with the average demand, signifying ag-
gressive participation in the market share competition. When the average demand
increases the average market price also increases at a rate 1
βF
. At the higher average
market prices, FGs find it beneficial to lower their price intercepts in order to increase
their average market share, even if the average market price slightly drops.
Comparison With the All FG Model
We will consider two problems in this subsection:
• Problem AF (All Flexible): All generators in GF and GI are flexible in this
problem, and
• Problem FI (Flexible/Inflexible): Generators in GF are flexible while generators
in GI are inflexible in this problem.
We will use the same variables for these two problems but with an AF and FI
superscripts. For a set of generators G and a scalar b ≥ 0 define the bid solution to
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a linear SFE as
B(G, b) = {βk, k ∈ G :
∑
l∈G\k
βl + b =
βk
1− ckβk
∀k ∈ G}. (4.19)
B gives the linear supply function solution to the set of generators G with demand
derivative b. Using this notation, the slope bids for the AF problem is B(GF ∪GI , 0)
and the solution to the FI problem is B(GF , 0) for generators in GF and B(GI , βF )
for generators in GI . In order to compare the bid solutions from the two problems,
we show in the following Lemma that the generator slope bids are increasing in b.
Lemma IV.2. The bids βk for k ∈ G given by B(G, b) are increasing in b.
Proof of this lemma and other results in this chapter can be found in Appendix D.
If we think of b as the demand derivative, then this Lemma can be restated as
follows: The generator competition in a linear SFE intensifies when the demand curve
becomes steeper. Using Lemma IV.2, we can get the following result.
Theorem IV.3. βAFk > β
FI
k ∀ k ∈ GF ∪GI .
Theorem IV.3 shows that generators submit more competitive price bids in the
AF problem compared to the same generator bids under the FI problem. The in-
tuition behind this result is that the exclusion of IGs from the demand balancing
competition gives FGs the opportunity to markdown their βj values in the FI prob-
lem. Consequently, IGs lower their slope bids in the market share competition in
response to the aggressive FG bids. One thing to note is that the set of generators in
GI are only slightly less competitive in the FI problem (compared to the generators
in GF ) because their βi markdowns are not caused by the exclusion of competitors,
but are rather in response to the lower bids of the generators in GF .
The significance of Theorem IV.3 is that it confirms that failing to account for
generator inflexibility overestimates the slope bids for all generators. If an all flexible
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generator model were used to study the competition in a system with flexible and
inflexible generators then only FGs may come out as irrational because IGs would
appear to submit rational best response bids to the seemingly irrational FGs. Not
accounting for generator inflexibility can also have a profound impact on the electricity





and V ar(P FI(D)) > V ar(PAF (D)).
In addition to overestimating the competition intensity, Theorem IV.4 shows that
not accounting for generation inflexibility underestimates the average spot price and
the price variance. Figure 4.1 illustrates the difference in bid between the AF and
FI problems for a FG (Figure 4.1a) and an IG (Figure 4.1b) and Figure 4.2 shows














Figure 4.1: Generator bidding under the the AF and FI problems.
4.5 Future Work
We developed in this chapter an ODE system for finding the SFE when there
are flexible and inflexible generators. We then found the unique affine SFE when
all generators have quadratic cost functions. There are several potential extensions
to this work. First, studying the general non-linear equilibrium solution can give















Figure 4.2: Aggregate supply curves for the AF and FI problems.
literature, ownership of multiple generators by a single firm does not complicate the
problem since all generator’s can be lumped into a single generator. However, in our
model, if the firm’s generation portfolio consists of flexible and inflexible generators,
then the problem becomes significantly more complicated. Studying the impact of
multiple firm ownership is another modification to the problem that we intend to
consider.
Electricity contracts have been studied for the traditional SFE with all flexible
generators. Flexible generators may have additional incentives to enter into long term
contracts to protect themselves against low prices. Incorporating contract positions
for generators could be an interesting third research direction. Lastly, integrating
variable generation into the model and studying its impact is also a relevant research
direction given the recent interest in renewable energy.
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CHAPTER V
Price Bidding in Electricity Markets
5.1 Introduction
We study in this chapter two electricity auction models where generators submit
price bids for their generation capacity to an ISO, who dispatches generators to
satisfy demand in a uniform price auction. In the first model, we study the effect
of transmission capacity constraints on the competition when there are only two
generators. We find that the addition of these constraints does not change the bidding
policy of generators, instead it changes the critical demand levels at which generators
revise their bids. We then consider a problem with multiple symmetric generators
and a random demand. We consider a symmetric mixed strategy Nash equilibrium
and give the ODE condition for the equilibrium, then solve for closed form solutions
for the duopoly case and the multiple generator case with uniform demand.
5.2 Background
The literature on price bidding in electricity auctions was first introduced by
von der Fehr and Harbor (1993) to study the electricity market in the United King-
dom. In their model, firms that owned generators with constant marginal costs sub-
mitted price bids to the system operator that indicate the prices at which they would
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offer the entire capacities of their generators. Although their model considered the
competition between multiple firms, where each firm can own several generation units
with different production costs and capacities, their analysis only focused on Pure
Strategy Nash Equilibrium (PSNE) solutions for two firms, each with a single gener-
ator.
Supatgiat et al. (2001) consider PSNE solutions for a problem with multiple firms,
where each firm owns a single generator, and with discrete bid increments. They
characterize properties of the equilibria and develop an algorithm that finds the most
aggressive PSNE. Brunekreeft (2001) studied a multiple firm problem in which every
firm owns multiple units. The paper uses a very specific generation unit order and
demand pattern and does not fully characterize the equilibrium, but rather provides
bidding bounds. Garcıa-Dıaz and Marın (2003) studied a more general multi-unit
multiple firm auction for a fixed deterministic demand. Crawford et al. (2007) focused
on asymmetric equilibria for multi-unit auction duopoly with complete information.
5.2.1 Model Description
A set of generators i = 1 · · · , n bid selling prices b = (bi)ni=1 (in $ per power
unit) for their electricity production to satisfy a demand D ∈ [D,D]. In this chapter,
we assume that the demand is not affected by the electricity prices. The cost of
producing q power units from generator i is ciq ($ per time unit), where ci is generator
i’s marginal production cost (in $ per power unit). We will assume that generators
are indexed based on non-decreasing marginal costs, so ci ≤ cj if i < j. Generators
also have production capacity limits ki (energy per unit time). We will denote the
aggregate capacity for generators 1 through i by Ki =
∑i
j=1 kj, and we will assume
that Kn ≥ D to ensure sufficient capacity for all demand realizations. We will also
assume that the system has a maximum price bid p ($ per power unit). This implies
that a rational generator i bids in the range bi ∈ [ci, p]. We will assume that all
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generators are rational and have perfect information about all the generation costs,
production capacities, and the customer demand.
An ISO that minimizes the production cost to consumers can use any portion of
any generator’s capacity as long as generators are paid at least their bids for every
energy unit. We consider a uniform price auction in which all generators are paid the
same price for every unit sold. The uniform market clearing price is the lowest price











Recall that 1 is the indicator function where 1{A} = 1 if event A is true and 0 if
A is false. All generators with bids strictly below p are completely utilized while
generators with bids above p are not used. Generators with bids exactly equal to p
may be partially loaded. If multiple generators bid p then the generators with the least




Therefore, generator i gets the following production allocation,












and makes a profit of
πi(b, D) = qi(b, D)(p(b, D)− ci). (5.3)
Finding an equilibrium for this problem is not trivial, even for the duopoly case.
von der Fehr and Harbor (1993) showed that this problem may have multiple PSNE
1Others, including von der Fehr and Harbor (1993) and Garcıa-Dıaz and Marın (2003), have
made a similar assumption. Ideally, more sophisticated tie breakers that gives equal priority to all
generators should be used, but such allocation rules would complicate the model without adding
insights.
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when the demand is deterministic, and there may not exist a PSNE when the demand
is stochastic.
5.2.2 Model Applications
The United Kingdom’s switch from uniform price to discriminatory price auctions
in the early 2000’s triggered an abundance of studies comparing the two price mech-
anisms. California considered switching to discriminatory pricing shortly after the
UK experience, which resulted in numerous studies both for and against the switch.
For example, Kahn et al. (2001) argue agains the shift while Rassenti et al. (2003)
conclude that discriminatory pricing can improve the market performance by sub-
stantially lowering the price volatility. The explicit price decision in the generator’s
objective makes the price auction a popular model for comparing the two market
mechanisms. For example, Federico and Rahman (2003) use a price auction model
to characterize the different trade-offs between these mechanisms. Fabra et al. (2006)
study the uniform and discriminatory auction cases for a duopoly problem with a
known demand, using both PSNE and MSNE. They also consider several extensions
to the problem such as price-elastic demand and stochastic demand.
Unlike the SFE models, the price bidding models are commonly used to construct
increasing step function supply offers, which is required by most system operators. To
construct such offers, generator price curves are first linearized. Each linear segment
of the cost is then treated as an independent generator with its own marginal cost
and capacity, and a supply offer curve is constructed by optimizing the price bid over
the demand range.
Price auction models with deterministic demand are also applicable in markets
with short-lived auctions in which firms regularly update their bids. Their appli-
cability under such settings is due to two factors: (1) When the duration between
bids is short the demand variability becomes small, and hence the demand can be
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approximated by a constant value between bid durations, and (2) generators operate
within a tight production range in the short duration between bids, and hence their
marginal costs can be approximated by a constant value. Moreover, under the short-
lived auction setting the price bidding model can be used to predict renewable plant
bids since their available capacity can be accurately predicted over short durations.
5.3 Duopoly in a Transmission Constrained Network
In a duopoly model with c1 < c2, the cheap generator can undercut the expensive
generator by bidding b1 = c2 when the demand is low, while both generators must
produce to satisfy a demand that exceeds k1. To maximize their profits, one of the
generators would have an incentive to bid p in high demand scenarios. von der Fehr
and Harbor (1993) showed that only one generator bids p in a PSNE. However,
they showed that there may be multiple pure strategy equilibria with different price
setters. Fabra et al. (2006) showed that the cheap generator may break the monopoly
and bid p even if the demand is below its capacity. This occurs when the cheap
generator’s capacity is large enough compared to the expensive generator’s capacity,
and the price ceiling is high enough such that the cheap generator would be willing to
loose market share in order to increase its selling price. They show that the critical
demand at which the clearing price jumps from c2 to p and generators change their





. Notice that we use the notation ∧ and ∨ for
the min and max operators, respectively, throughout this chapter.
In this section, we extend this problem to include the transmission network. The
introduction of transmission network constraints change the ISO’s problem. Instead
of setting a clearing price according to (5.1) and allocating production according
to (5.2), the ISO solves a transmission constrained optimal dispatch problem after
getting the generator bids. Consequently, the two generators anticipate the auction’s
new structure and bid accordingly. We find that the solution structure of the auction
91
with network constraints is similar to the original problem, but with a lower critical
demand level D∗ that depends on the network topology and line capacities. Appendix
A shows some background and derivation of the DC optimal dispatch problem that
is used in this section.
5.3.1 Production Allocation
We consider a general network topology with a set of nodes N and a set of trans-
mission lines L, where each transmission line l ∈ L has capacity f̄l. The transmission
lines are assumed to be directed arcs in this model, with the the same capacity in
either direction. We will assume that every transmission line is represented twice in
L to model flows in both directions. That is, if line (i, j) ∈ L the we assume that line
(j, i) ∈ L with f̄(i,j) = f̄(j,i). Each node i ∈ N has a fixed demand di ≥ 0. Genera-
tors 1 and 2 are located in two arbitrary nodes in the network, which we denote by
nodes 1 and 2. We will assume without loss of generality that these two nodes are




i∈N di and the demand vector
by d = (di)i∈N . Also, let D ⊂ R|N |+ be the set of feasible demand vectors (i.e. the
combinations of demands in the network that can be satisfied by the two generators),
which we will determine later in this section. We will denote by d̄i the maximum
demand in node i.
Upon receiving the generator bids b1 and b2, the ISO uses these bids to construct
the generator revealed cost functions Ci(q) = biq for i ∈ N . Because the demand is
fixed in this problem, the decision values qi = −di are known and the revealed costs
Ci(qi) = 0 for all nodes i ∈ N \ {1, 2} in the problem (A.5)-(A.8). Nodes 1 and 2
have nodal injections q1−d1 and q2−d2 and revealed costs b1q1 and b2q2, respecitvely,
where q1 and q2 are the only unknown variables in the ISO’s problem. According to
(A.5), the ISO’s objective in this problem is to minimize b1q1 + b2q2.
2If the two generators happen to connect to the same node we can split this node into two nodes
with an infinite capacity line in between.
92
By selecting node 2 as the slack node we can set β2l = 0 for all lines and (A.7) can
be expressed without q2






l q1−β>l d. By substituting
q2 = D − q1 the objective becomes minq1(b1 − b2)q1 + b2D, where D =
∑
i∈N di as
before. Notice that b2D can be dropped from the objective since it is constant in the
ISO’s problem. The constraint that q2 ∈ [0, k2] can be written as q1 ∈ [D − k2, D],
and when combined with generator 1’s constraint q1 ∈ [0, k1] we get the condition




s.t. β1l q1 ≤ f l + β>l d ∀ l ∈ L
(D − k2)+ ≤ q1 ≤ D ∧ k1.
To ensure the existence of a feasible solution, we assume the following:
(1) No generation capacity limitation:
∑
i∈N d̄i ∈ (0, k1 + k2].
(2) No transmission line limitation: f̄l ≥ 0 is large enough such that ∃ q1 ∈ [(D −
k2)
+, D ∧ k1] that satisfies f̄l ≥ β1l q1 − β>l d ∀ d ∈ D and l ∈ L.
Condition (2) ensures the existence of a pair of generator injections q1 ≥ 0 and q2 ≥ 0
that can satisfy demand without violating any line capacity. If β1l = 0 for some line
l, then condition (2) cannot be binding and q1 is not restricted by line l’s capacity.
Let
L1 = {l ∈ L : β1l > 0}, L2 = {l ∈ L : β1l < 0}.
3Refer to Appendix A for the definition of the slack node and the power transfer distribution
factors (PTDF) βkl , which can be interpreted as the portion of the flow from node k’s power injection
passing through line l on its way to the slack node. We also use βl as the column vector of PTDFs
for line l and β>l for its transpose (row) vector.
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∀ l1 ∈ L1 and l2 ∈ L2.
Note that the left most term in the inequality decreases to −∞ as f̄l2 → ∞ and
the right most term increases to ∞ as f̄l1 → ∞. In other words, condition (2) is






∀ l ∈ L1 ∪ L2.
rl(d) is the maximum (minimum) injection q1 for which the flow in line l ∈ L1 (L2) is
feasible when the demand vector is d. We will also define l∗(d) ∈ argminl∈L1 {rl(d)},
which is the set of first lines in the network that get congested when increasing
a feasible q1, and l∗(d) ∈ argmaxl∈L2 {rl(d)} as the set of first lines that become




{rl(d)}, r∗(d) = max
l∈L2
{rl(d)}.
r∗(d) and r∗(d) are the maximum and minimum levels for which q1 is feasible, and
thus q1 ∈ [r∗(d), r∗(d)]. By convention, r∗(d) = ∞ if L1 = φ and r∗(d) = −∞ if
L2 = φ. If we now combine all constraints we get
max{D − k2, r∗(d), 0} ≤ q1 ≤ min{D, k1, r∗(d)}. (5.4)
By the same argument as before (when f̄l → ∞), we can find f̄l values for which
max{(D − k2)+, r∗(d)} ≤ min{D, k1, r∗(d)}, which is a necessary condition for the
existence of a feasible solution4. Using (5.4), the quantity allocation problem becomes
4max{D − k2, 0} ≤ min{D, k1} follows from the range of D ∈ (0, k1 + k2].
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trivial; set q1 to min{D, k1, r∗(d)} if b1 ≤ b2 and to max{(D− k2)+, r∗(d)} if b1 > b2.
Therefore, we can write a closed form solution for the quantity allocations.
q1(b,d) =1{b1≤b2}min{D, k1, r∗(d)}+ 1{b1>b2}max{(D − k2)+, r∗(d)}, (5.5)
q2(b,d) =1{b1≤b2}max{(D − k1)+, D − r∗(d)}+ 1{b1>b2}min{D, k2, D − r∗(d)}.
(5.6)
Notice that Equation (5.6) is attained by subtracting q1(d,b) from D.
We can solve a similar problem for generator 2, where generator 1 is used as the
slack node and q1 is replaced by D − q2. To distinguish between the two problems,
we will use β̃, l̃∗, l̃∗, r̃
∗, and r̃∗ in place of β, l
∗, l∗, r
∗, and r∗. By solving the same
problem when q2 is the decision variable we get
q2(b,d) =1{b1>b2}min{D, k2, r̃∗(d)}+ 1{b1≤b2}max{(D − k1)+, r̃∗(d)}, (5.7)
q1(b,d) =1{b1>b2}max{(D − k2)+, D − r̃∗(d)}+ 1{b1≤b2}min{D, k1, D − r̃∗(d)}.
(5.8)
Define the effective capacities for generators 1 and 2 as k̃1(d) = k1 ∧ r∗(d) and
k̃2(d) = k2 ∧ r̃∗(d). We interpret the effective capacity as the limit of a generator’s
production, which is determined by the generator’s capacity or the transmission line
bottleneck, whichever is lower. We can therefore write the first term in (5.5) as
1{b1≤b2}(D ∧ k̃1(d)) and the first term in (5.7) as 1{b1>b2}(D ∧ k̃2(d)). The first term
in (5.6) can be written as








Likewise, the first term in (5.8) can be simplified to
























Equations (5.9) and (5.10) have an intuitive interpretation: a generator with the
lower bid satisfies the entire demand if possible, otherwise it produces at the level
where it reaches its effective capacity, and if it has a higher bid then it generates the
portion of the demand the other generator could not satisfy.
5.3.2 Clearing Prices
The basic rule in a uniform price auction is that all generators are paid the same
clearing price for their production. When network constraints are introduced, gen-
erators can exercise locational convenience to raise their prices. This causes price
discrimination between nodes whenever a transmission line becomes congested. In
such a scenario, no single uniform price can be used in all locations to clear the mar-
ket, instead each node must have its own uniform price that is used for all agents
connected to the node, which can be calculated from (A.9). The node-dependent
price is known as the locational marginal price (LMP).
When a generator is marginal (i.e. supplies the additional unit of demand in the
node) and produces at partial capacity then, according to (A.9)5, the generator is
paid its own bid. From (5.9), this scenario occurs for generator 1 when it has a larger
5The capacity constraint is not binding for a generator operating at partial capacity, and hence




bid and the total demand exceeds the second generator’s effective capacity (b1 > b2
and D > k̃2(d)), or if generator 1’s bid does not exceed the other generator’s bid but
the total demand is less than its effective capacity (b1 ≤ b2 and D < k̃1(d)). From
(5.10), the same scenario occurs for generator 2 if it submits at least as large a bid as
b1 and there is sufficient demand (b1 ≤ b2 and D > k̃1(d)), or if generator 2 submits
a smaller bid and the total demand is smaller than its effective capacity (b1 > b2 and
D < k̃2(d)).
A generator’s price may depend on the other generator’s bid when the generator
is non-marginal, which can either happen because (1) the generator’s bid is high and
the demand is low, or (2) the generator’s bid is low and the demand is high. We
need not consider the first case because a generator does not produce when its bid is
high and the other generator can satisfy the entire demand on its own. In the second
case, the low bidding generator i produces k̃i(d). If the generator is operating at
partial capacity (k̃i(d) < ki) then using the first part of (A.9) its LMP must equal its
own bid. If, on the other hand, generator i is operating at full capacity (k̃i(d) = ki)





where λ is the other generator’s bid and µl are the dual variables for the line capacity
constraints. However, the fact that generator i reaches its full capacity implies that
the network is not congested, and hence µl = 0 for all lines. Therefore, generator i is
paid the other generator’s bid in this case.
By combining the scenarios from the previous discussion, we can write the nodal













+ 1{b1>b2}1{D>k̃2(d)}(1{k̃2(d)<k2}b2 + 1{k̃2(d)=k2}b1).
(5.12)
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Notice that the case when b1 > b2 and D ≤ k̃2(d) was not considered for p1 because
generator 1 is not allocated any production in this case. Similarly, the scenario b1 ≤ b2
and D < k̃1(d) does not appear in p2 because generator 2 is not active in this case.
Now that we have characterized the ISO generation allocation decision and clearing
prices as functions of generator bids and demand realizations, we will consider the
generator bidding problem next.
5.3.3 The Generator Problem
A generator’s profit function in this problem has the form shown in Equation
(5.3) but with a location dependent nodal price instead of the uniform price. By
substituting the quantities and prices rom Equations (5.9), (5.10), (5.11), and (5.12),




+ 1{D>k̃1(d)}(1{k̃1(d)=k1}b2 + 1{k̃1(d)<k1}b1 − c1)k̃1(d)
]





+ 1{D>k̃2(d)}(1{k̃2(d)=k2}b1 + 1{k̃2(d)<k2}b2 − c2)k̃2(d)
]
+ 1{b1≤b2}(b2 − c2)(D − k̃1(d))+.
(5.14)
In a best response problem, a generator determines the bid that maximizes its own
profit in response to the other generator’s (known) bid. Our goal in this subsection
is to characterize the best response bids to find bidding equilibria.
In generator 1’s best response problem, we assume that it knows the other gen-
erator’s bid b2, the demand in every node d, and finds b1 that maximizes its own
profit. Generator 1’s profit function depends on whether it bids below or above b2.
If generator 1 bids b1 ≤ b2 then according to (5.13), it is a weakly dominant strategy
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to bid b2, and if it bids above b2 then bidding p is a dominant strategy. Generator 2
has a similar strategy, but with bidding b1 − ε6 as a weakly dominant strategy when
b2 < b1 and p as a dominant strategy when b2 ≥ b1. Because of their rationality,
generator i bids bi ∈ [ci, p], i = 1, 2, otherwise a generator could make a negative
profit when bi < ci. Since generator 2 never bids below c2 then it is weakly dominant
for generator 1 to never bid below c2. We will consider the weekly dominant strategy
in which both generators bid in [c2, p].
If it is more profitable for generator 1 to bid higher than generator 2 then, from
(5.13), it is always optimal to bid p. Therefore, generator 1 only bids below p to
undercut the second generator. Consequently, a bid b1 ∈ (c2, p) can only be optimal
if b1 ≤ b2. This solution can be an equilibrium if it is profitable for the second
generator to bid higher, in which case it bids p according to (5.14). However, if
generator 2 finds it profitable to bid low then it can undercut b1. This results in
a Bertrand competition in which generators undercut one another, which has an
equilibrium with both generators bidding c2. As a result, there can only be two
possible equilibrium nodal prices in pure strategy; c2 and p. In fact, this result has
the same structure of the original auction problem with no transmission constraints
(see for example Fabra et al. (2006)). Nevertheless, it turns out that transmission
constraints change the generator preferences on whether to bid high or low as we will
see next.
5.3.4 Comparison with the Original Problem
The transmission line capacities affect the solution only when they constrain a
generator’s production. For large enough line capacities the critical ratios r∗(d) > k1
and r̃∗(d) > k2, which makes k̃i(d) = ki for i = 1, 2. When this happens, the
6ε is a small positive number used to break the tie with generator 1.
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production allocation in Equations (5.9) and (5.10) become
q1(b, D) =1{b1≤b2} (D ∧ k1) + 1{b1>b2} (D − k2)
+ ,
q2(b, D) =1{b1>b2} (D ∧ k2) + 1{b1≤b2} (D − k1))
+ ,











and the profits in (5.13) and (5.14) become
π1(b, D) =1{b1≤b2}
[
1{D≤k1}(b1 − c1)D + 1{D>k1}(b2 − c1)k1
]
+ 1{b1>b2}(b1 − c1)(D − k2)+,
π2(b, D) =1{b1>b2}
[
1{D≤k2}(b2 − c2)D + 1{D>k2}(b1 − c2)k2
]
+ 1{b1≤b2}(b2 − c2)(D − k1)+.
In this problem, the first generator bids c2 when the demand is low, but when
it rises above k1 then the equilibrium price is p (either generator may be marginal).
However, when k1 > k2 there may be a demand below k1 but above k2 at which
generator 1 prefers to change its policy and raise its bid to p at some production
loss to the second generator, which would be compensated by the high clearing price.
This critical demand value is the point at which generator 1 is indifferent between
bidding high and bidding low, which satisfies the equation
(c2 − c1)D = (p− c1)(D − k2).
This gives the indifference demand level D = p−c1
p−c2k2. Therefore, the price rises from
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c2 to p when the demand either exceeds this level or exceeds k1, whichever occurs
first. Hence, as D increases, the price starts at c2 for low demands, jumps to p at





, and remains at p for high demand values.
To compare the transmission constrained problem with the original problem, we
will assume that the demand increases uniformly in every node as D increases. That
is, if D0 > 0 with a demand vector d0, then d1 = D
1
D0
d0 for the demand level D1 with
the demand vector d1. For a sufficiently small demand, the transmission network is
not capacitated and the cheaper generator can satisfy the entire demand by bidding
c2, which gives a price of c2 in all nodes. As the demand is increased the price in node
1 would jump to p at some point. If k̃1(d) = k1 for some d then the transmission
constraint does not limit generator 1’s production and the same analysis for the
unconstrained case holds. However, if k̃1(d) < k1 for demand vector d, then generator
1 is constrained not by its own capacity, but by the network. Under this scenario,
node 1’s price is high if the demand exceeds either k1 or
p−c1
p−c2 k̃2(d) as before, but we
also need to considers the case when k̃1(d) < D < k1. In such a scenario, according
to (5.13), generator 1 always gets its price when it bids low, but also gets to sell its
maximum potential k̃1(d). The indifference demand level between bidding c2 and p
when k̃1(d) < D < k1 satisfies
(c2 − c1)k̃1(d) = (p− c1)(D − k̃2(d))
⇒D = c2 − c1
p− c1
k̃1(d) + k̃2(d).
Consequently, node 1’s price will be high if D exceeds both this level and k̃1(d).


















Indeed, this formula is a generalization of the duopoly problem when network
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constraints are considered. To derive the non-constrained network solution with a





from (5.15) we can take all line capacities f l,
l ∈ L, to be sufficiently large, which makes k̃i(d) = ki, i = 1, 2, for every feasible
d. The max term in (5.15) becomes max{k1, c2−c1p−c1 k1 + k2}. If k1 ≥
c2−c1
p−c1 k1 + k2
then this max term becomes k1, which makes D





. On the other
hand, if k1 <
c2−c1
p−c1 k1 + k2 then this max term becomes
c2−c1
p−c1 k1 + k2, which can be
disregarded because it is obviously larger than the first term in the min operator in
(5.15). Therefore, in either case the price jumps from c2 to p at the critical demand





when the network is not congested, which is identical to the
solution when there are no network constraints. By taking k̃i(d) = ki, i = 1, 2, it can
also be verified that the system has the same uniform price and all generators would
behave as in the non-network constrained problem.
We have shown in this subsection that including network congestion in our two
stage market mechanism starting with an auction then moving to a network economic
dispatch problem requires some work in calculating power transfer distribution fac-
tors and effective capacities under different demand realizations, but the equilibrium
structure remains unchanged. The main insight in this section is that accounting for
transmission capacity constraints in the Bertrand duopoly model does not change the
solution structure nor does it significantly complicate the calculations. This result
holds because setting a slack generator reduces the number of decision variables in
the ISO problem (A.5)-(A.8) to one, and the allocation to this generator can be ex-
pressed in terms of the relative values of the two generator bids. Unfortunately, we
could not use a a similar approach when the network has more than two generators
because (A.5)-(A.8) becomes a multivariable linear program.
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5.4 Symmetric Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium for Multi-
ple Generators with Stochastic Demand
The price bidding equilibrium model becomes more difficult when the demand
is modeled as a stochastic process. PSNE may not even exists in this stochastic
demand case7. Fabra et al. (2006) derive the MSNE for the two generator game.
When there are multiple generators all the different bid orders have to be accounted
for when solving for a mixed strategy equilibrium. This problem becomes increasingly
more complicated as the number of generator’s increase because accounting for all
scenarios becomes a combinatorial problem. Even if brute force enumeration is used
to attain all possible scenarios, getting the mixed strategies requires solving an ODE
system, one ODE for every generator, with all these combinatorial terms. Solving
this system could be numerically achievable for small problems, but may not provide
useful insights.
To study the competitive behaviour of multiple firms we assume in this section that
all firms have identical costs and capacities, and we focus on the class of symmetric
equilibria. These assumptions make the model much more tractable and can lead to
closed form solutions for many special cases. We will go over the problem’s model in
§5.4.1 and derive an ODE that can be used to attain the mixed strategy equilibria.
We will then present a duopoly example in §5.4.2 and an oligopoly example with a
uniform demand in §5.4.3. Our main goal from this section is to find the generator
equilibrium strategies in order to understand how the number of generators, their
costs, the market price ceiling, and the demand distribution affect the competition
and the market prices.
7See for example Proposition 4 in von der Fehr and Harbor (1993).
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5.4.1 The Model
Our problem has n generators each with a capacity k and a fixed marginal cost
c. Let D be the random variable representing the stochastic consumer demand. Let
b = (b1, · · · , bn) be the generator bid vector. Let b(i) be the ith smallest bid, so
b(1) ≤ b(2) ≤ · · · ≤ b(n). We will partition the demand range into n left continuous
equilength intervals, where the jth interval is Ij = ((j − 1)k, jk]. Generator i’s payoff






1{bi=b(j)}(D − (j − 1)k)(bi − c) + 1{b(j)>bi}k(b(j) − c)
]
.
Now consider the case when generator i chooses its bid when the other generators
randomize their bids. Let B be the random variable of the other generator bids with
distribution FB, density fB, FB(x) = 1−FB(x), and support [b, p]. We will denote the
ith order statistic (ith smallest) random variable among the n− 1 generators by B(i).
We will denote the probability of the demand being in interval Ij by PDj
def
= P{D ∈
Ij} and the expected excess demand in interval Ij by EDj
def
= E[D|D ∈ Ij]− (j− 1)k.
If generator i bids bi and the remaining n− 1 generators bid according to the mixed






P{B(j−1) ≤ bi < B(j)}EDj(bi − c)




Notice that this expectation is taken with respect to the demand D and the n − 1
generator bids that are drawn from FB, while bi in this formula is an input variable.
We use the convention B(0) < c and B(n) > p in (5.16). The following theorem gives
the ODE that characterizes the symmetric MSNE for this game.





















The proof of this theorem can be found in Appendix E.
We will go over two examples next where the solution to (5.17) can be expressed
in closed form.
5.4.2 Duopoly Model Example
In a duopoly model with two symmetric generators, the demand has support
(0, 2k]. If D never exceeds k then a trivial pure strategy equilibrium exists where
at least one generator bids c and satisfies the entire demand. We will therefore
assume that D has a a continuous distribution FD with FD(k) = 1 − FD(k) > 08.
We can write the problem parameters as PD1 = FD(k), PD2 = FD(k), PED1 =







− kFD(k). We can substitute n = 2 in (5.17) to
get the following differential equation for the symmetric duopoly model.
PED1FB(x) + PED2FB(x) + (∆PED1 − kFD(k))(x− c)fB(x) = 0
⇒PED1 + ∆PED1FB(x) + (∆PED1 − kPD2)(x− c)fB(x) = 0.
8If FD(k) = 1 then the problem becomes trivial and both generators bid c with probability 1.
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; if ∆PED1 6= 0,
PDE1
kFD(k)
ln(x− c) +K2; if ∆PED1 = 0,
where K1 and K2 are constants determined by the boundary conditions and
α = − ∆PED1
∆PED1 − kFD(k)
.








⇒FD(k) (2k − E[D|D > k]) ≤ −FD(k)E[D|D ≤ k].
If FD(k) > 0 and FD is continuous on (0, 2k], then the LHS of this inequality would
be positive and the RHS would be non-positive, which is a contradiction. Therefore,
α = 0 if ∆PED1 = 0 and α > 0 when ∆PED1 6= 0.
































; if ∆PED1 = 0.
(5.18)
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The lower bid bound b can be calculated by setting FB(p) = 0, which gives
b =





; if ∆PED1 6= 0,
c+ (p− c)e−
kFD(k)
PDE1 ; if ∆PED1 = 0.
(5.19)
The lower bidding bound is greater than c, with b ↓ c when FD(k) ↓ 0. This confirms
that (5.17) gives the symmetric version of the stochastic model by Fabra et al. (2006)
when n = 2.
5.4.3 Uniform Demand Model Example
We consider in this subsection the case when the demand is uniformly distributed


























where K is an integration constant. By using the boundary condition FB(p) = 1 then














The minimum bid that satisfies FB(b) = 0 is
b = c+ (p− c)e−2(n−1). (5.22)











































Notice that the distribution of this order statistic is different from the one used in
the derivation of Equation (5.17) because all n generators are accounted for in this
ordering, while only n − 1 generators were used in Equation (5.17)’s derivation. We
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This result shows that the average price increases linearly with the price ceiling p




Incentive Design for Optimal Electricity Network
Transmission Expansion
6.1 Introduction
The sustainable development of electric power networks is a pressing issue in many
regions, and according to Hogan (2008) there is currently very little incentives for in-
vestors. The electricity network is recognized as a natural monopoly (Hogan (1992)),
and most of the transmission expansions in electricity networks are traditionally car-
ried out by a central planner, such as the government or a regulated transmission
company. The central planner chooses the transmission line paths and determines
their capacities to maximizes the collective social welfare. This problem can be for-
mulated as a mixed integer programming problem (Binato et al. (2001), Alguacil et al.
(2003), and de la Torre et al. (2008)). Congestion-driven methods, such as Shrestha
and Fonseka (2004), are also commonly used to make investment decisions. There is
an abundance of transmission expansion planning models in the literature. Latorre
et al. (2003) classifies some of these publications.
One distinct feature of electric networks is the loop flow phenomenon, which entails
that an electricity injection in a node flows in every transmission line in the network
according to Kirchhoff’s laws. This causes free riding and public goods sharing issues
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and can deter network investments. Nevertheless, several mechanisms have been
proposed to attract investors. Among the most popular mechanisms are the coalition
investment and the merchant investment models. We will consider these two models
in this chapter.
In the coalition investment model, generation companies and electricity retailers
invest in transmission lines to access distant markets. This model became popular
after its successful implementation in Argentina in the mid 1990’s as depicted in
Littlechild and Skerk (2008). Cooperative game theory is commonly used to study
the investor coalition formation. For example, Contreras and Wu (1999) studies the
coalition formation and the investment cost allocation using Shapely values, while
Contreras and Wu (2000) considers kernel-stable coalitions. The benefits from a
transmission expansion are unevenly realized by the network agents. In fact, some
generators and customers may even be harmed by transmission expansions. Subse-
quently, coalitions are formed among agents that benefit from the investment, and
an agent’s investment share often depends on the agent’s benefit from the transmis-
sion expansion. The physical network usage can also form a basis for allocating the
investment costs as proposed by Conejo et al. (2007). Although some non-investors
may also benefit from the expansion, the investors usually share most of the benefits.
In the merchant investment model, an independent investor seeks monetary gains
from the transmission rent. This gains come in the form of financial transmission
rights (FTR) that specify nodal injections in the network that the investor is entitled
to. The investor ultimately benefits from collecting the monetary value of these
nodal injections. The FTR concept has been adopted in many networks, and their
benefits can also be realized by coalition investors. Several variants and hybrids of the
merchant investment model have been considered, such as the merchant-regulatory
mechanism proposed by Hogan et al. (2010). New transmission capacity often changes
the topology of the network and affects the profits of generators, consumers, as well
111
as transmission line owners. In fact, many of the ongoing transmission market design
efforts aim at encouraging investments and protecting market participants from future
network modifications.
Building new transmission lines relieves congestion in the network, which can
affect the revenue of existing transmission line owners. Hogan (2011) uses a simple
two node example to illustrate this phenomenon. To limit this effect, some have
proposed mechanisms that reward existing FTR owners whenever a transmission
expansion is made. For example, Kristiansen and Rosellón (2013) propose a method
for awarding incremental FTRs that maintains revenue adequacy for existing FTR
holders. We will not address this effect in this chapter and leave it as a possible
future research direction. Another approach proposed by Contreras et al. (2009) is to
use Shapley values to allocate the total rewards from the investments to the different
investors based on the value added by each transmission line.
Transmission capacity expansions can also influence the generation competition.
Borenstein et al. (2000) study the capacity of a transmission line connecting two
nodes with symmetric generating firms and customers. They show that increasing
the transmission line capacity can substantially improve competition. Sauma and
Oren (2009) reach the same conclusion from studying a similar two node problem
but with asymmetric generators and consumers between the two nodes. They also
conclude that the cheaper generator has the correct capacity investment incentive.
In this chapter, we analyze the incentives of the coalition and merchant investment
models for a general network topology. Although certain transmission expansions may
reduce the operating efficiency and/or network capacity, we only consider expansions
that are overall beneficial. We assume that the expansion paths are determined and
study the capacity increment under each investment model. We first present the so-
cially optimal expansion increments in §6.3.1, then consider the merchant investment
model in §6.3.2 and the coalition investment model in §6.3.3. We show that neither
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of these models achieves the socially optimal capacity increment. We then consider
in §6.3.4 and §6.3.5 two investment setups that are based on the merchant investor
mechanism. We show that these two models yield near optimal investment levels. We
then compare the different mechanisms using the IEEE 14 bus test system in 6.4 and
conclude this chapter with some future research considerations in 6.5.
6.2 Background
We will use in this chapter the DC power network model shown in Appendix
A. Specifically, we will use the optimal dispatch problem but without generator
capacities, which is given by the subset of the problem (A.5)-(A.7) rather than the
complete problem (A.5)-(A.8).
6.2.1 Problem Description
Consider an electricity network with a set of nodes N and directed transmission
line arcs L. Without loss of generality, assume that each node i ∈ N has at most a
single generator and a single customer. A generator / load located in node i is indexed
by i. Generator i incurs a cost rate Ci(q) (in $ per unit time) from generating q electric
power units, and load i has a benefit rate Bi(q) (in $ per unit time) from consuming q
power units. The functions Ci are increasing convex functions and Bi are increasing
concave functions ∀ i ∈ N . Starting with a line capacity K0, the network operator
wants to make capacity increments to each line according to the increment vector
∆. Such an investment relieves congestion and improves the social welfare, but costs
I(K0,∆), where I is a jointly increasing and concave function in ∆.
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6.2.2 Optimal Dispatch Problem
Consider a network with the set of line capacities K. The ISO allocates production









i (K)− Ci(qsi (K)
)
.




(qs,qd) ∈ RN+ × RN+ : −K ≤ H(qs − qd) ≤ K
}
.







i )− Ci(qsi )]
}
.
We can consider this formulation as special case of problem (A.5)-(A.7) when the
injection into node i is qi = q
s
i −qdi and the generation cost in node i is Ci(qsi )−Bi(qdi ).
We will denote the solution to the optimal dispatch problem when the line capacities
are K as qs(K) and qd(K) with individual nodal injection into node i as qsi (K) and
extraction (i.e. negative injection) from node i as qdi (K). To satisfy the first order









i (K)) ∀ i.
In other words, in an optimal solution the marginal benefit from consumption in a
node equals the marginal cost of producing electricity from the node. This marginal
cost / benefit equals the electricity LMP pi(K), which is the uniform price customers
1This is equivalent to the first order condition in Equation (A.9), but since the generation capacity
constraint is not accounted for we can assume that γi is zero for all nodes.
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in node i pay for their entire consumption and suppliers in node i receive for their
entire production. Therefore, the surpluses of suppliers and customers in node i are
πsi (K) = pi(K)q
s
i (K)− Ci(qsi (K)), πdi (K) = Bi(qdi (K))− pi(K)qdi (K).
Because different nodes may have different prices and supply may not equal the
demand at a node, the consumer payments to the system may exceed the amount








i (K)− qsi (K))
is known as the transmission rent, and is paid to the transmission line owners. This





























i (K))− Ci(qsi (K))
]
,
and the social welfare can be expressed as
SW (K) =Π(K) + TR(K).
In other words, the social welfare of the system is given by the total benefits of the
producers, consumers, as well as the transmission line owners. The difference in
nodal prices in our model is caused by transmission line congestion2, which implies
2Transmission losses may also play a role in the difference in nodal prices, but we do not consider
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that owners of congested transmission lines get larger transmission rent allocations.
The most common allocation method is based on point to point FTRs.
6.2.3 Financial Transmission Rights
The owners of a transmission network are collectively paid the transmission rent
TR(K) = p(K)>T (K). Correspondingly, the owners of the transmission network
have the right to collect the profits on the injection vector T (K) given the price
vector p(K). The vector T (K) is known as the aggregate node to node FTR. If there
are multiple transmission line owners, each owner is assigned a FTR vetor τ , and all
FTRs sum to T (K).
Definition VI.1 (Financial Transmission Rights (FTR)). A point to point financial
transmission right is a non-zero vector τ ∈ RN , where a positive entry signifies power
injection at a node and a negative entry signifies power generation at the node.
A transmission owner k with FTR τ k is obligated to collect or make payments
that match the generated and consumed generation values according to τ k at the




i , where pi is the spot
price at node i. The total FTRs in a network T =
∑
k τ
k is simultaneously feasible if
−T ∈ Q(K). A necessary condition for financial feasibility is revenue adequacy, which
requires that the surplus the ISO collects be at least as large as the required FTR











i − qsi ) ∀ (qs,qd) ∈ Q(K).
This result obviously applies to an FTR T (K) since −T (K) ∈ Q(K). If the sum of
FTRs in a network with line capacities K0 is T (K0), then an investor that raises the
their effect in this chapter.
3See for example Hogan (2002).
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line capacity to K1 is assigned the incremental FTR




− (qs(K1)− qs(K0)) .
(6.1)
Naturally, no rational agent would make the capacity investment unless
p(K1)
>τ(K1, T (K0)) ≥ 0.
6.3 Transmission Investment Models
6.3.1 Centralized Transmission Investment Problem
In this problem a social welfare maximizing entity, such as the government or a
regulated transmission company, expands the transmission line capacities to relieve
congestion and improve the aggregate profit of producers and consumers. Starting
with the transmission line capacity vector K0, expanding the transmission lines by

























We will focus on the investment in a single line l throughout this chapter. Let the
incremental capacity vector ∆l be the vector of zeros for all entries k 6= l and ∆l for
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− C ′i(qsi (K0 + ∆l))
















Therefore, the central planner should invest in increasing the capacity of line l so
that the marginal benefits from the capacity expansion equals the marginal cost of
the investment.
6.3.2 Merchant Investment Model
A merchant investor is a transmission line investor that neither supplies or con-
sumes power nor owns existing FTRs in the network. If the transmission capacity
vector is initially K0 with total FTRs T (K0) allocated to existing network owners,
the merchant would gain the FTR
τ(K0 + ∆, T (K0)) = q
d(K0 + ∆)− qs(K0 + ∆)− T (K0)
from an investment in capacity ∆, but would also incur the investment costs I(K0,∆).
If we consider the problem of investing in a single line l, then the merchant’s surplus
from adding capacity ∆l to line l would be
π(K0,∆l) = p(K0 + ∆l)
T τ(K0 + ∆l, T (K0))− I(K0,∆l). (6.3)
The optimal merchant investment ∆l makes the marginal benefits from incre-
























i (K0 + ∆l)− qsi (K0 + ∆l)− Ti(K0)).
(6.4)
The last term in this formula is generally negative, which gives merchants an incentive
to underinvest when compared to the socially optimal investment in (6.2). The in-
tuition for this underinvestment is that a merchant benefits from congestion because
it causes large price discrepancies between nodes, and hence the merchant would be
willing to lower the magnitude of the FTR injections to raise electricity prices. If the
expansion does not cause significant price changes in the network, then the second
line in (6.4) becomes small and the transmission expansion would be close to the
social optimal. Although the merchant investor model may seem as an attractive
alternative to the centralized transmission approach, this model also has its fair share
of criticism. Joskow and Tirole (2005), for example, point out that many challenges
of the electricity markets that are not accounted for in the merchant investor model
can cause significant inefficiencies.
6.3.3 Coalition Investment Model
In this model, a coalition of agents P make a transmission investment of capacity
∆. A coalition may include both suppliers and consumers. We denote the set of
nodes with suppliers and consumers in P as P s and P d respectively. The coalition’s
gain has 2 parts: (1) the incremental FTRs from the transmission expansion, and (2)
the increased surplus due to the nodal price and quantity changes. If the coalition
invests in increasing the line capacities from K0 by ∆ with existing aggregate FTR
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qdi (K0 + ∆)− qsi (K0 + ∆)− Ti(K0)
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i (K0 + ∆))−Bi(qdi (K0))− pi(K0 + ∆)qdi (K0 + ∆) + pi(K0)qdi (K0)
]
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qdi (K0 + ∆)− qdi (K0)
)
− I(K0,∆).
This model, in general, does not give the socially optimal investment that satisfies
(6.2). Coalitions with expensive generators and customers with access to cheap gen-
eration tend to have an incentive to underinvest in order to limit competition, while
coalitions with cheap generators and expensive customers tend have an incentive to
over-invest in order to reach other customers or access to cheap generation. Clearly,
the central planner’s problem and the merchant model are special cases of this model
with P = N and P = φ respectively.
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6.3.4 Competitive Merchant Investment Model
We consider in this model the problem where M identical merchant investors
expand the network simultaneously. A merchant investor j makes a decision to expand




l as line l’s entry and 0 everywhere





l and an initial FTR allocation T





















































By symmetry, ∆jl = ∆
k
l = ∆l and T
j = T k = T̂ ∀ j and k. Therefore, Kj0 =
K0 + (M − 1)∆j and T̂ = T (K0) + (M − 1)τ(K0 + (M − 1)∆l, T̂ ). We can further
expand T̂ as
T̂ =T + (M − 1)
(













This result can be used to calculate a single merchant’s FTR as
τ(K0 +M∆, T̂ ) =q



















qd(K0 +M∆l)− qd(K0 + (M − 1)∆l)
]





qd(K0 + (M − 1)∆l)− qs(K0 + (M − 1)∆l)− T
]
.
Under the assumptions that qsi and q
d
i are smooth, bounded, and monotone with
respect to ∆l, then τ(K0 + M∆l, T̂ ) goes to 0 as M → ∞. We can substitute this












































qdi (K0 + (M − 1)∆l)− qsi (K0 + (M − 1)∆l)− T
]
.
We will let M →∞ to reflect a perfectly competitive market. If there exists a solution
∆̃l = limM→∞M∆l <∞ then all the terms except for the first sum cancel as M →∞
4. The increment in this case would be ∆̃l
5 and the competitive equilibrium would
4Under the assumptions that qsi and q
d
























(K0 + ∆̃l). (6.6)
If we further assume that investment costs are not path dependent6, then (6.6) and
(6.2) become equivalent, and the competitive equilibrium coincides with the socially
optimal solution.
6.3.5 Capacity Bidding Model
In this model, a public auction is conducted in which transmission investment
companies compete for building a transmission line l in a network with initial trans-
mission capacity K0. Investment companies bid for the capacity they are willing to
add to line l, and the bidder with the largest capacity increment bid wins the
auction, builds the line with the proposed increment, and collects a FTR according
to (6.1). In case of a tie, the winner is chosen randomly from the maximum capacity
bidders with equal winning probability for each player. We assume in this model that
all bidders are merchant investors with profit functions given by (6.3) for the winning
bidder. We will denote the optimal merchant investment that solves (6.4) by ∆∗l , and
the capacity at which an agent is indifferent between investing and not investing by






qdi (K0 + ∆l)− qsi (K0 + ∆l)− Ti
)
.
Consider agent k’s best response problem to a set of generators −k with a maxi-
mum capacity bid ∆−kl . Agent k’s preferred scenario is to win the auction with a bid
6An investment in a transmission line is not path dependent if expanding a line’s capacity from A
to A+B then from A+B to A+B+C is the same as expanding it from A to A+C and then from A+C
to A+B+C. In terms of I this can be expressed as I(A+B,A+B+C) = I(A+C,A+B+C). This
assumption in transmission investment is also made by Vogelsang (2001). An investment function
with a constant marginal cost falls under this category.
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l . If the highest bid from other
generators equals or exceeds ∆∗l then agent k would want to win if his winning bid
does not exceed ∆l. Therefore, as long as ∆
−k
l < ∆l then k would rather win the bid.
Since agent k’s profit is decreasing in ∆kl in the region [∆
∗
l ,∆l], then k minimizes his
bid in this region. Bidding exactly ∆−kl would create a tie, in which case agent k’s
expected profit would be divided by the number of agents bidding ∆−kl , and hence
agent k bids slightly over ∆−kl to secure a win. If ∆
−k
l = ∆l then agent k makes a
negative profit if he bids over ∆l and makes a zero profit if he ties the bid or looses the
auction. Therefore, agent k is indifferent between tying the largest bid and loosing
the auction and bids ∆kl ≤ ∆l. Finally, if ∆−kl exceeds ∆l agent k cannot profitably
win the auction, and would bid ∆kl < ∆
−k
l . Agent k’s bid ∆
k
l is summarized in the










∆−kl + ε, if ∆
−k
l ∈ [∆∗l ,∆l);
≤ ∆l, if ∆−kl = ∆l;
< ∆−kl , if ∆
−k
l > ∆l.
ε in this expression is a small positive increment that agent k makes to win the
auction. Figure 6.1 illustrates the best response bids for a two agent problem. Agent
1’s bid in this Figure when ∆2l ∈ [∆∗l , Dl) is slightly below the dashed line, while
agent 2’s bid when ∆1l ∈ [∆∗l , Dl) is slightly above the dashed line. The two best
response correspondences only intersect in (∆l,∆l). Therefore, this problem has a








Figure 6.1: Best responses plot for 2 investors in the capacity bidding model.
Linear Investment Model
We consider in this subsection a linear investment cost model
I(K0,∆l) = Il∆l.
We assume that Il is a constant marginal expansion cost for all agents. Since the






































If ∆̄ is small compared to the existing transmission line capacity in the network
and if the change in supply and demand quantities due to this change is relatively
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small, then we can approximate






(K0 + ∆l) and





















By comparing this to (6.2) we can conclude that this mechanism gives an approximate
socially optimal solution when the investment cost is linear and the increment is not




We conduct in this section a numerical assessment of five transmission investment
scenarios on the IEEE 14 bus transmission network used in Freris and Sasson (1968).
The network has 5 generators, which we assume to be identical with production cost
rate q + 1
2
q2 for producing q power units. The network has 10 customer loads, which
we also assume to be identical with a benefit function 5q − 6q2. Each generator and
load is located in one of 14 nodes in a network that consists of 20 transmission lines.
Figure 6.2 shows a schematic of this network and Table 6.1 shows the line resistance
R and conductance X information. Note that the per-unit (pu) system is used for all
quantities throughout this example7.
Initially, we assume that all generators and transmission lines have large enough
capacities and never reach their limits in an optimal dispatch. We call this case the
7The per-unit system is a standard normalization convention in power systems that is used to
compared actual quantities to base values. For example, refer to Glover et al. (2011) for more details.
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Figure 6.2: IEEE 14 bus transmission network. The busses are shown as the nodes
indexed by 1-14 inside the circles and the transmission lines are shown as the directed
arcs between the nodes with indices given in boxes. Generators (Loads) are indexed
by G (L) and are connected to their respective nodes in this drawing.
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infinite capacity case. We then downgrade line 15 alone and assume it has a zero
capacity, but without removing the line from the network. This causes line 15 to
bind the network operation and limit the rest of the line power flows and the nodal
injections in the network. We refer to this second case as the zero capacity case.
After finding the optimal dispatch solution under line 15’s two extreme cases, we
allow investors to expand this line and collect the incremental FTRs from this expan-
sions and incur a constant marginal cost of 1 $ per capacity unit for their investment.
We consider 5 investment scenarios: the social welfare solution (SW) shown in §6.3.1,
the merchant investment model (MI) from §6.3.2, the capacity auction model (CA)
from §6.3.5, and two coalition examples (P1) and (P2) from the coalition investment
model presented in §6.3.3. We let the P1 coalition consist of the generators and
customers that benefit from the line congestion and the P2 coalition be the set of
generators and customers that are hurt by the congestion.
6.4.2 Limiting Cases
In the infinite capacity case, the generators and loads are free to exchange elec-
tricity as if all agents were at the same location. As a result, the LMPs are identical
($ 2 per power unit) for all nodes as shown in Table 6.2. Because of the generator
and load cost symmetry, all generators produce 0.5 power units and make a profit of
$0.25 per time unit as shown in Table 6.3, while every load consumes 0.25 power units
and makes a profit of $0.875 per time unit as shown in Table 6.4. Line 15 has a flow
magnitude of 0.6404 power units, which is the largest among all transmission lines as
shown in 6.1. Note that negative flows in this Table indicate power flow opposite to
the predefined flow direction.
Reducing the capacity of line 15 to 0 affects the entire network because it changes
the feasible set Q, which can have a profound impact on the optimal dispatch solu-
tion. Indeed, as Table 6.1 shows, all line flows change when line 15’s capacity drops
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Table 6.1: Transmission line information for the IEEE 14 bus system.
Line
Bus
R X Infinite Capacity Zero Capacity
From To Power Flow µ Power Flow µ
pu pu pu $/pu pu $/pu
1 1 2 0.01938 0.05917 0.2239 0 0.1727 0
2 1 5 0.05403 0.22304 0.2761 0 0.0604 0
3 2 3 0.04699 0.19797 -0.0132 0 0.0624 0
4 2 4 0.05811 0.17632 0.2248 0 0.0209 0
5 2 5 0.05695 0.17388 0.2624 0 0.0153 0
6 3 4 0.06701 0.17103 0.2368 0 -0.0455 0
7 4 5 0.01335 0.04211 0.1417 0 -0.0245 0
8 4 7 0 0.20912 0.1404 0 0 0
9 4 9 0 0.55618 0.1794 0 0 0
10 5 6 0 0.25202 0.4302 0 -0.2367 0
11 6 11 0.09498 0.1989 0.1582 0 0.1743 0
12 6 12 0.12291 0.25581 0.213 0 0.1453 0
13 6 13 0.06615 0.13027 0.309 0 0.23 0
14 7 8 0 0.17615 -0.5 0 0 0
15 7 9 0 0.11001 0.6404 0 0 -7.2238
16 9 10 0.03181 0.0845 0.3418 0 -0.0267 0
17 9 14 0.12711 0.27038 0.228 0 0.0113 0
18 10 11 0.08205 0.19207 0.0918 0 -0.0689 0
19 12 13 0.22092 0.19988 -0.037 0 -0.0182 0
20 13 14 0.17093 0.34802 0.022 0 0.0622 0
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to zero, with some flows increasing in magnitude, some decreasing in magnitude, and
some flows changing direction. The µ values in this table are the dual variables of the
flow capacity constraint. µ is zero when the line capacity constraint is not biding and
non-zero when it is. Because line 15 is congested in this problem, incremental capacity
to this line would have a marginal benefit of $7.22 per power unit, which is attributed
to the increase in both agent surpluses and transmission rent. Although the gain in
transmission rent may be initially attractive, the capacity increments have reducing
marginal gains that give independent merchants an incentive to under-invest. Exist-
ing agents and transmission line owners investing in the network may have different
capacity increment incentives when accounting for the additional surpluses to their
existing generator, load, and FTR portfolios. Naturally, no investor would exceed a
capacity increment of 0.6404 power units since it relieves line 15 of its congestion,
and exceeding this level would incur additional investment costs without impacting
the optimal dispatch solution.
The drop in line 15’s capacity restricts the trade between generators and loads that
would otherwise have access to the entire market. As a result, generators and loads
at different loctions in the network have varying injections and marginal costs and
benefits, causing locational price discrimination. Although the average nodal price
increases by about %12, half of the nodes see a reduction in prices as shown in Table
6.2. The prices at node 7 and 8 even become negative, indicating that additional
consumption in these busses can relieve congestion in the network and allow more
efficient trades to take place in another part of the network. Consequently, generator
5 located in node 8 refrains from production when line 15 has a zero capacity.
This limited market access reduces the electricity trade from 2.5 to 1.608 power
units and causes a social welfare drop of about 36%. Nevertheless, some agents can
benefit from the reduced competition. For example, generator 4 can reach customers
that would have been served by other generators had there been sufficient network
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capapcity. As a result, generator 4’s production increases by almost %92 and its
profits increase by over 3.5 fold. Similarly, the isolation of other customers gives
loads 1, 2, and 3 greater access to cheap generation. This causes these loads to
consume %18 more electricity and to raise their gains by %39 when the network is
congested.
Table 6.2: Node information for the IEEE 14 bus system.
Node
Infinite Capacity Zero Capacity
LMP Angle, θ LMP Angle, θ
$/pu degrees $/pu degrees
1 2 0 1.4663 0
2 2 -0.0147 1.4445 -0.0113
3 2 -0.0119 1.3865 -0.0244
4 2 -0.0586 1.3317 -0.0154
5 2 -0.0652 1.5449 -0.0143
6 2 -0.1736 2.9194 0.0454
7 2 -0.088 -1.1188 -0.0154
8 2 0.0001 -1.1188 -0.0154
9 2 -0.1584 4.8159 -0.0154
10 2 -0.1914 4.4937 -0.0128
11 2 -0.2122 3.7352 0.0028
12 2 -0.2407 3.0377 -0.0004
13 2 -0.2242 3.2044 0.0077
14 2 -0.2337 4.1178 -0.0192
Table 6.3: Generator information for the IEEE 14 bus system.
Generator Node
Infinite Capacity Zero Capacity
Prod Rev Cost Profit Prod Rev Cost Profit
pu $/pu $/pu $/pu pu $/pu $/pu $/pu
1 1 0.5 1 0.75 0.25 0.2331 0.3419 0.2875 0.0544
2 2 0.5 1 0.75 0.25 0.2222 0.321 0.2716 0.0494
3 3 0.5 1 0.75 0.25 0.1932 0.2679 0.2306 0.0373
4 6 0.5 1 0.75 0.25 0.9597 2.8018 1.8808 0.9211
5 8 0.5 1 0.75 0.25 0 0 0 0
Total 2.5 5 3.75 1.25 1.6082 3.7326 2.6705 1.0622
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Table 6.4: Load information for the IEEE 14 bus system.
Load Node
Infinite Capacity Zero Capacity
Cons Benefit Cost Surplus Cons Benefit Cost Surplus
$/pu $/pu $/pu $/pu $/pu $/pu $/pu $/pu
1 2 0.25 0.875 0.5 0.375 0.2963 0.9547 0.428 0.5267
2 3 0.25 0.875 0.5 0.375 0.3011 0.9616 0.4175 0.5441
3 5 0.25 0.875 0.5 0.375 0.2879 0.9422 0.4448 0.4974
4 6 0.25 0.875 0.5 0.375 0.1734 0.6865 0.5062 0.1804
5 9 0.25 0.875 0.5 0.375 0.0153 0.0753 0.0739 0.0014
6 10 0.25 0.875 0.5 0.375 0.0422 0.2003 0.1896 0.0107
7 11 0.25 0.875 0.5 0.375 0.1054 0.4604 0.3937 0.0667
8 12 0.25 0.875 0.5 0.375 0.1635 0.6572 0.4967 0.1604
9 13 0.25 0.875 0.5 0.375 0.1496 0.6138 0.4795 0.1343
10 14 0.25 0.875 0.5 0.375 0.0735 0.3352 0.3027 0.0324
Total 2.5 8.75 5 3.75 1.6082 5.8872 3.7326 2.1545
6.4.3 Investment Scenarios
§6.4.2 shows the optimal dispatch outcomes for the two extreme cases with line
15 having zero and infinite capacity. In this section, we consider the problem in
which an investor builds a line, incurs the investment cost, and gains the incremental
transmission rent. As we have seen throughout this chapter, an investor’s optimal
capacity expansion decision depends on the model’s incentives. The socially optimal
investment from the centralized model is used as a benchmark in this section. We
refer to the socially optimal solution as SW. Using the coalition investment model in
§6.3.3, we consider two coalition options: P1 is the set of agents that benefit form the
congestion of line 15, and P2 are the agents that are harmed by the congestion. We
also use two merchant investment models: MI is the model with a single merchant
that chooses the optimal solution as shown in 6.3.2, and CA is the capacity auction
model discussed in §6.3.5. When considering the optimal investment we limit our
search to capacities no greater than 0.6404 power units for all models as discussed in
§6.4.2.
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The outcomes of the five investment scenarios are shown in Figure 6.3. The
horizontal axis in this Figure is the capacity investment level and the vertical axis
is the investor surplus. Each of the 4 plots shows a utility curve for a scenario
with the best investment marked on the curve. The merchant investor curve has
two investment outcomes; the utility maximizing solution for the single merchant
investor ∆MIl and the zero surplus solution for the capacity auction model ∆
CA
l .
The centralized optimal investment level for which the marginal welfare improvement
equals the marginal investment cost is 0.495 pu. Figure 6.3 shows that agents in
coalition P1 would under invest by about %82 if given the opportunity, while agents
in coalition P2 would over-invest by about %23. These deviations from the socially
optimal levels are caused by the non-FTR related surplus losses (gains) agents in P1
(P2) realize. On the other hand, the optimal investment capacity for a merchant is
%64 lower than the socially optimal value, but if multiple merchants are asked to bid
for the line’s capacity as in §6.3.5 then the winning bidder would build the socially
optimal capacity.





































Figure 6.3: Capacity expansions under different investors for the IEEE 14 bus trans-
mission network for the linear investment cost function I(K) = K.
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The same model is tested for two other investment cost functions. Figures 6.4 and
6.5 show the solutions under the four investment options for a concave and a convex
investment cost function, respectively. Although the capacity auction solution is not
socially optimal when the investment cost is either concave or convex, the result is
very close to the social optimal and gives a substantial improvement over all other
investment models.





































Figure 6.4: Capacity expansions under different investors for the IEEE 14 bus trans-
mission network for the concave investment cost function I(K) = K − 0.5K2.
6.5 Conclusion and Future Work
We have studied in this chapter several transmission network expansion mecha-
nisms and used a network example to compare their performance to the central plan-
ner’s solution. The analysis in §6.3.5 shows that the transmission expansion from
the merchant investor capacity auction mechanism can approximate the social opti-
mal, and the numerical experiment confirms it. Our analysis assumes that merchant
investors do not already own network assets and do not account for risk or future ex-
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Figure 6.5: Capacity expansions under different investors for the IEEE 14 bus trans-
mission network for the convex investment cost function I(K) = K + 0.5K2.
pansions. One possible area of future work is to include investors with existing FTRs.
In such a model, FTRs of existing transmission line owners would lose value due to
the reduction in price discrepancy, which can cause them to underinvest. Although
most of the analysis conducted in this section pertains to single line investments,
many of these results can be extended to the multiple line investment problem. Nev-
ertheless, having investors choose both the lines and the capacity expansions could
be an interesting research direction.
The transmission expansion benefit usually discussed in the literature are based
on operational efficiency improvements. However, as discussed by Hogan et al. (2010),
a lot of the transmission expansions are prompted by the system’s reliability stan-
dards rather than congestion relief. They argue that the current network reliability
standards cannot be justified economically and express the importance of resolving
this issue. Finding mechanisms that give investors the correct incentives for reliabil-
ity investments could be an important step in closing the reliability standards and
economic benefits gap.
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After a network expansion is made, strategic generators can change their bidding
behavior to capture some of the transmission rent as shown in Oren (1997). In
fact, Joskow and Tirole (2000) show that more ownership of transmission rights by
generating firms can influence their market power. Such a research direction would
be in the merit of this dissertation because it integrates the competitive behavior of




The evolution of electricity systems and the emergence of new technologies can
have profound consequences on the market structure and competition. In fact, this
thesis was partly inspired by the recent interest in renewable energy technologies, and
especially by their impact on the electricity market. As it turns out, the penetration
and subsidies to renewables could indeed change the strategic behavior of generat-
ing firms as shown in Chapter III. The widespread of renewables could also require
substantial transmission investments if they are located in remote areas, as is com-
mon with many wind plants, which can be regarded as another form of government
subsidy. Developing incentive mechanisms for connecting these remote plants to the
grid could be integral to the promotion of renewable technologies and an interesting
future research topic.
With the adoption of the smart grid technologies, the market competition issues
can become very different. For example, the widespread of cheap energy storage tech-
nologies would reduce the negative impact of intermittency, reduce the reliance on
flexible generation, and downgrade the market power caused by fast ramping capabil-
ities. Competition can also be intensified by increased consumer market participation
and the popularity of smart appliances that can adjust their operating levels in re-
sponse to real-time spot prices.
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Some of the new technologies can alter the physical network constraints. Trans-
mission switching technologies, as in Hedman et al. (2011), would regularly alter the
transmission network topology, which may require the development of new FTR cal-
culation methods and new reward systems for transmission line owners and network
investors. Moreover, the strategic response of generating firms would influence the
optimal transmission switching scheme. The special structure of electricity markets
and the ongoing technology changes continuously invoke research interest and the





Electrical Power Network Background
Electric power flow can be modeled with varying degrees of complexity. The more
detailed models are usually used for operational purposes, while simpler models are
used for market design and economic analysis. We use the DC representation of power
networks in this study, which is consistent with the market design problems in the
literature.
Consider a connected network with a set of nodes N and a set of directed arcs
L ⊆ {(i, j) : i, j ∈ N}. A node can represent a generator or a consumer, while an
arc represents a transmission or a distribution line. We use directed arcs rather than
non-directed edges to represent power lines because the flow in one direction of a line
does not necessarily have the same magnitude as the flow in the opposite direction
due to transmission losses. Note that if (i, j) ∈ L then we required that (j, i) ∈ L.
A line (i, j) has four attributes: susceptance Bij ≥ 0, conductance Gij ≥ 0, flow
fji, and capacity f̄ij > 0. Flow through a line is a function while the other attributes
are transmission line properties, where Bij = Bji, Gij = Gji, and f̄ij = f̄ji. fij
represents the flow leaving node i towards node j, which may be different from the
flow entering node j coming from node i on the other end of the line. Generally
fij 6= −fji unless we ignore the line losses. A node i has three attributes: voltage Vi,
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phase angle θi, and injection qi. We wil use the notation θij = θi−θj and Vij = Vi−Vj
for the phase angle and voltage difference between two nodes. Vi and θi are variables
that depend on the state of the network while qi is a decision variable that represents
the exogenous power generation or consumption. In contrast to some other network
problems, power flow through lines is not a decision variable, it is determined by the
state of the network. We will derive the power flow equations next.
A.1 The AC Power Flow Equations
The susceptance and conductance of a line (i, k) can be calculated from the lines
resistance Rik and reactance Xik, both measured in Ohms (Ω). The impedance of a
line is defined as Zik
def
= Rik + jXik, where j =
√






















⇒ Yik = Gik− jBik. If the current flow through
the line is Iik, then the voltage drop across the line is Vik = Vi − Vk = IikZik and
Iik = VikYik. The power loss in the line is Sik = VikI
∗
ik, where a superscript ∗ denotes
the complex conjugate. S, measured in volt-ampere (VA), is called the complex power
and consists of a real or active power flow component P measures in watts (W), and
a reactive power flow component Q measured in volt-ampere reactive (var). The
relationship between these power components is given by S = P + jQ. Note that
we use Si, Pi, and Qi for power injections into node i and Sik, Pik, and Qik for the
power flow through line (i, k). Due to line losses, the flow in one end of a line may
be different from the flow at the other end of the line. As a convention, we define the
flows Sik, Pik, and Qik at node i’s end of the line.
If Si is injected into node i then using Pi =Re(Si) and Qi =Im(Si) we can calculate
141








ViVk (Gik sin θik −Bik cos θik) .
For two different busses i and k (i 6= k), the power flow equations are:
∂Pi
∂θk
=ViVk (Gik sin θik −Bik cos θik) ,
∂Pi
∂Vk
=Vi (Gik cos θik +Bik sin θik) ,
∂Qi
∂θk
=− ViVk (Gik cos θik +Bik sin θik) ,
∂Qi
∂Vk
=Vi (Gik sin θik −Bik cos θik) .
If i = k then
∂Pi
∂θi
























[−Vk (Gik cos θik +Bik sin θik) ∂θk + (Gik sin θik −Bik cos θik) ∂Vk] .
Shunt capacitors are often connected in parallel to transmission lines to reduce current
losses due to electromagnetizm. If line (i, k) has a shunt capacitance Csik (in Ω), then
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the real and reactive power flows along line (i, k) can be calculated as
Pik =Gik
[





V 2i − ViVj cos(θik)
]
−GikViVj sin θik − V 2i Csik.
A.2 The DC Power Flow Model
The AC power flow model gives a non-linear set of equations with a non-convex
solution space. Solving large power flow problems using the AC power flow model can
be challenging, which is why the simpler DC linear model is often used to approximate
the solution. The DC power flow model is commonly used in problems that do not
directly affect the network’s physical operation. In particular, the DC models is
widely used in modeling electricity markets and in resolving financial transactions.
Starting from the general AC model, we will derive the DC power flow model using
the necessary approximations next.
The focus in the DC power flow is on the real power Pij. Therefore, we will
set fij
def
= Pij in the DC power flow model. From the power flow equations, the
flow on line (i, j) can be calculated as fij(θij, Vi, Vj) = GijV
2
i − GijViVj cos(θij) +
BijViVj sin(θij) ∀ (i, j) ∈ L. Power network analysis is usually simplified by adopting
a “per unit” system in which voltages are normalized to 1 without loss of generality
(i.e. Vi = 1 ∀ i ∈ N ). Consequently, we can simplify the line flow expression to
fij(θij) = Gij − Gij cos(θij) + Bij sin(θij). Furthermore, the phase angles are usually
small under normal operating conditions, and it is typical to adopt the second order
Taylor approximations for the sin and cos functions (sin(θ) ≈ θ and cos(θ) ≈ 1− θ2
2
).




(i, j) ∈ L. Although transmission capacities are not hard constraints, meaning that
they could be violated for short durations as proposed by Hedman et al. (2011), we
will restrict power flow to rated line capacities in our model, so the ISO must ensure
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that fij(θij) ≤ f̄ij ∀ (i, j) ∈ L. Note that there is no need to specify a lower bound
on the flow through line (i, j) since it is guaranteed by the constraint on the flow
through line (j, i).
Nodes have two sets of constraints in the DC model; nodal balance and in-
jection capacities. To get a balanced model, nodal injections must satisfy qi =∑
j∈N :(i,j)∈L fij(θij) ∀ i ∈ N . Because of the network structure of the problem, one
nodal balance constraint becomes redundant. Therefore, we will disregard the nodal
balance equation for one of the nodes, which we refer to as the reference or slack node
and denote it node 0. Let N ′ = N \{0} and set the reference phase angle θ0 = 0. In-
jection capacity constraints represent generation and consumption limits at nodes. If
we denote kmini and k
max
i as the capacity limits, then the capacity constraints at node
i become qi ∈ [kmini , kmaxi ]. Denote Ci(q) as the a convex differentiable cost function
for injections at node i. Ci(q) represents an increasing convex generation cost rate
for producing q > 0 in node i and −Ci(q) is an increasing concave benefit rate for
consuming −q > 0 in node i. Now that we have defined the electrical power network,
we will next consider a market setting for this problem starting with a centralized
market and then move to a decentralized market.
An ISO seeks to find feasible nodal injections that minimizes the total system
cost. The ISO problem can be formulated as follows:
min




Subject to qi =
∑
j∈N :(i,j)∈L
fij(θij) ∀ i ∈ N ′ (A.2)
fij(θij) ≤ f̄ij ∀ (i, j) ∈ L (A.3)
kmini ≤ qi ≤ kmaxi ∀ i ∈ N . (A.4)
This problem is also called the network’s optimal dispatch problem. The non-
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linearity of the constraints makes problem (A.1)-(A.4) difficult to solve because the
solution space is in general non-convex. Chao and Peck (1996) show that for small
θij values the flows remain in a locally convex region under normal operating condi-
tions. However, even with convexity assumptions, the nonlinearity of the constraints
complicates the problem. The source of the nonlinearity are the Gij variables, which
are the loss coefficients. In fact, the total loss in the line connecting nodes i and j
is fij + fji = Gijθ
2
ij. To resolve this issue, losses are usually not directly account for.
Instead, it is typical to initially assume that Gij = 0 ∀ (i, j) ∈ L so that the system
becomes lossless. The losses are then made up by some generator(s); the slack gener-
ator is usually used if it is not at its capacity. The discrepancy in the model is then
calculated and included in the linear system, which is solved again. This process is
repeated until an ε-solution is obtained, where the total discrepancy is no more than
a small ε value. For example, Chao and Peck (1996) and Wu and Varaiya (1999)
assume linear systems then extend their market mechanisms for non-linear systems
using this approach. In the DC model, we assume that electric networks are lossless
and set Gij = 0 ∀ (i, j) ∈ L.
The zero conductance assumption simplifies the line flow formula to fij(θij) =




Bij(θi − θj) ∀ i ∈ N ′.
This equation gives a the linear system q = Aθ, where q is a column vector of the
nodal injections without the reference injection, θ is a column vector of phase angles
without the reference angle, and A is an N ×N vector with entries aij given by
aij =
 −Bij; if i 6= j,∑n
k=1 Bik; if i = j.
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Alternatively, we can calculate θ = A−1q and write θi as the linear combination
θi =
∑
j∈N ′ αijqj where αij are the entries of the A
−1 matrix. The flow through line
fij is thus given by
fij(q) = Bij(θi(q)− θj(q)) = Bij
∑
k∈N ′
(αik − αjk)qk =
∑
k∈N ′
βkijqk ∀ (i, j) ∈ N ,
where βkij = Bij(αik−αjk) are the PTDF. βkij can be interpreted as the portion of flow
from node k’s injection ending up in the reference node that flows through line (i, j).
We will use the convention β0ij = 0 for the reference node. We can therefore drop the









qi = 0 ⊥ λ (A.6)
∑
i∈N
βilqi ≤ f̄l ∀ l ∈ L ⊥ µl (A.7)
kmini ≤ qi ≤ kmaxi ∀ i ∈ N ⊥ γ−i , γ+i . (A.8)
Problem (A.5)-(A.8) is much simpler to solve than (A.1)-(A.4) because it has a convex
objective function and linear constraints.
Let λ be the dual variable to the constraint (A.6), µl as the dual variable to (A.7),
γ−i as the dual variable to the lower bound inequality for qi and γ
+
i as the dual variable
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for the upper bound inequality in (A.8). The Lagrangian of this problem is



































The Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) condition for qi gives the LMP at every node.
pi = C
′




where γi = γ
+
i − γ−i . A positive µl implies that line l is operating at its capacity (in
the predefined direction), a γ−i > 0 implies that the nodal injection is at its minimum
value1, and a γ+i > 0 occurs when a nodal injection reaches its maximum capacity
2.
Notice that the LMP at the slack node is λ.
1This occurs when the maximum demand level is reached and additional electricity usage does
not improve the consumer surplus.




B.1 Chapter II Proofs
Proof of Lemma II.3.
Proof. Consider the optimal allocation problem in (2.2), rewritten below
CF (q) = min
{ ∑
j∈GF






For any q > 0, the objective in (B.1) is convex on a closed convex set
{
(q, qj, j ∈





. Hence, the theorem on convexity preservation
under minimization (Heyman and Sobel , 1984, p. 525) implies that CF (q) is convex
in q.
For a given q > 0, let {q∗j} be the minimizer for (B.1). We show {q∗j} has two
properties:
1) If q∗j , q
∗

















we can strictly reduce the objective by increasing q∗j by ε and reducing q
∗
k by ε,
where ε > 0 is small.
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2) If q∗j = 0 and q
∗
k > 0, then C
′
j(0) ≥ C ′k(q∗k). To see this, if C ′j(0) < C ′k(q∗k), we
can strictly reduce the objective by setting q∗j = ε and reducing q
∗
k by ε, where
ε > 0 is small.
Denote p ≡ C ′j(q∗j ) for q∗j > 0. Note that p > 0 because Cj(qj) is convex and
strictly increasing in qj for qj ≥ 0. Define GF+ =
{








j ). For j 6∈ GF+, we have q∗j = 0 and Ĉ ′j(0) > p. Then, for
sufficiently small ε > 0, we have





j + εj), (B.2)
for some εj ≥ 0 and
∑
j∈GF+
εj = ε. Using Taylor series, (B.2) can be written as












= CF (q) + εp+O(ε2).
Similarly, we can show that CF (q) − CF (q − ε) = εp + O(ε2). Hence, CF (q) is
differentiable with derivative (CF )
′
(q) = p > 0.
Similar results can be shown for IGs’ problem in (2.1), which completes the proof.
Proof of Theorem II.4
Proof. We first prove that (2.11) is optimal in the case of Lt − qI −Wt ≥ 0. In this
case, constraints (2.8)-(2.9) imply that qFt ≥ Lt − qI −Wt ≥ 0. If we set qFt at the
lower bound Lt − qI − Wt, then qVt = Wt and et = 0, which clearly minimize the
objective in (2.7).
When Lt − qI − Wt < 0, we have qF∗t = 0 because: (i) if qFt > 0 and et > 0,
then a lower qFt reduces the objective in (2.7); (ii) if q
F
t > 0 and et = 0, then
qVt = Lt− qI − qFt < Wt, and we can reduce qFt and increase qVt to lower the objective
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− r qVt + h(qI + qVt − Lt) : 0 ≤ qVt ≤ Wt
}
,
where we set h(e) = 0 for e < 0. An interior optimal solution satisfies h′(qI + qV ∗t −
Lt) = r, or q
V ∗
t = Lt − qI + µ(r), which is indeed optimal if 0 < Lt − qI + µ(r) < Wt.
If Lt − qI + µ(r) ≥ Wt, then qV ∗t = Wt. If Lt − qI + µ(r) < 0, then qV ∗t = 0. This
proves that (2.11) is optimal.
For any q > L, the objective function in (2.7) is convex on a closed convex set
{(qI , Lt,Wt, qFt , qVt ) : qI ∈ [0, q], Lt ∈ [L,L], Wt ∈ [0, K], qFt ∈ [0, q], (2.8), and (2.9)}.
By the theorem on convexity preservation under minimization (Heyman and Sobel ,
1984, p. 525), we conclude that C̃(qI , Lt,Wt) is jointly convex in (q
I , Lt,Wt).
Proof of Theorem II.5




, which is useful for deriving
the first-order condition for (2.15). Using Theorem II.4, we can write
C̃(qI , Lt,Wt) = C
F (qF∗t )− r qV ∗t + h(qI + qF∗t + qV ∗t − Lt),
where qF∗t and q
V ∗
t are given in Figure 2.2 under the four events. The indicators of
these events can be written as
1A1 = 1{Lt≤qI−µ(r)},
1A2 = −1{Lt≤qI−µ(r)} + 1{Lt<qI+Wt−µ(r)},




We denote C̃Ai(·, ·, ·) = C̃(·, ·, ·) when Ai occurs. Then, using the optimal policy in
Figure 2.2, we have
C̃A1(q
I , Lt,Wt) = h(q
I − Lt),
C̃A2(q
I , Lt,Wt) = −r (Lt − qI+ µ(r)) + h(µ(r)),
C̃A3(q
I , Lt,Wt) = −rWt + h(qI+Wt − Lt),
C̃A4(q
I , Lt,Wt) = C
F (Lt − qI−Wt)− rWt.
(B.4)







































It can be verified that C̃(qI , Lt,Wt) is differentiable in q
I except at qI = Lt −Wt,
where the left derivative is −CF ′(0) and the right derivative is h′(0). Because Lt and




is differentiable in qI everywhere.
Next, we compute its derivative.
The first three expectations in (B.5) all have the form E
[
g(qI , Lt,Wt)1{Lt≤b(qI ,Wt)}
]
,
for some functions g(qI , Lt,Wt) and b(q
I ,Wt). Let the joint probability density func-
tion of Lt and Wt be ft(l, w), l ∈ [L,L], w ∈ [0, K], and let “∨ ” and “∧ ” denote the
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The last expectation in (B.5) is in the form of E
[







































Now, applying (B.6)-(B.7) to the derivatives of the expectations in (B.5), we find
that the integral term g
(










































−(CF )′(Lt−Wt− qI)1A4 + h′(qI+Wt− Lt)1A3





− P (qI , Lt,Wt, CF )
]
,
where the last equality follows from the definition in (2.13).
























which is equivalent to (CI)
′
(qI∗) = P (qI∗, CF ), completing the proof.
Proof of Theorem II.6












(Lt −Kρt − qI)1{qI<Lt−Kρt} − r1{Lt+µ(r)−Kρt≤qI<Lt+µ(r)}


















(Lt −Kρt − qI)1{qI<Lt−Kρt}














(Lt −Kρt − qI)1{qI<Lt−Kρt}






P{Lt + µ(r)−Kρt ≤ qI < Lt + µ(r)} dt = 0.
























(Lt −Kρt − qI)1{qI<Lt−Kρt}










(Lt −Kρt − qI)1{qI<Lt−Kρt}




The fact that both partial derivatives of qI are non-positive implies that qI is decreas-
ing in both r and K.
To determine the impact of r and K on Ca we will consider the two cases when
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µ(r) = 0 and when µ(r) > 0. The average production cost when µ(r) = 0 is






































P{qI < Lt ≤ qI +Kρt} dt.
This expression is clearly nonnegative, which makes Ca increasing in r. The derivative















F ′(Lt − qI −Kρt)1{qI<Lt−Kρt}
]
dt.
The first term is nonnegative and the second term is non-positive. If r = 0 the first
term is zero, making Ca a decreasing function of K. This result does not hold for
general r as the first term can outweigh the second term for r > 0.
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The average production cost when µ(r) > 0 is





CF ((Lt − qI −Kρt)+) + h(qI − Lt)1{qI≥Lt+µ(r)}
h(µ(r))1{Lt−Kρt+µ(r)≤qI<Lt+µ(r)}
+ h(qI +Kρt − Lt)1{Lt−Kρt≤qI<Lt+µ(r)−Kρt}
]
dt.














− CF ′(Lt − qI −Kρt)1{qI<Lt−Kρt}
+ h′(qI − Lt)1{qI≥Lt+µ(r)} + h







P{qI − µ(r) < Lt ≤ qI +Kρt − µ(r)} dt.











P{qI − µ(r) < Lt ≤ qI +Kρt − µ(r)} dt > 0.
Therefore, Ca is increasing in r.
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− CF ′(Lt − qI −Kρt)1{qI<Lt−Kρt}
+ h′(qI − Lt)1{qI≥Lt+µ(r)} + h











− CF ′(Lt − qI −Kρt)1{qI<Lt−Kρt}
















− CF ′(Lt − qI −Kρt)1{Lt>qI+Kρt}
+ h′(qI +Kρt − Lt)1{qI+Kρt−µ(r)<Lt≤qI+Kρt}
)]
dt.
The first and last terms in this formula are positive while the second term is negative,
which implies that Ca in general is not monotone with respect to K. However, if
r = 0 then the first and last terms becomes 0 and Ca becomes negative. Hence, Ca




C.1 Chapter III Proofs
Proof of Lemma III.2
Proof. For a given q > 0, let p ≡ (CF )′(q) and {q∗j} be the optimal FG allocation,
and define GF+ =
{
j ∈ GF : Ĉ ′j(q∗j ) = p
}
. We want to show that p = (SF )−1(q).
From Lemma II.3, p = Ĉ ′j(q
∗




j ) or Sj(p) = q
∗
j for j ∈ GF+. For j /∈ GF+,
then from Lemma II.3 we have Ĉ ′j(0) > p, which implies that S
−1
j (0) = p
min
j > p
and in turn leads to Sj(p) = 0 = q
∗






q∗j = q, which leads to p = (S
F )
−1
(q). Because SF (p) also satisfies
Assumption III.1, (SF )
−1
(q) is continuous in q. Therefore, (CF )
′
(q) = (SF )
−1
(q).
Proof of Corollary III.3
Proof. We will verify that P (qI , Lt,Wt, S
F ) has the alternative expression in (3.8) by
considering the disjoint regions A1-A4 in Figure 2.2. The inequality in (3.8) is
SF (p) +Wt1{p≥−r} − µ(−p) ≥ Lt − qI . (C.1)
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In region A1, Lt − qI ≤ −µ(r), and (C.1) clearly holds if p = po ≡ −h′(qI − Lt).
Note that po ≤ −r. Thus, for any other price p1 < po, the left side of (C.1) becomes
−µ(−p1), which is strictly less than Lt−qI . Hence, po is the minimum price for (C.1)
to hold.
In region A2, Lt − qI ∈ (−µ(r), Wt − µ(r)). If p = −r, then (C.1) holds because
Wt−µ(r) > Lt− qI . For any other p1 < −r, (C.1) does not hold because −µ(−p1) <
−µ(r) < Lt − qI .
In region A3, Lt − qI ∈ [Wt − µ(r), Wt]. If p = −h′(qI +Wt − Lt) ∈ [−r, 0], then
(C.1) holds with equality: Wt − (qI +Wt − Lt) = Lt − qI .
Lastly, in region A4, Lt − qI > Wt. If p = (CF )
′
(Lt −Wt − qI) > (CF )
′
(0), then
(C.1) also holds with equality: (Lt −Wt − qI) +Wt = Lt − qI .
Hence, the minimum price p for (C.1) to hold is exactly P (qI , Lt,Wt, S
F ).
Proof of Lemma III.4
Proof. Recall that the average price P (qI , βF ) decreases in qI , as we discussed after
the definition in (3.7). Furthermore, because Lt and Wt have continuous distributions,
P (qI , βF ) is differentiable in qI everywhere. Denote P 1 ≡ ∂P/∂qI . We have P 1 ≤ 0.
Equation (3.16), qI − βIP (qI , βF ) = 0, implicitly determines qI as a function of
















< 0, j ∈ GF ,
where P 2 ≡ ∂P/∂βF < 0 is established below.
We will express P (qI , βF ) and derive P 2. To simplify notations, let random vari-
ables L and W follow the probability distribution fL,W (x, y) defined in (3.23). Let
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D = L−W denote the net demand.
For a continuous random variable X, we use fX(x) and FX(x) to denote the
probability density and cumulative distribution functions, and we let FX(x) = 1 −
FX(x).
Then, we can write the average price function in (3.15) as










(qI − x)fD(x) dx− ch
qI−µ(r)∫
−∞
(qI − x)fL(x) dx






















(βF )2 (1− βIP 1)
< 0, j ∈ GF . (C.4)
This completes the proof.
Proof of Lemma III.5
Proof. We first bound the average price in (C.3). Note that
qI∫
qI−µ(r)
(qI − x)fD(x) dx ≥ 0, and
qI−µ(r)∫
−∞










Using these inequalities, the average price in (C.3) is bounded above by







− ahFD(qI) + (ah − r)FD(qI − µ(r)). (C.5)





If ah < r, then (C.5) implies P (q







these two cases, we obtain














































dy + (µD − qI)FD(qI)
≤ σD√
2π
+ (µD − qI)FD(qI). (C.7)
The inequalities (C.6) and (C.7) lead to








Using (3.16), (3.18), and (C.8), we have












We now prove qI max < µD. If the opposite is true, q
I max ≥ µD, then FD(qI max) ≥ 12
and (C.9) implies

























. This contradicts qI max ≥ µD. There-
fore, we conclude that qI max < µD when σD ≤ σ∗D.
Proof of Theorem III.6. Because generator k’s pure strategy set is a finite interval
[βmink , c
−1
k ], it suffices to show that, ∀ k ∈ GI ∪ GF , generator k’s profit function
is quasi-concave with respect to βk to prove the existence of a pure strategy Nash
equilibrium (Debreu, 1952).
The proof of the quasi-concavity will use the derivatives of P (qI , βF ). Differ-
















chµ(r) + (ah − r)
] [
fD(q








I)− FD(qI − µ(r)) + FL(qI − µ(r))
]
− ahfD(qI) + (ah − r)+
[
fD(q















I)− fD(qI − µ(r)) + fL(qI − µ(r))
]
− ahf ′D(qI) + (ah − r)+
[
f ′D(q




By Lemma III.5, if σD ≤ σ∗D, we have qI max < µD. When qI < µD, and σD → 0,
all the distribution functions in (C.10)-(C.11) approach zero, except for FD(q
I), which
approaches one. Therefore, when σD is small, P 1 is close to −1/βF and P 11 is close
to zero.
Quasi-concavity of IG’s profit function. The profit function of IG i ∈ GI is
expressed as πi(βi; β−i, β
F ) in (3.20). To prove its quasi-concavity in βi, we will show
that its derivative ∂πi/∂βi can cross the zero value from above at most once as βi
increases, while holding β−i and β
F constant.
In (3.20), the function QI(βI , βF ) is used to emphasize the dependence of the ag-
gregate IG output qI on βI and βF . In what follows, we use qI to denote QI(βI , βF )
when no confusion will rise. Note that ∂qI/∂βi ≡ ∂QI/∂βi is given by (C.2). Differ-






















































where X(βi; β−i, β
F )
def
= 1 − ciβi +
(
βi(1 + ciβ−i) − β−i
)
P 1. To show ∂πi/∂βi can
cross zero value from above at most once, it suffices to show X decreases in βi.
Differentiating X with respect to βi,
∂X
∂βi
= −ci + (1 + ciβ−i)P 1 +
(






where P 11 is derived in (C.11). Note that −ci+(1+ciβ−i)P 1 < 0. Thus, if P 11(qI , βF )
is sufficiently small, we can establish ∂X/∂βi ≤ 0. Based on the discussion after
(C.10) and (C.11), there exists σ̂D, such that when σD < σ̂D, we have ∂X/∂βi ≤ 0
and, therefore, πi is quasi-concave in βi.
Quasi-concavity of FG’s profit function. Using the probability distribution in
















We will show that ∂πj/∂βj can cross the zero value at most once from above when
βj increases.
Differentiating πj with respect to βj and using ∂q







































] βIE [(D − qI)+]






(βF )3 (1− βIP 1)
[
Y (βj, β−j, β





























E [((D − qI)+)2]
.





(1− βIP 1) +
(β−j
βj







(βF )2 (1− βIP 1)
.
By the same argument used for the quasi-concavity of πi, we see that when σD is
sufficiently small, P 1 is close to −1/βF and P 11 is close to zero. Thus, there exists
σ̃D, such that when σD < σ̃D, we have ∂Y /∂βj ≤ 0.
































































βF (1− βIP 1)
)]
.
We will show that ψ(qI) is close to FD(q
I) when σD is sufficiently small and q
I < µD
to complete the proof.
















= ((µD − qI)2 + σ2D)FD(qI) + σ2D(µD − qI)fD(qI),
ψ(qI) =
[
(µD − qI)FD(qI) + σ2DfD(qI)
]2[
(µD − qI)2 + σ2D
]
FD(qI) + σ2D(µD − qI)fD(qI)
.
If σD ≤ σ∗D, we have qI max < µD (Lemma III.5). The above expression for ψ(qI)
implies that as σD → 0, we have FD(qI) → 1, fD(qI) → 0, and ψ(qI) → 1. Hence,
there exists σ†D, such that when σD < σ
†
D, we have ∂Z/∂βj ≤ 0.
To summarize, when σD < min{σ∗D, σ̂D, σ̃D, σ
†
D}, the profit function πj is quasi-
concave in βj. This establishes the existence of a pure strategy equilibrium, i.e., the
linear supply function equilibrium.
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C.2 SFE ODE Derivation for IG, FG, and VG model
We derive in this appendix the ODE that characterize the SFE for the problem
with the three generator types IG, FG, and VG. We first present the problem IGs and
FGs face and then find their equilibrium ODEs. The FG ODEs are found using two
different methods. The first method uses optimal control in which the optimal supply
function trajectory of every agent is chosen to satisfies the Euler-Lagrange condition.
The second method is the price control approach, which is widely used in the SFE
literature. Generators in the price approach method use the residual demand as their
supply functions and choose a price trajectory that maximizes their profit. We show
that these methods give the same SFE ODEs. We will assume that all IGs and FGs
have initial marginal costs C ′i(0) = a
I and C ′j(0) = a
F ). We also make the generator
rationality assume to ensure that the IG and FG supply functions produce nothing
when the price is below their initial marginal cost (i.e. Si(p) = 0 for p < a
I and
Sj(p) = 0 for p < a
F ).
To study their bidding strategies, we find the best response of every generator,
assuming all other generators’ supply functions are given. As a convention, we define
S−i(p)
def
= SI(p)− Si(p), and S−j(p)
def
= SF (p)− Sj(p).
C.2.1 IG Bidding Strategy
Knowing all FGs’ supply functions, generator i ∈ GI can compute the real-time
price P (qI , Lt,Wt, S
F ) in (3.6) and derive the average market price as a function of















Note that P (qI) decreases in qI . That is, the more IGs produce, the lower the average
real-time price, which also equals the price that IGs are paid because of the market-
clearing condition in (3.10). Hence, P (qI) is essentially an inverse demand function
facing IGs, and we can use the classical approach in Klemperer and Meyer (1989) to
find the equilibrium condition.
IG i can equivalently use the market-clearing price as a decision variable. If the
market-clearing price is p, then the total IG output is qI = P
−1
(p), and other IGs



















































, ∀ i ∈ GI . (C.12)
This is the classical equilibrium condition derived by Klemperer and Meyer (1989).
The difference is that the demand function in our setting is implied by FGs’ supply
functions. Hence, the last term in (C.12) captures how FGs’ decisions affect IGs’
supply functions.
C.2.2 FG Bidding Strategy
An individual FG j ∈ GF offers supply function Sj(p), knowing that Sj(p) has two
effects on the outcomes of the game. The first effect is that Sj(p) directly influences
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real-time prices P (q, Lt,Wt, S
F ) in (3.8). This effect captures the fact that FG j
directly competes with other FGs in satisfying the balance of the demand. This first
effect also changes the average price on the right hand side of (3.10), which affects the
market-clearing IG output rate qI∗ in (3.10). This second effect captures the fact that
FGs and IGs are also competing with each other. These two effects are intertwined
because the IG output qI∗ influences real-time price through (3.8) as well.
Recognizing the above effects, FG j decides its supply function Sj(p). We first
consider FG j choosing among all feasible supply functions that support a given qI as
the market-clearing IG output. Once a desired supply function is found to support
each qI , FG j will then optimize over qI .
For notational convenience, we define net demand as load minus VG capacity,
Dt
def
= Lt − Wt. Let the cumulative distribution function of Dt be FDt , and its
complement be FDt = 1 − FDt . Whenever the net demand Dt > qI , FGs must
produce exactly the remaining demand, Dt − qI > 0, and the real-time price pt must
satisfy
SF (pt) = Dt − qI > 0.
The above equation suggests that if FG j desires a market price pt > 0 when the net
demand is Dt, it must produce Dt − qI − S−j(pt) at price pt, which corresponds to
a point on its supply function. Hence, we can equivalently use pt as FG j’s decision
variable. FG j decides price pt > 0 for each level of net demand Dt > q
I , under the
constraint that the prices should support qI as the market-clearing IG output. That
is, the time-average real-time price should match SI
−1












Note that FG j makes price decision only when Dt > q
I . When Dt ≤ qI , the
real-time price is zero or negative, which is independent of any supply function, for


















− h′(qI +Wt − Lt)1A3 − r1A2 − h′(qI − Lt)1A1
]
dt. (C.14)






∣∣Dt > qI]FDt(qI)dt = TSI−1(qI)− P−(qI) ≡ g(qI). (C.15)
Hence, FG j’s problem is choose pt > 0 for each level of Dt > q
I so that the
expected positive price equals g(qI). This equality ensures that qI is indeed the
market-clearing IG output rate. Taking one step further, FG j chooses qI and pt












(Dt − qI − S−j(pt)








∣∣Dt > qI]FDt(qI)dt = g(qI),
where pt is implicitly a function of Dt. An FG can find its optimal decision by
satisfying the first order conditions of (C.16), and the system’s equilibrium conditions
can be attained by solving the system of ODEs given by (C.12) and the optimality
conditions for each FG from (C.16).
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Dt − qI − S−j(pt)
)∣∣Dt > qI]FDt(qI) dt+ ηj g(qI).
The first-order condition for pt is
(




pt − C ′j(Dt − qI − S−j(pt))
]
= 0.




, ∀ j ∈ GF . (C.17)











xSF ′(x)ψ(SF (x), qI) dx
∀ j ∈ GF , (C.18)
where





F (x) + qI)fDt(q
I)− f ′Dt(S




Two derivation of (C.18) are shown next; using the optimal control approach and
using the price control approach.
Optimal Control Approach
We can use the relation SF (pt) + q
I = Dt to get pt’s distribution Fpt(x) =
FDt(S
F (x) + qI) when pt > a
F . This makes fpt(x) = S
F ′(x)fDt(S
F (x) + qI) for
pt > a
F and Dt > q
I . Let b bet the price ceiling that corresponds to the maximum
demand. The probability that pt > a
























F (x) + qI)FDt(q
I) dt dx ⊥ ηj.































The partial derivative of the Lagrangian with respect to Sj is






F (x) + qI)FDt(q
I) dt






F (x) + qI)FDt(q
I) dt,
and the partial derivative of the Lagrangian with respect to S ′j is




F (x) + qI)FDt(q
I) dt.
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F (x) + qI)FDt(q
I) dt






F (x) + qI)FDt(q
I) dt.
















xSF ′(x)ψ(SF (x), qI) dx
,
where





F (x) + qI)fDt(q
I)− f ′Dt(S





In this approach, generator j sees a residual demand of Dt − qI − S−j(pt) in time
t, provided that Dt > q
I , and chooses pt to maximize his gain. If we denote by D the



















I) dt ⊥ ηj
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where the expectation is taken over the stochastic process Dt and pt is implicitly a











The first order condition for pt is
Dt − qI − S−j(pt)− ηj − S ′−j(pt)
(








We can derive ηj from the first order condition for q
I . The Lagrangian can be written












where p is an implicit function of y. The first order condition with respect to qI is

























We used the relations p = aF when y = qI and S−j(a
F ) = 0 in deriving this equation.










































We can now make a change of variables from y to p, where y = qI + SF (p) which





































































F (p) + qI)FDt(q
I) dt dp.

















F (p) + qI)FDt(q
I) dt dp.
By substituting S ′j(p) = S
F ′(p)− S ′−j(p) we can write
Sj(p) + S
′
j(p)(p− C ′j(Sj(p))) = Sj(p)− S ′−j(p)(p− C ′j(Sj(p))) + SF
′
(p)(p− C ′j(Sj(p)))








































F (p) + qI)FDt(q
I) dt dp.











































F (p) + qI)FDt(q








































D.1 Solving Linear SFEs
We solve Green’s (1996) affine SFE problem using Rudkevich (1999). In this
problem, the demand is assumed to be price elastic with the form D(p) = θ − bp,
where θ is a random demand shock and b is the price elasticity of the demand.





linear supply functions of the form Sk(p) = βk(p− αk). Rudkevich gives a procedure







In this procedure, we first find U ∈ (0, 1) that satisfies











where U is a market power index (market is competitive when U is close to 1 and





ε = bcM , and sk =
cM
ck















The Matlab function fsolve with a starting point of 1 can be used to solve for U .
D.2 Chapter IV Proofs
Proof of Lemma IV.2
Proof. The βk bids can be calculated using Equation (D.1) in Appendix D.1, where


















where U ′ = ∂U
∂ε




















(U ′ + 1)
(




Therefore, βk is increasing in b ∀ k ∈ G.
Proof of Theorem IV.3
Proof. Using the bid solution function B defined in (4.19), we can find the slope bids
for the AF problem βAFk for k ∈ G by solving B(G, 0). In other words, the set of
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∀ i ∈ GI .
Therefore, bids βAFj for j ∈ GF are the solution to B(GF , (βI)AF ) and the bids βAFi
for i ∈ GI are the solution to B(GI , (βF )AF ).
For the FI problem, we can get βFIj for j ∈ GF by solving B(GF , 0). Since
(βI)AF > 0, we can use Lemma IV.2 to concluded that βAFj > β
FI
j for j ∈ GF . This
also implies that (βF )AF > (βF )FI .
After finding (βI)FI , we can calculate βFIi for i ∈ GI by solving B(GI , (βF )FI).
Since (βF )AF > (βF )FI , we can use Lemma IV.2 again to show that βAFi > β
FI
i for




E.1 Chapter V Proofs
Proof of Theorem V.1
We will use the following distributions to derive the different term in (5.16).
P{B(j−1) ≤ bi < B(j)} =
(n− 1)!


































































Notice that P{B(0) > bi} = 0, and hence we could start the sum in A2’s formula from






















































l=j+1 PDl. In a MSNE, generators other than i mix their strategies





We will find the derivative of A1, A2, and A3 with respect to bi next and then combine

















(j − 1)!(n− j)!
(j − 1)F (bi)j−2F (bi)n−j





(j − 1)!(n− j)!







































(j − 1)!(n− j)!






(j − 1)!(n− j)!
(n− j)F (bi)j−1F (bi)n−j−1


























































(j − 1)!(n− j − 1)!
F (x)j−1F (x)n−j−1 = 0.












(j − 1)!(n− j − 1)!
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